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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1990s, decentralisation has acquired increasing 
popularity among governments and aid agencies. Today, it is hard 
to find a country that has not undergone the reform of its local 
government system. Since 2000, decentralisation has been heavily 
promoted by donors as an important tool to tackle extreme poverty 
and promote development. Despite this popularity, the pro-poor 
effects of decentralisation are not supported by unarguable 
evidence and the literature available offers, at best, a mixed picture. 
This study tries to contribute at filling this gap, using as case study 
a country, Zambia, which has been almost neglected by the 
literature on decentralisation. 
Key words: accountability, decentralisation, development policies, 
empowerment, fiscal decentralisation, local governance, 
participation, poverty, public services, Zambia. 
 
Sin dagli anni ’90, le politiche di decentramento hanno acquisito 
una crescente popolarità tra i governi e le principali organizzazioni 
internazionali allo sviluppo. E’ diventato ormai difficile trovare un 
governo che non abbia avviato una riforma in senso decentrato 
della macchina statale. Dal 2000, il decentramento è stato 
crescentemente promosso dai donors come uno strumento 
essenziale per alleviare la povertà e promuovere lo sviluppo 
economico. Tuttavia, nonostante la sua popolarità, la letteratura 
accademica è divisa nel valutare gli effetti del decentramento sulla 
povertà e ha indicato le criticità di tale legame. Questa tesi cerca di 
contribuire alla discussione accademica in corso attraverso 
l’analisi di due distretti in Zambia, un paese poco studiato nella 
letteratura sul tema. 
Parole chiave: accountability, decentramento, decentramento 
fiscale, empowerment, governo locale, partecipazione politica, 
politiche di sviluppo, povertà, servizi pubblici, Zambia. 
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Source: Nations Online Project. Retrieved from: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/zambia-political-map.jpg 
 
 
Figure 1: Republic of Zambia 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Decentralisation refers to the transfer of power and resources from the central 
units of government towards sub-national levels, either deconcentrated 
officials at local level responsive to their cabinet minister or elected local 
authorities accountable to the voter.   
Since the 1990s, decentralisation has acquired increasing popularity among 
governments and aid agencies. Today, it is hard to find a country that has not 
undergone the reform of its local government system (Connerley, Eaton & 
Smoke, 2010). In 1994, Dillinger (1994) estimated 12 out of 75 developing and 
transitional countries had initiated some form of decentralisation. 
Decentralisation has been often advocated by governments, aid agencies and 
civil society organisations as an unavoidable tool, used to reach a tremendous 
variety of goals, such as democracy, popular participation or an efficient social 
services delivery. A poignant example is reflected in the mission statement of 
the Zambian Ministry of Local Government and Housing states: 
“To promote a decentralised and democratic local government system 
and facilitate the provision of efficient and effective delivery of quality 
housing, infrastructure and social services by local authorities and 
other stakeholders for sustainable development”1. 
Since 2001, following the publication of the famous World Bank Report 
‘Attacking Poverty’, decentralisation has also been understood as a key policy 
for poverty alleviation. Therefore, decentralisation has been heavily promoted 
as an important tool among the strategies used to tackle extreme poverty and 
                                                             
 
1  Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) of Zambia. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mlgh.gov.zm/ (09/04/2013). 
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promote development2. Local governments are also indicated as key actors in 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For instance, in a web-
page dedicated to ‘participatory local development’, UNDP argues: 
“In supporting MDG localization - translating national MDGs so that 
they are relevant, applicable and attainable at the local level - UNDP 
recognizes the key role of subnational and local governments in putting 
plans into action and keeping national governments in touch with 
people's needs, progress made and challenges ahead”3.  
Despite this popularity, the pro-poor effects of decentralisation are not 
supported by unarguable evidence. The (limited) literature available on the 
last wave of decentralisation in development countries offers, at best, a mixed 
picture4. In the medium term, millions of persons will continue to live within a 
decentralised system (Connerley, Eaton & Smoke, 2010). Therefore, more 
academic studies, based on empirical data, are needed to highlight the links 
and understand the implications of decentralisation for the well-being of 
people in developing countries. 
This study tries to contribute at filling this gap, using as case study a country, 
Zambia, which has been almost neglected by the literature on decentralisation.  
This study is divided in seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
research questions, hypothesis and it clarifies and establishes the relevance of 
the study within the development discourse and academic literature. This 
latter will be reviewed in the second chapter, focusing on the main works 
available regarding the linkage between decentralisation and poverty 
alleviation. 
                                                             
 
2 According to Kaiser (2006), during the period from 1995 to 2005, 135 out of 511 development 
initiatives approved by the World Bank where directly linked with decentralization policies. See also 
the famous World Bank Development Report, titled ‘Attacking Poverty’, published in 2001.  
3 Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/povertyreduction/focus_are
as/focus_local_development/ (09/04/2013). An additional page on UNDP’s website is also dedicated t
o ‘MDGs Localisation’. 
4 For an insightful analysis of the last decentralization experiences, see: Agrawal and Ribot (1999); Bird 
and Rodriguez, 1999; Bossuyt and Gould, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Jonhson, 2001; Crook, 
2003; Smoke, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Jütting and Kaufmann, 2004; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Steiner, 
2007; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Treisman, 2007; Linder, 2010; Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 
(2010), Sepulveda and Martinez-Vasquez, 2011. 
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The third chapter explains the conceptual framework used in the analysis of 
decentralisation in Zambia while the forth will outline the methodology 
followed for data collection and analysis.  
Chapter five introduces the legal framework of the local governance system in 
Zambia today, taking into consideration the political, administrative and fiscal 
regulations. Given the long Zambian tradition in terms of local governance, its 
evolution is briefly outlined in order to better understand some of the 
mechanism visible in the current functioning of the local institutions. 
Finally, chapter six and seven describe the main outcomes of the research, on 
the political and socio-economic dimension. The political dimension – 
‘empowerment’ – is analysed through three main variables: participation, 
representation and political accountability. The socio-economic dimension will 
be mainly studied through the analysis of the households’ income and their 
access to public services.  
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1  C h a p t e r  
THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
1.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this study is to analyse if and how decentralisation policies 
initiated in the 1990s have had a positive impact on alleviating poverty in two 
rural districts in Zambia. In line with the current development discourse, we 
accept the current understanding of poverty and decentralisation as ‘multi-
dimensional’ concepts. On the one hand, poverty is defined for the purposes of 
this research and maintains the current working definition as 
“the result of economic, political, and social processes that interact with 
each other and frequently reinforce each other in ways that exacerbate 
the deprivation in which poor people live” (World Bank, 2001: 1). 
On the other hand, decentralisation, defined as the transfer of power and 
resources from the central units of government towards sub-national levels, 
has huge effects across a country’s economy, political structures and society 
(Steiner, 2007; Jütting et al, 2005; Eaton and Connerly, 2010). Therefore, both 
the political and socio-economic mechanisms of this linkage will be analysed, 
using two main dimensions:  
- Political dimension (through ‘empowerment’) 
- Socio-economic channel (‘through increased ‘efficiency’ and 
‘targeting’). 
The academic evidence already available seems to disagree or at least to be 
cautious in supporting this linkage. In the opinion of Steiner: “There is no 
30 
automatism in decentralization bringing about the expected outcomes” (2005: 
6). 
This study attempts to provide additional evidence on the pro-poor outcomes 
of decentralisation policies as claimed by the donors’ or governments’ 
discourse and to challenge this automatism. To do so, a theoretical framework 
linking decentralisation and poverty alleviation will be used. It is inspired by 
Jütting et al. (OECD, 2004), Steiner (2007), Crawford (2008), Asante and Ayee 
(2008). In addition, this research with make use of a previous field work in 
Mali (Serrenti, 2012) and different field works undertaken by the researcher in 
different African countries over the last 3 years5. The use of these combined 
complimentary approaches will increase the assessment of outcomes allowing 
for a comparative prospective, further linking the research’s results with 
previous academic work.  
Specific objectives of this study are therefore to investigate, on the one hand, if 
and how decentralisation had a positive impact in empowering the populace 
and namely the poorest and most marginalised groups in Zambia. On the other, 
to understand if and how the local government in Zambia, as reshaped by the 
Local Government Act in 1991, has been able to provide a more efficient and an 
increased number of services or development projects to the communities, 
targeting the most vulnerable groups. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
This study attempts to address the following research questions. The sub-
questions are divided according to two main level of analysis: on the one hand, 
a ‘macro level’ – understood as the goals of the local government reform – is 
investigated, focusing on the nature and features of the local-central 
interactions created by the decentralised system. On the other hand, the 
                                                             
 
5 The countries include Kenya, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Mali and Ethiopia. 
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‘micro-level’ which addresses the two main dimensions in the relation between 
decentralisation and poverty:  the political and socio-economic dimension. 
A. General question:  
1. Do decentralisation policies have pro-poor effects in Zambia?  
B. Sub-questions (I): macro level 
2. Which are the main goals of the last decentralisation reform – as reshaped with 
the LG Act in 1991 and the Decentralisation Policy (2009) – and the main 
institutional features of the Zambian local government system? 
C. Sub-questions (II): micro level 
3. Does the functioning of the local institutions in Zambia allow for the 
empowerment and the inclusion of the poorest in the decision-making? 
- Has decentralisation increased popular participation of Zambian’s 
living in rural areas in public affairs? 
- Has decentralisation created better opportunities for people, 
especially the poorest and most vulnerable or marginalised, to be 
represented within the local government institutions? 
- Has decentralisation created or improved accountability mechanisms 
at the local government level, therefore facilitating responsive elected 
councillors to the needs of local residents? 
4. Has decentralisation helped local institutions in Zambia to undertake local 
development initiatives and create opportunities to support households’ income 
in the last 5 years? 
- Do rural local councils in Zambia have an impact (positive or negative) 
on the households’ income? 
- Are local councils able to create opportunities to improve the 
economic situation of the residents? 
 
5. Has decentralisation allowed local institutions in Zambia to provide a better 
access to public services (ex.: water, education, etc.) especially to the poorest and 
most vulnerable groups? 
- Which is the impact of the development initiatives undertaken by the 
local councils in Zambia on the different wealth groups (ex: ‘poor’, 
‘rich’, average’)? 
- Which is the local perception on the local government performance?  
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1.3 Research Hypothesis  
A. General hypothesis:  
1. Decentralisation may have pro-poor outcomes but at a very limited extent. 
B. Sub-questions (I): macro level 
2. Decentralisation in Zambia has been mainly by ‘default’ and not ‘by design’: 
international pressures have had a leading role in the creation of the local 
government and sub-district structures but a lack of governmental commitment 
has hindered its full implementation 
C. Sub-questions (II): micro level 
3. Decentralisation has facilitated the inclusion of the community but the lack of 
solid accountability mechanisms and the weakness of district and sub-district 
structures hinder full empowerment of the poorest and most marginalised groups 
in the society. 
4. Decentralisation is used by central elites to keep or strengthen their electoral 
power at the grassroots and by local elites to attract the resources available for 
development projects. 
5. Decentralisation in Zambia has helped to undertake local development initiatives 
and provide services for the benefit of the most vulnerable but only to a limited 
extent. 
6. The limited impact on poverty alleviation in terms of development initiatives and 
provision of social services is mainly due to the lack of real financial autonomy 
and a persistent lack of capacities at local level. 
 
 
1.4 Relevance of the Research 
Decentralisation policies have reached great relevance in the last two decades. 
Most of the developing but also developed countries have been introducing (or 
at least, discussing) different forms of decentralisation as a means to reach 
different ends such as popular participation, increased accountability, higher 
access to service delivery, or poverty alleviation. 
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First, today elected local governments are often important centres of political 
power and policy formulation, vested with of a wide range of responsibilities 
related to the provision of public services such as water supply, health, 
education, etc. (ICHRP, 2005). Also, the economic and political pressures that 
have determined the current decentralisation wave, are still in place and it is 
expected that in “the short to medium term we will continue to live in a 
decentralising area” (Snyder, 2001 quoted by Eaton and Connerly, 2010: 3). 
Moreover, especially in previously highly centralised countries, these reforms 
have huge effects across a country’s economy, political structures and society, 
which explain the importance for deepening our understanding of the current 
reforms (Eaton and Connerly, 2010. Crawford and Hartman, 2008). 
Second, scholars have created an impressive stock of literature on specific 
aspects of decentralisation (political, administrative, fiscal, impacts of 
decentralisation of some public goods or services as health, education, etc.). 
However, despite the current popularity of decentralisation, there are still few 
works analysing the impact of the last wave of decentralisation reforms on 
poverty alleviation. More studies are needed to understand the functioning of 
local government institutions and their role in improving social well-being 
(Bossuyt and Gould, 2000). 
Third, drawing on the literature available, there is seemingly unfounded trust 
on the pro-poor effects of decentralisation policies.  Individual country and 
cross-country case studies draw a quite variegated picture, where successful 
reforms cohabit with quite negative experiences6. This is coherent with the 
nature of decentralisation that “does not occur in general but rather in a 
particular context, so that decentralisation takes many different forms in 
different countries at different times” (Bird and Rodriguez, 1999: 299). 
Therefore, this analysis attempts to contribute to the larger understanding of 
                                                             
 
6 The literature indicates the state of West Bengal in India as an example of positive impact of 
decentralization policies on poverty alleviation (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). However, most recent 
cross-country studies show a mixed or negative scenario (among others, see: Jütting et al., 2005). 
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the decentralisation outcomes on poverty reduction using the experience of 
the last two decades in Zambia. 
Fourth, most of the literature available has been either directly funded by 
international institutions as the World Bank, USAID or other governmental or 
non-governmental agencies, that have also been the main supporters of 
decentralisation in the last decades (Conyers, 1984)7. Also, many studies use 
only secondary literature, with still few using an empirical approach, with data 
collected during extensive field work8. The intent of this study tries is to fill 
this gap, using data collected during three different visits in Zambia between 
2011 and 2013. 
Moreover, this research introduces an original methodological approach to 
address the topic of this study. On the one side, the analysis moves from a 
locally defined conception of ‘poor’, ‘average’ and ‘rich’. On the other side, 
mixed method research and participatory tools are used in order to 
understand the impact of local institutions on poverty alleviation in the two 
selected Zambian districts. From my knowledge, in the literature on 
decentralisation, this represents a completely new and innovative approach.  
Fifth, only a few countries have been particularly popular and featured in the 
literature on decentralisation and it overall impacts on local communities: 
Ghana, Uganda, West Bengal (India), China are a few examples. Although 
interesting and relevant, the works focusing on Indian and Chinese 
states/provinces cannot be used as benchmark for other countries given their 
unique characteristics in term of social, political and economic culture. Ghana 
and Uganda, and to some extent Kenya, have been ‘over-studied” by the 
literature in the last fifteen years as they witnessed the most far-reaching 
                                                             
 
7 As noticed by Conyers (1984), this body of literature tends to assume a prescriptive and descriptive 
approach and it is often linked to technical assistance or consultancy work. 
8 On the donors’ side, many publications and evaluations are available as World Bank (2008a,b), OECD 
(1995) or European Commission (2007). Some popular cross-country studies on the linkage between 
decentralization and poverty reduction use secondary literature as Jütting et al. (2004 and 2005) and 
Crook & Sverrisson (2001).  
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decentralisation reforms. However, it is now time to focus on the experience of 
other countries that have tried to follow the same reform trajectory. Zambia 
has been largely left out of the discourse of academic literature which, in the 
last years, have mainly focused on health issues (ex.: HIV-AIDS) or economic 
topics (ex.: liberalisation, mines, trade unions, etc.)9. Very limited literature is 
available on other academic disciplines (ex.: history, anthropology, etc.) and 
studies on the evolution and current features of the local government 
structures are almost absent10.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
9 In her literature review on decentralization, Conyers (1984) argued some countries had received much 
attention by the literature, namely India and Nigeria, followed by Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya and Sudan. Zambia up to 1983 had been the focus of almost 20 studies. 
10  A remarkable exception is the well documented book by Gewald, Hinfelaar and Macola (ed.) (2008) on 
some aspects of the Zambian post-colonial history, mainly the political dissent, the public role of 
religion, and some political and economic issues during the Third Republic. Also, the last important 
works analyzing the Zambian political and administrative features date often back to the ‘90s, when 
the end of the single-party regime and the beginning of the multiparty Third Republic attracted much 
attention by the academic literature (see: Gulhati, 1991; Bjornlund and Bratton, 1992; Ndulo and Kent, 
1996; Carcangiu, 1998; Bratton, 1999; Barlett, 2000; Burnell, 2001, 2002a/b; McDonagh, 2002; Gould, 
2006; Burnell, 2006). 
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2  C h a p t e r  
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Today, decentralisation is a widespread phenomenon that involves and takes 
place in most of the countries, not only in Africa, but also in Asia, Latin America 
and Europe (Crook and Manor, 1998; Eaton and Connerley, 2010; ICHRP 2005; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). As Treisman put it, with an ironic tone: 
“For anyone who might not yet have noticed, political decentralization 
is in fashion. (…) It is hard to think of any other constitutional feature – 
except perhaps democracy itself – that could win praise from both Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush, Newt Gingrich and Jerry Brown, François 
Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac, Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox, Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin” (2007:1). 
However, decentralisation and the debate on local government are not new 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Decentralisation experiences in Africa are rooted in 
colonial history and since then, they have passed through different waves of 
popularity, following a ‘pendulum model’ between centralisation and 
decentralisation (Mawhood, 1983).  
Since independence, in African states and in many other developing countries, 
“political actors have embraced decentralisation as a means towards many 
different ends. (…) More specifically, three overarching goals: democracy, 
economic development and public security, have convinced governmental and 
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nongovernmental actors around the world to support decentralisation” 
(Connerley, Eaton, & Smoke, 2010: 1)11.  
Not surprisingly, it has generated vast literature on various aspects of 
decentralisation, involving different academic traditions and concepts12 . 
However, Bardhan in 2012 has argued that “The literature on decentralisation 
in the context of development is still in its infancy” (2012: 203). To review this 
immense literature is not an easy task. Decentralisation is a complex 
phenomenon that has widespread effects on different levels of a country’s 
system and not only within the institutional legal framework (Olowu, 2001). 
For instance, it may change the power relations between and within the central 
and local institutions; it may influence the citizens’ approach and involvement 
in politics and public affairs; or it may alter the pattern of production and 
distribution of public services. Not surprisingly, different academic schools and 
traditions have studied the past and current waves of decentralisation: in 
particular, public administration and legal studies, political science, sociology, 
political economy, anthropology (Conyers, 1986)13. Moreover, although a wide 
                                                             
 
11 For instance, Eaton and Connerley (2010) indicate Brazil, the Philippines, and South Africa as moved 
by democratic concerns; China, Chile, and Vietnam by economic goals; Colombia, Ethiopia, and Sudan 
as a mean to settle internal armed conflicts.  
12 Some scholars have tried to review the trends in the literature on decentralization. In particular: 
Conyers (1984) offers a review of the literature on following what she identifies as the main cleavages 
(or ‘scopes’) in the literature: temporal, topical and geographical scopes. In a more recent paper, 
Conyers (2007) offers a critical discussion on the most relevant literature produced on the linkage 
between decentralization and service delivery. See also, Rondinelli et al. (1989), Cheema and 
Rondinelli (2007, especially chapter 1), and White, 2011. 
13 Conyers offers an insight of the “disciplinary origins” of the concept and have noticed a lack of 
coordination and the tendency for each discipline to use “their own ‘languages’ (1984: 190-191). A 
major challenge for scholars and development practitioners is “the need to scan a vast amount of 
literature, including material which is of peripheral – but nevertheless significant – interest. For 
example, there are volumes of literature on popular participation and community development, rural 
development management, regional development planning and organization design which are not 
primarily concerned with decentralization but include relevant and useful ideas and information” 
(Ibid.: 191). In addition, it is interesting to note that, not surprisingly, from this review of the literature 
emerges how the popularity of decentralization in the academia is strictly linked to the ‘waves’ of 
decentralization (see: heading 3 in this chapter). In fact, a first group of major contributions emerged 
in the ‘60s, following the first attempts to establish ‘decentralised’ local government structures after 
the Second World War (see: Maddock, 1963: ‘Democracy, Decentralisation and Development’; Fesler, 
1965: ‘Approaches to the understanding of decentralisation’; Alderfer, 1964: ‘Local Government in 
Developing Countries’; and Ursula Hicks, 1961: ‘Development form Below: Local Government and Finance 
in Developing Countries of the Commonwealth’). A second group of studies emerges in the ‘80s, as a 
result of the new local government experiments initiated in the ‘70s by many developing governments 
and development agencies (see: Conyers 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1986; Mawhood, 1983; Rondinelli, 
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range of literature is available, it is often “complex, inconsistent, and 
conflicting” (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: 3). 
This chapter is divided in three parts. The intension is to understand the main 
discussions and results that have emerged in the literature over the past 
decades. First, we will try to understand the meaning of ‘decentralisation’ and 
to review the different types that have been proposed and discussed over the 
past decades.  
Second, given that usually decentralisation is initiated not as an end in itself 
but to reach other goals, we accept that “since decentralisation is successful 
only when it succeeds in promoting this ends, it should be judged accordingly” 
(Eaton and Connerley, 2010: 2)14.  
However, these goals (democracy, economic development and public security) 
have emerged in different historical periods and they have experienced 
various cycles of popularity and understanding both in the academia and 
within the practice of governments and aid agencies. This evolution is strictly 
connected to the dramatic challenges imposed by the state-building and 
economic goals pursued by African states in the post-independence period, 
and also by the role played by the international development agencies. 
Therefore, in the second part of this chapter, we will briefly focus on the goals 
and evolution of academic and governmental support to decentralisation in the 
period between the 1960s and the 1990s.  
During the 1990s a new wave of decentralisation started, mainly triggered by 
two main phenomena: the emergence of what Huntington (1991) called the 
‘third wave’ of democratisation; and the failure of development policies that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
1981; Rondinelli, 1982; Rondinelli et al., 1983). Finally, more a more recent group of studies emerged 
in the ‘90s with the last wave of reforms (Crook & Manor, 1998; Rao, Bird & Litvack, 1998; Bird & 
Rodriguez, 1999; Manor, 1999; Bossuyt, 2000; Crook & Sverrisson, 2001; Johnson, 2001; Von Braun & 
Grote, 2002; Crook, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Jütting et al. 2005;  Steiner, 2007; Crawford and 
Hartmann (Eds.), 2008; Connerley, Smoke & Eaton, 2010). 
14 A similar approach in the discussion on decentralization is also used by Asante & Ayee (2008); Olowu 
(2001); Olowu and Smoke (1992). 
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were pursued by the Washington consensus through the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs). 
This last ‘decentralisation wave’ is quantitatively and qualitatively different 
from the previous one. As already mentioned, the geographical scope of this 
wave is completely new and it has not a similar reference in the past. Today 
almost everywhere in the world governments are implementing some kind of 
decentralisation reform, or they are at least talking about it. 
Also, the ‘quality’ of this wave is different. In fact, decentralisation has emerged 
in the same period as a key reform within the international development 
policies. However, the pursued goals have gradually evolved. If in the 1990s 
‘democracy’ is the key word for new local government experiments, in 2000 
‘development’, ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘conflict management’ also emerged, 
following new international development strategies as designed by the World 
Bank famous report ‘Attacking Poverty’ (World Bank, 2001). 
Finally, in the last part of this chapter, will attempt to provide a critical review 
of the results suggested by the literature on the last wave of decentralisation.  
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2 CONCEPTS AND TYPES 
2.1 Definition 
The ‘object’ decentralization is not easy to define as it has been applied over 
the last decades by governments, development agencies and scholars to 
identify a variety of policies. Scholars in the 1980s seem to agree on the ‘vague’ 
understanding of decentralization both in the academia and among the 
governments and also on the need for further clarification of this concept 
(Adamolekun, 1991). For instance, Conyers has argued that “everyone knows 
roughly what ‘decentralisation’ means, but defining it precisely presents 
problems because it can be used in a number of different ways and in 
significantly different contexts” (1984: 187) 15 . Still in the 2000, 
decentralisation was defined as “highly political” (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000: 2) 
and “slippery” (Bird, 1995 as quoted by Olowu, 2001: 2). 
Despite this assumption, many scholars tried to provide a definition of 
decentralization, in order to clarify its meaning and facilitate analysis16. 
Rondinelli broadly defined it as 
“the transfer or delegation of legal and political authority to plan, make 
decisions and manage public functions from the central government 
and its agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous 
public corporations, area wide or regional development authorities; 
functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or 
nongovernmental organizations” (1981: 137)17. 
In a following paper that appeared in the review Development and Change, this 
definition was further expanded to include “a situation in which public goods 
                                                             
 
15 This idea has been also supported by other scholars in the same period: Mawhood (1983); 
Adamolekum in 1991 still has talked about “confusion over definition” (1991: 185) and Bardhan in 
2002 has stressed: “different people mean different things by decentralization” (2002: 186). For a list 
of definitions on decentralization and its different types, see: UNDP, 1999. Dubois & Fattore (2009) 
have recently offered an interesting critical review of the evolution of this concept. 
16 This need is strictly linked with the ‘second wave of decentralisation’ in the ‘70s and early ‘80s.  
17 Another influential work is “Decentralisation: the territorial dimension of the state”, where Smith 
defines decentralization as “reversing the concentration of administration at a single centre and 
conferring powers on local government” (Smith, 1985 quoted by Asante & Ayee, 2008: 2). 
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and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of 
individuals by market mechanisms” (Rondinelli et al., 1989: 59). This approach 
was strongly criticized by Slater who has argued it is weak and mainly at the 
service of the neo-liberal discourse of the international institutions. They were 
probably both right as it is true that many countries that have implemented 
decentralization reforms in the late 1970s and 1980s were moved pre-
eminently by economic reasons, pushed by the international development 
institutions as the World Bank18. 
However, this academic dispute between Rondinelli and Slater is interesting 
because it highlights a defining issue within decentralization which is linked to 
the ‘feelings’ usually attached to it or, to use Conyers’s words “much of the 
terminology associated to decentralization has emotive overtones” (1986: 
595). This ‘emotional’ approach to decentralization has become even stronger 
since the 1990s, when decentralization gained a new momentum following 
dramatic political changes that affected many developing countries, especially 
in Africa.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the main goals of local government reforms, 
which were pursued by governments and so enthusiastically supported by the 
international development agencies, were reflected in the definitions given by 
a new set of scholars. The concept of ‘democratic decentralisation’ acquired 
momentum and it provided the basis for a rich academic literature19. Thus, 
decentralisation is described as a “transfer of power away from a central 
authority to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy (Crook and Manor, 1999: 6) 
characterized by an “increase in the scope and depth of subordinate group 
participation in authoritative resource allocation” (Heller, 2001: 133)20. 
                                                             
 
18 See headings 3 and 4 in this same chapter. 
19 For an insightful analysis on democratic decentralization, see: Crook and Manor (1998); Manor (1999); 
Ribot, 2002; Vedeld, 2003; Olowu and Wunsch (2004); Chikulo (2010); Dauda (2006). Heller (2001) 
and Linder (2010).  
20 Democratic decentralization is used as synonymous of ‘devolution’, a specific type of decentralization 
emerged in the ‘90s (see, heading 2.2 in this chapter). 
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Although the term decentralization can still be considered as broadly 
embracing different types of ‘power transfer’ from central to local units or 
governments, today it is more often associated with concepts titled:  
‘devolution’ or ‘democratic’21. These two words are often used synonymously 
by governments, development agencies and practitioners to describe aspects 
of decentralisation.  
 
2.2 Types 
Given the broad definition commonly associated with the term 
‘decentralisation’, the scholars and developmental practitioners have tried to 
better define it, introducing typologies able to identify the main ‘shapes’ 
decentralisation can take22.  
Starting from Rondinelli (1981), a first distinction is made between ‘functional’ 
and ‘areal’ decentralisation to distinguish whether the transfer of powers and 
responsibility focuses on the tasks and activities or on the territorial unit23. 
Originally, Rondinelli (1981) proposed a distinction based on the ‘degrees’ of 
decentralization, starting from ‘deconcentration’ (the lowest degree), 
‘delegation’ and ‘devolution’ (the highest degree of decentralization). 
Deconcentration is defined as the “least extensive form of decentralisation”, 
which involves at minimum the transfer of workload “from central government 
ministry headquarters to staff located in offices outside of the national capital, 
and the staff may not be given the authority to decide how those functions are 
                                                             
 
21 See Heading 2.2 of this chapter for an insightful discussion on the typologies of decentralization 
proposed by the scholars in the last decades. 
22 Mawhood argues that the controversy on the notion of decentralisation has emerged quite recently in 
the literature and it is mainly linked to the early works of “Fesler, Hanson and Maddick” (1993: 2). 
23 Precisely, ‘functional’ decentralization is defined as “the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks 
or activities to specialized organizations that operate nationally or at least across local jurisdictions” 
(Rondinelli, 1981: 137). The ‘areal’ decentralization is defined as “primarily aimed at transferring 
responsibility for public functions to organizations within well defined sub-national spatial or political 
boundaries” (ibidem, 1981: 137). 
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to be performed” (Rondinelli, 1981: 137)24-25. Delegation is the “delegation of 
decision-making and management authority for specific functions to 
organisations that are only under the indirect control of central government 
ministries” (Rondinelli, 1981: 138). Finally, devolution represents the highest 
degree of decentralisation and indicates a situation where local authorities are 
legally created, have the authority within “recognised geographical 
boundaries”, have the “power to raise sufficient resources” and they are “given 
autonomy and independence (…) over which central authorities exercise little 
or no direct control” (Rondinelli, 1981: 138). Rondinelli has subsequently 
specified this classification, adding ‘privatisation’ that occurs when 
“governments have divested themselves of responsibility for functions and 
have either transferred them to voluntary organisations or allowed them to be 
performed by private enterprises” (Rondinelli et al., 1983: 28)26. 
In his work on ‘Decentralisation: the way forward for rural development’, Parker 
has also introduced a different typology based on the following dimensions: 
political, fiscal and institutional. In a political form of decentralisation the focus 
is on “increasing public participation through citizens' active engagement in 
public institutions” and where an active commitment of the government is 
required (1995: 23). ‘Fiscal decentralization’ indicates the need for local 
institutions to have appropriate resources “to cover the costs of providing 
                                                             
 
24 This extreme form of deconcentration is controversial. It represents the minimum amount of 
decentralization as it actually translates in ‘centralisation’ of power. Manor has accepted this 
definition, however he has better elaborated this point: “When deconcentration occurs in isolation, or 
when it occurs together with fiscal decentralization but without simultaneous democratization - that is, 
when agents of higher levels of government move into lower level arenas but remain accountable only 
to persons higher up in the system - it enables central authority to penetrate more effectively into 
those arenas without increasing the influence of organized interests at those levels. The central 
government is not giving up any authority. It is simply relocating its officers at different levels or 
points in the national territory. In such circumstances, it tends in practice to constitute centralization 
(…)” (1999: 5). A similar form of decentralization has been experienced in Zambia in the ‘80s when the 
local government system was reshaped under the Local Administration Act in 1981 (see: chapter 5). 
25 The type ‘deconcentration’ was also subdivided in ‘field’ and ‘local’ administration’: the first involves 
the “transfer of decision-making discretion to field staff”; the second indicates that at local level the 
different ministry line agents are also responsible at district, provincial or regional level to a 
representative appointed usually by the Ministry of Interior of Local Government. The local 
administration may be ‘integrated’ or ‘unintegrated’, depending on the status of the ministry and local 
officials (Rondinelli, 1981: 137-138). 
26 See also Adamolekun, (1991), Agrawal and Ribot (1999). 
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rural public good and services” and they can have the form of locally-generated 
resources; transfers from higher-level institutions; and resources from 
borrowing” (1995: 28)27. Finally, ‘Institutional decentralisation’ is used to refer 
how different institutions are actually involved in the decentralization 
programme. Here a variety of institutions may be concerned (state institutions, 
civil society, etc.) and a legal framework applied.  
Manor (1999) has simplified these first attempts and introduced a 
classification still used today: ‘deconcentration’ (or administrative 
decentralisation), ‘devolution’ (or political / democratic decentralisation), and 
‘fiscal decentralisation’28. 
Deconcentration is the “dispersal of agents of higher levels of government into 
lower level arenas” (Manor, 1999: 5) and it refers to what Parker (1995) has 
called ‘administrative decentralisation’ 29 . Devolution (or political 
decentralization) is defined as “transfer of resources and power to lower level 
authorities which are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of 
government, and which are democratic in some way and to some degree” 
(Manor, 1999: 6). Finally, ‘fiscal decentralisation’ is used as in Parker (1995) to 
refer to “downward fiscal transfers, by which higher levels in a system cede 
                                                             
 
27 Some authors refer also to ‘market’ to identify the same concept (Cohen and Peterson, 1999). 
28 Interestingly, this classification recalls the approach used in classic definitions (used during the 
colonial period), where ‘deconcentration’ was characterized by the following elements: presence of 
ministry line officials at local level, performing specific tasks as dictated by and under the supervision 
of the central authority. On the other side, ‘decentralisation’ entailed the presence of local political 
structures separated and independent from the central government, with the power to take and 
implement decisions, within a limited area and with its own financial autonomy (Mawhood, 1993: 1-4).  
29 See Cohen and Peterson (1999) for an insightful analysis on administrative decentralization. See also 
Ribot (2002). 
Figure 2: Forms of decentralisation 
 
Source: Steiner (2005:10) 
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influence over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels” of government 
either in the form of deconcentrated civil servants or appointed bureaucrats 
(Manor, 1999: 6). However, some have argued that fiscal decentralization is 
not a type per se but it is a transversal concept that refers to both 
deconcentration and devolution (Ribot, 2002). Despite this minor debate, this 
typology is today widely accepted30. 
Finally, as already mentioned, since the 1990s, the emergence of ‘democratic 
decentralisation’ followed the democratic shift experienced by many political 
regimes during that decade. Democratic decentralization refers to the concept 
of ‘devolution’ and ‘political decentralisation’ but it stresses the democratic 
feature of the local agency to which the power is transferred: a council elected 
through free, fair and regular elections, downwardly accountable to the voters 
(Ribot, 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998; Johnson, 2001; Vedeld, 2003).  
The concept of ‘democratic decentralisation’ as emerged in the 1990s 
highlights that the evolution of this notion is strictly linked on the one hand, to 
political and developmental challenges that the newly independent states 
faced since the 1960s. And, on the other, a major role has been played by 
national and international development agencies that have regularly put 
‘decentralisation’ (or some type of it) up in their agenda during the last 
decades. Keeping these actors in mind, this will be focus of the analysis in the 
following pages. 
 
  
                                                             
 
30 The last major works on decentralization all refer to this typology. See: Crook and Manor, 2000; Olowu 
and Wunsch, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Treisman, 2007; 
Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Connerley, Eaton and Smoke, 2010. Schneider (2003) has also offered 
an analysis on how to measure these different forms of decentralisation. 
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3 WHY IS DECENTRALISATION SO POPULAR? 
Decentralisation is not a new concept in the debate on local administration in 
Africa (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). On the contrary, decentralisation is rooted in 
colonial history and since then, it has passed through different waves of 
popularity, following a ‘pendulum model’ between centralisation and 
decentralisation (Mawhood, 1983). An historical review of decentralisation in 
Africa is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, a brief evaluation of its 
waves of popularity in the last decades is needed to clarify the academic 
debate31. 
To my knowledge, Olowu & Wunsch (2004) have offered the most advanced 
and precise review of the history of African decentralisation and the following 
analysis makes constant reference to their work. Their identification of four 
phases in the African experience is accepted here as it emphasizes the different 
phases of its popularity among African governments and aid agencies during 
the first 30 years of independence. Their review also better represents what 
Mawhood has labelled “pendulum model” to indicate the “swings into favour 
and out again” (1983: 8) of decentralisation and identifies the shift between 
decentralisation and centralisation as one of the main features of the 
construction and evolution of African independent states32.  
 
  
                                                             
 
31 The aim here is to highlight the goals and claims that played as driving forces in the implementation of 
decentralisation policies in Africa and, more generally, in the developing countries31. In fact, some of 
the driving forces that shaped the first decentralisation experiences until the late ‘80s and their results 
had an important role in shaping the features of the last wave of local government reforms, which 
started in the ‘90s. This review concerns mainly the African experience. However, examples from other 
Latin American or Asian countries may also be included. In fact, as it will emerge during the discussion, 
some driving-forces of decentralization were similar for many developing countries and not specific of 
the African experience. 
32 Mawhood borrowed and developed the concept of the ‘pendulum swing’ from an earlier work by 
Wraith, R. (1972). Local Administration in West Africa. London: Allen and Unwin. 
48 
3.1 The Pendulum Swings In and Out 
Many authors indicate period between the end of World War II and the 
beginning of the independence as the first phase in the history of 
decentralisation in Africa (Mawhood, 1983; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). 
World War II shifted the previous international equilibrium and completely 
rewrote the rules on which the national governments and the international 
system laid on. In fact, in the aftermath of the War, France and the UK were 
subject to political, economic and ideological pressures that imposed an urgent 
revision in their approach towards the colonies (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004)33. 
Therefore, a first wave of decentralisation in Africa started, aimed at improving 
the efficiency in delivering the public services and at increasing the 
participation of the local African elite in the public decision-making. 
Therefore, in the 1950s, African colonies went through a major administrative 
restyling. In British African colonies, the local governments were partly or fully 
democratised, allowing local representatives to represent the native interests. 
The same trend became visible in the French colonies: the system of communes 
already established before the World War II was ‘upgraded’ and, in 1955, 
forty-four more cities in West Africa acquired the status of ville (Hesserling, 
1985). 
The late colonial period has been defined by some as the ‘golden age’ of local 
administration in Africa (Olowu, 1989). In fact, at independence, the African 
states inherited a system characterised by: 
                                                             
 
33 On the political side, the colonies had provided a tremendous support during the war in terms of 
human lives and commodities. In many cases, the colonial administration ‘bought’ the support of the 
growing African leaders with the promise of increased autonomy and involvement of the subjects into 
the colonial administration. Economically, the colonies were also increasingly perceived by the 
European civil society as an intolerable burden that was diverting huge amount of resources that could 
have been employed to finance the reconstruction’s efforts at the end of the World War II. Finally, 
ideologically, the colonies appeared completely outdated. In fact, the war against authoritarian regimes 
and the crimes perpetuated under the imperialist Nazi-fascist flag provoked the emergence of the new 
concept of self-determination and the right to independence (Parker & Rathbone, 2007; Calchi Novati 
& Valsecchi, 2005; Meredith, 2005). 
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- “A tradition of elected councils 
- A well-defined local tax system (ranging from per capita flat 
rates in most places to graduated personal rates in East Africa, 
and the beginning of a property/land tax in the major urban 
centres). 
- Involvement of local governments in a range of minimal 
infrastructures services: especially in education, health and 
sanitation, rural roads and water supply, agricultural extension 
services, and natural resources management – all of these with 
carefully articulated grant systems from the central government. 
- Involvement of municipal governments in major capital 
investment activities and the rural governments in cooperatives 
and community development activities”. (Mawhood and Davey, 
1980 as cited by Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 32). 
However, in this system, local governments were mere “tools of administrative 
management” and a real democratic effort was not made (Ribot, 2002: 5). 
Nevertheless, one major effect of the reshaped local administration was the 
emergence of a stronger African elite: leaders such as Senghor or Kenneth 
Kaunda, who lead their countries toward independence, started their political 
career in the local governments and climbed the political ladder, reaching 
prestigious positions as MPs or ministers at the wake of independence (Parker 
& Rathbone, 2007; Meredith, 2005). 
The 1960s opened a completely new phase in the African history. The 
independent states inherited a delegitimized colonial local administration, 
based on a coercive system, ruled by the traditional (native) authorities and 
the preféts or district officers nominated by the governors. This system was 
generally initially inherited by the new independent government; however 
some modifications were needed in order to use it to pursue the two main 
goals of independent states in Africa: nation-building and a fast socio-economic 
development34. In this period: 
                                                             
 
34 According to Manor: “Local or regional councils, which some colonial authorities had created, might be 
maintained or occasionally extended in the name of deepening democracy. But they were often held in 
low esteem by the new rulers because they had been used by the imperial powers as mere sops and 
substitutes for self-determination at the national level” (1999: 19). Main modifications included the 
introduction of centrally controlled elections or simply their abolishment; the transfer of many 
functions related to the provision of public goods, services and infrastructures to the central 
authorities; and the reduction or increased control over the resources available for the local 
authorities (Ribot, 2002). See also: Manor, 1999; Mamdani, 1996. 
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“Decentralisation was used to expand the reach of the state, so reforms 
took the shape of deconcentration – extending central administration 
into the local arena. This was reinforced by the period’s dominance by 
one-party states and socialist governments, which did not create the 
space for elected local government” (Ribot, 2002: 5). 
Not surprisingly, one of the first decisions often taken by the newly 
independent African states was the abolishment of the system of local 
governance inherited by the colonial administration and its substitution with a 
new legal framework. In different countries, a new law regulating the local 
administration was introduced few months after the independence, often 
under the label ‘decentralisation’. However, these new systems were mainly 
designed to address the needs and goals recalled above, resulting in a general 
centralisation of the power. In this framework of “centralisation via nominal 
‘decentralisation”:  
“Leaders now had to deliver and they saw democratic local 
governments as irritants at best, if not obstacles, to their ambitions to 
build powerful states. Leaders of newly independent states such as 
Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Sekou 
Touré in Guinea, among others, followed the same pattern” (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004: 33-34). 
Looking back to these early experiences, Nyerere in 1984 severely criticized 
the decision to dismantle the local government system as inherited by the 
former colonial states: 
“There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of 
them is the abolition of local governments and the other was the 
disbanding of cooperatives. We were impatient and ignorant… We had 
these two useful instruments of participation and we got rid of them. It 
is true that local governments were afraid of taking decisions but 
instead of helping them we abolished them. Those were two major 
mistakes” (Nyerere, 1984 as cited by Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 34). 
In the 1970s, many African countries experienced tremendous changes in their 
political and economic structures. Most African states responded to those 
crises with more centralised and authoritarian regimes and they were forced 
to accept the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed by the 
international financial institutions (Parker & Rathbone, 2007; Calchi Novati & 
Valsecchi, 2005; Meredith, 2005).  In the 1970s and 1980s, the idea of 
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decentralisation acquired growing popularity and usually with a positive 
connotation attached to it: 
“Most of us – and most governments like the idea of decentralisation. It 
suggests the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert central 
bureaucracy, curing managerial constipation, giving more direct access 
for the people to the government and the government to the people, 
stimulating the whole national to participate in national development 
plans” (Mawhood, 1983: 1). 
This third vague of decentralisation has been characterised by a higher variety 
if compared with the experiences of “nominal decentralisation” of the 1960s 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 33) and they usually belonged to the 
‘deconcentration’ rather than ‘devolution’ type. Moreover, the motives pushing 
towards decentralisation focused on national development, efficiency and 
greater participation of the grassroots to the development efforts (Conyers, 
1984: 188). Decentralisation was integrated within the SAPs as a strategy to 
reduce the size of the central state and its costs (Olowu, 2001). The results of 
this wave of decentralisation were quite fragmented and the reforms did not 
really contribute to the expected results; in fact, 
“The fundamental weakness of the decentralisation reforms of the 
1980s associated with SAPs was (…) their lack of attention to the 
nature and type of decentralised structures they were promoting. No 
clear distinction was made between deconcentration and devolution 
(…). No real changes in governance at the localities were made. (…) 
During this time, there was no real commitment to shifting power from 
the center to the localities, (…)” (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 38). 
The mid-1990s saw the emergence of a new wave of popularity of 
decentralisation, which is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the 
previous ones. Many factors have contributed to this renovated trust in 
decentralisation, as the failure of previous centralised attempts of public sector 
reforms, growing urbanisation, and pressures from the international donors 
(Olowu, 2001: 10). The latter have looked at decentralisation as a tool to 
respond to new democratic demands that emerged in the early 1990s in many 
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African states, which often resulted with the end of various authoritarian or 
single party regimes and the emergence of new multi-party democracies35 
More lately, and especially after the publication of the famous World Bank 
report ‘Attacking Poverty’ (World Bank, 2001), governments and aid agencies 
also supported the idea of a positive effect between (democratic) 
decentralisation and poverty alleviation, understood as a multi-dimensional 
concept36. Also, the Millennium Development Goals ask for a decentralised 
approach: 
“Local governments need to lead MDG-based local planning and 
implementation involving their communities. National averages on 
MDGs often mask differences in living standards across regions and 
communities in a country, so localizing MDGs allows local governments 
to keep national governments informed of the specific needs of their 
regions or localities. In middle-income countries, MDG localization 
helps draw attention to pockets of poverty, so that basic services can be 
improved in the underdeveloped areas identified” (UNDP, website, last 
accessed on the 04/04/2013). 
Olowu has argued that “local governments can alleviate poverty, because they 
are particularly well placed to help target small scale industries, agriculture 
support and needy members of the community, provided that the capacity 
exists to deliver such programmes” (2001: 24). Moreover, Ayee has illustrated 
that: 
“(…)Decentralisation must be viewed more realistically, however, not 
as a general solution to all of the problems of underdevelopment but 
rather as one of a range of administrative or organisational devices that 
may improve the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of various 
levels of government under suitable conditions” (Ayee, 1997: 54-55). 
In general, since the 2000s, decentralisation (especially in the type concerning 
democratic decentralisation or devolution) is claimed to have a wide range of 
benefits such as empowerment, increased popular participation and 
                                                             
 
35 This democratic wave that involved not only Africa but also many other developing countries have 
been analysed by the landmark study by Samuel Huntington (1991), “The third wave: democratisation 
in the late twentieth century”.  
36 See chapter 3. 
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accountability, resources mobilisation, increased efficiency and responsiveness 
of the local authorities (Crook & Manor, 1999; Blair, 2000; Crook & Sverrisson, 
2001; Olowu, 2001; Wunsch, 2013). 
 
4 DECENTRALISATION: A COMPLEX REFORM 
Despite its current popularity, the literature has identified numerous issues 
that have hindered decentralisation from producing its benefits. The most 
recurrent issues are proposed below, mainly – but not exclusively – drawing 
on the African decentralisation experiences. 
 
4.1 Lack of Political Will and (re)centralisation 
First, the commitment of the national elites to the implementation of 
decentralisation is a main factor influencing the outcome of the reforms (Ayee, 
1997; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Jütting et al., 2005). In fact, as Crook and 
Sverrisson clearly put it: 
“different governments do have different political purposed and 
motives for introducing decentralisation reforms and these purposed 
are embodied in the details of the structure and form of the 
decentralisation scheme or, more subtly, are revealed only in the way 
that the system functions after it is introduced” (2001: 2). 
A useful distinction that emerged in the literature is between decentralisation 
‘by default ‘or ‘by design’ (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000; Jütting et at., 2005, 
Crawford, 2008). In the first case, where the national government is the main 
initiator of the reforms, there is a general agreement within the national elites 
of the desirability of decentralisation and thus, it is embedded in the national 
strategies to achieve better governance or pursue the development goals. 
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Decentralisation is considered ‘by default’ if the introduction of 
decentralisation has been the result of strong international pressures37. 
This difference seems particularly important as decentralisation is more 
successful when it is introduced ‘by design’, due to the fact that it implies a 
greater local ownership (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004)38.  On the other hand, 
usually decentralisation ‘by default’ comes along with a general lack of political 
will. In this case, the national elites are not committed to the decentralisation 
reform or may officially accept it solely to please the donors39. For instance, 
studying the local system in Malawi, Chinsinga has argued that: 
“Malawi experience demonstrates one key problem with the design of 
donor-driven decentralisation policy reforms. They are more often 
designed on the basis of donor’s ideological arguments than on the 
analysis of empirical reality of what exists on the ground. Consequently 
donors often prevail in pushing for decentralisation policy reforms, nut 
it is largely the prerogative of the national and local politicians (...) to 
decide how exactly to put them into practice” (2008: 99). 
Also, with respect to decentralisation, the national elite may be fragmented, 
with “some working for it and others against it” (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004: 23).  
The importance of the national elites’ goals has been demonstrated by the 
experience of some countries where decentralisation actually resulted in 
increased centralisation. Crawford (2008) has introduced the concept of 
‘politics of (de)centralisation’ to stress this process: national elites undertook 
decentralisation reforms to pursue mainly their national interest and one 
                                                             
 
37 Mali is an example of reforms introduced ‘by design’. It does not imply that the aid agencies are not 
involved in the decentralization process. In the Malian experience, donors, and especially the European 
Commission, have been extremely active in promoting and financing the decentralization reforms. 
However, the main drivers in initiating the devolution process were the national elites and the design 
of the reform was mainly a result of a national debate (Guillaume Lévy, 2003; Berthomé, 2003; 
Serrenti, 2012).  
38 Jütting et al. (2005) have argued that the most ‘best performers’ in their cross-country study (Kerala or 
West Bengal in India, Bolivia, South Africa, the Philippines and Ghana) had introduced decentralization 
mainly ‘by design’, while the ‘worst performers’ had introduced it ‘by default’ (Guinea). 
39 The national elites may be just not willing to share the power with local institutions or they fear a 
fragmentation of the country, with risks to the national unity (Olowu, 2001). 
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cannot expect them to promote ‘decentralisation form above’, aimed at 
increasing the citizens’ participation and the pro-poor outcomes40.  
 
4.2 Weak Legal Framework 
A second issue concerns the entrenchment of decentralisation in the national 
legal framework. This implies two different aspects. On the one hand, 
decentralisation is usually stronger when it is included in the constitution if 
compared with the cases where it is regulated by other legal instruments such 
as decrees or ordinary laws (Thede, 2008 cited by Crawford & Hartmann, 2008: 
14)41. 
On the other hand, the lack of a clear division of roles and responsibilities 
between the local government institutions and the central government creates 
additional challenges, corroding the decentralised potential benefits especially 
in terms of public service delivery (Smoke, 2013: 13 cited by  Crawford & 
Hartmann, 2008: 14). In some cases, the central government have also 
indirectly undermined the powers transferred to the local authorities by 
revising the sectoral policies (ex.: health, education, water) and diverting the 
funds accordingly (Jütting et al., 2005). 
 
4.3 Central / Local Relations 
Strictly linked to the commitment of the national governments is how the new 
decentralisation structure (devolved or deconcentrated) reshapes the central–
local relations (Jütting et al., 2005). In fact, decentralisation necessarily implies 
                                                             
 
40 On the contrary, a pro-poor outcome is likely only if the decentralisation process is initiated to meet 
the popular demands, organized through civil society organisations as political parties or social 
movements (Crawford, 2008) 
41 For instance, Zambia included the local government for the first time in the Third Republic’s 
Constitution. The previous legal framework was regulated only through ordinary laws (see chapter 5, 
heading 2). 
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a reallocation of powers and resources within the governmental structures 
both at national and local levels. Therefore, different patterns of local–central 
relations necessarily influence the way decentralisation is actually 
implemented on the ground and its pro-poor outcomes42.  
For instance, in some cases, although the system is formally decentralised, the 
government can still play an important role at local level through its network 
of line ministries departments (Steiner, 2008). In some case, decentralisation 
may even exacerbate the ethnic tensions that it was supposed to address 
(Treisman, 2007).  
 
4.4 Failures in Participation and Accountability  
A fourth recurrent issue in the implementation of decentralisation reforms 
concerns the extent of popular participation actually achieved through 
(democratic) decentralisation. The literature has highlighted that 
decentralisation does not always facilitate the inclusion of the citizens in the 
political debate or in the decision-making process. Often, the expectations for 
an increased accountability are deceived; and, finally, in many cases, it does 
not improve the information available to the residents on the local politics and 
development initiatives undertaken by their local representatives (Jütting et al., 
2005; Treisman, 2007; Azfar, Livingston, & Meagher, 2011). 
In many cases, the new devolved institutions are also likely to be occupied by 
the local elites, excluding the most vulnerable or the minorities from the power 
positions (Olowu, 2001) or reinforcing the existing patterns of inequality and 
poverty (Johnson, 2001). 
                                                             
 
42 Crook and Sverrisson have identified four different scenarios of possible relations. The first is when 
“the ruling elite or central authority is seeking to build its power bases through alliances with 
established local or regional elites”. A second occurs when “the central ruling elite challenges (…) 
locally powerful groups” or to weaken regional or ethnical political rivals; finally, a fourth scenario, “is 
associated with consolidation or renewal of an already powerful ruling elite” (Crook and Sverrisson, 
2001: 2-4). 
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These issues seem to support the idea that decentralisation is not actually 
sufficient for the creation of a democratic environment at the grassroots43. In 
some cases, on the contrary, “politics and institutions are more democratic at 
national level than the local level”, thanks to a stronger role played by media or 
the political party system (Azfar, Livingston, & Meagher, 2011: 233). Therefore, 
the type of regime and the presence of strong democratic experiences are also 
regarded as important preconditions for a successful decentralisation, as they 
can create an enabling environment for greater participation and 
accountability (Manor, 1999). 
 
4.5 Resources Do Not Follow Functions 
Fifth, many authors have indicated that an additional issue is that resources 
(financial and human) usually do not follow the transfer of functions. Thus, the 
local institutions are often assigned important responsibilities in the delivery 
of public goods and services (ex.: water provision, education or health, etc.) but 
they are not granted the necessary resources (Adamolekun, 1991); or, simply, 
there are not enough resources available within the overall public system 
(Wittenberg, 2011). 
Financial resources are mainly constituted by government grants and local 
taxes; however, often, the first are not enough to cover the increased 
responsibilities, and the revenue raising powers may be limited (Steiner, 
2007)44.  Governmental grants are usually highly political and may also be 
subject to conditionalities over their use, limiting de facto the decision-making 
powers of the local institutions (Bird & Rodrigues, 1999)45. Delays in 
                                                             
 
43 Some authors have contested the compatibility of local government and democracy at local level 
(Olowu, 2001). 
44 For an analysis of a successful system of resource allocation (West Bengal, India) see: Bahl, Sethi & 
Wallace (2010). 
45 Bird & Smart (2002) have studied the conditions required for a successful transfer design of 
governmental grants, mainly in addressing the problems of vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance. 
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delivering the central grants are also frequent, creating serious issues in local 
authorities’ budgets (Azfar, Livingston, & Meagher, 2011) 
Moreover, across Africa, the local taxes collection is a common issue and 
usually this does not represent a reliable source of resources for the 
decentralised institutions (Olowu and Smoke, 1992; Steiner, 2008). 
Corruption within the decentralised institutions is also frequent, due to the 
principal-agent problem (Steiner, 2007 and 2008, Blundo, & Olivier de Sardan, 
2001)46. Fisman & Gatti also argued that usually there is a “very strong and 
consistent negative association” (2002: 13) between decentralization and 
corruption. 
Human resources may also represent a critical aspect in the implementation47. 
For instance, civil servants that used to be employed by the government do not 
always accept to be relocated at local level, under the direction of the local 
institutions (Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Olowu and Wunsch, 2014). 
Conflicts between civil servants and local politicians can be quite common and 
aggravated by the confusion over the respective responsibilities and powers48. 
Moreover, the lack of training or adequately educated local civil servants or 
councillors can undermine the potential efficiency of the local institutions on 
the delivery of public services and goods (Steiner, 2008). In other cases, they 
do not seem to know the local preferences, pushing them to allocate the 
resources accordingly (Azfar, Livingston, & Meagher, 2011). 
                                                             
 
46 Steiner (2008) identifies some reasons for the emergence of corruption practices at local level, such as 
low salaries or emoluments for the civil servants and politicians, weak monitoring and auditing 
capacities or, lack of accountability mechanisms. 
47 Ayee considers bureaucracies as “one of the most important factors that influences the successful 
implementation of decentralization” and it has provided an insightful analysis of the consequences of 
the lack of civil servants’ support in implementing decentralization reforms (1997: 37). 
48 Steiner (2008) has also indicated that this problem can even be exacerbated, especially when the 
economic benefits of the councillors (usually emoluments more rarely salaries) are bigger than those 
of the bureaucrats with full time jobs. 
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Finally, even the presence of resources does not guarantee success in service 
delivery or economic performance, meeting the expected pro-poor benefits. 
Sometimes, the local councils fail to meet the demands of the public (Crook and 
Manor, 1998). Other recurrent issues include: increased subnational spending, 
higher central and local budget deficits, and higher inflation (Treisman, 2007; 
Linder: 2010). 
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3  C h a p t e r  
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
1 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As already discussed49, the main goal of this research is to analyse if and how 
decentralisation policies have had a positive impact on alleviating poverty. The 
academic evidence already available (see chapter 3, “Literature Review”) 
seems to disagree or at least to be cautious in supporting this linkage. However, 
at least in the last two decades, decentralisation has been heavily promoted as 
an important tool within the strategies to tackle extreme poverty and promote 
development. 
This study attempts to provide additional evidence on the pro-poor outcomes 
of decentralisation policies and to challenge this automatism. For this purpose, 
a conceptual framework is used (figure 3). It describes the ideal linkage 
between decentralisation and poverty alleviation and it draws on the existing 
literature and previous frameworks, mainly those proposed by Jütting et al. 
(2004; 2005), Steiner (2007), Asante, Ayee (2008), Crawford & Hartmann 
(2008)50. As Steiner argued, this framework “(…) takes the form of an optimal 
scenario and is not meant to be in any way an image of the real world based on 
empirical evidence” (2007: 175). However, it facilitates the analysis as it 
                                                             
 
49 See chapter 1 and 2. 
50 The framework proposed in this study is very similar to the frameworks proposed earlier by these 
scholars. This is intended to help the comparison with the academic work and to compare the Zambian 
case-study to the decentralisation experiments carried out in other countries. 
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breaks down the possible channels of influence and impact that 
decentralisation policies may have on poverty alleviation. 
In this chapter, the main elements composing the possible theoretical linkages 
between decentralisation and poverty alleviation will be analysed. Firstly, 
‘poverty’ the groundwork concept is introduced: the conceptual framework 
lays on a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty, emerged from the 
academic literature in the 1960s and today is widely accepted in both 
academia and by major development agencies51. 
Figure 3: Links between decentralization and poverty: the ‘ideal’ scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Steiner (2007); Asante & Ayee (2008); Jutting et al. (2004; 2005). 
Nowadays, poverty is defined as a general status of vulnerability that “denotes 
people’s exclusion from socially adequate living standards and it encompasses 
                                                             
 
51 The evolution of the concept of decentralization, poverty and the new international strategies to tackle 
ill-being and deprivation are further discussed in heading 2 of this chapter. 
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a range of deprivations” (OECD, 2001: 18). The World Bank (2001) defines 
poverty as a general status of vulnerability, which includes three main types of 
deprivation, namely political, social and economic deprivation (see figure 3): 
“Poverty is the result of economic, political, and social processes that 
interact with each other and frequently reinforce each other in ways 
that exacerbate the deprivation in which poor people live” (World Bank, 
2001: 1). 
This shift has been translated in a threefold strategy for poverty alleviation 
based on “promoting opportunities”, “facilitating empowerment” and 
“enhancing security” (World Bank, 2001: 1-12) 52.  
Secondly, following the World Bank’s rationale, decentralisation may help at 
addressing the political deprivation understood as “voicelessness and 
powerlessness” (World Bank, 2001: 15) through “empowerment”. This latter is 
understood as increased participation and inclusion (representation) of the 
poorest, in decision-making and increased accountability of the elected 
councils to the voters53. 
Finally, “promoting opportunities” refers to economic and social growth, 
understood as increased possibility for the poorest to access material 
resources or economic opportunities and increased access or quality of public 
services such as water or education.  Thanks to its proximity, decentralized 
structures are supposed to be better placed to plan and implement pro-poor 
projects as they have better knowledge of the local needs and priorities54 
  
                                                             
 
52 ‘Enhancing security’ is beyond the scope of this study, which limits the analysis to the political and the 
socio-economic impacts and do not discuss the ‘security’ or ‘conflict management’ implications. The 
latter has been relatively less studied by the literature on decentralization. Steiner (2007) has included 
‘security’ in her framework as “Judicial Power” and “Regional autonomy”. The following (non 
exhaustive) list of studies provide an insightful analysis of the security implications: van Dijk (2008), 
Hartmann (2008), Schelnberger (2008), Tilburg (2008), Braathen & Bjerkreim Hellevik (2006), Dreher 
& Fischer (2010) and Gjoni & Wetterberg (2010).  
53 See heading 3 in this chapter. 
54 See heading 4 in this chapter. 
64 
2 KEY ‘MULTI-DIMENSIONAL’ CONCEPTS  
2.1 Decentralization 
The ‘object’ decentralization is a ‘slippery’ concept (Bird, 1995): it is not easy 
to define as it has been applied over the last decades by governments, 
development agencies and scholars to identify a variety of policies, including 
‘centralisation’55. Conyers for instance, argued that “everyone knows roughly 
what ‘decentralisation’ means, but defining it precisely presents problems 
because it can be used in a number of different ways and in significantly 
different contexts” (1984: 187)56. 
In the following analysis, we understand decentralisation as a multi-
dimensional concept and we accept a broad definition of decentralisation, as 
“the deliberate and planned transfer of resources away from the central state 
institutions to peripheral institutions” (Olowu, 2001: 2). 
Drawing on Manor (1999), the following typologies are also accepted: 
- Devolution or political or democratic decentralisation:  
It entails the transfer of power and resources (human or financial) from 
the central government to democratically elected sub-national units, 
relatively independent from the centre and mainly accountable and 
responsible to the local population. 
- Deconcentration or administrative decentralisation: 
It entails the transfer of authority, responsibilities and resources (human 
or financial) to local branches of the central government and ministries. 
- Fiscal decentralisation: 
It entails the transfer of financial resources and the authority over budgets 
to democratically elected local councils or deconcentrated agencies. 
                                                             
 
55 See chapter 2 heading 2 for an insightful analysis on the academic debate on the concept and types of 
decentralization. 
56 This idea has been also supported by other scholars in the same period: Mawhood (1983); 
Adamolekum in 1991 still talks about “confusion over definition” (1991: 185). 
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This latter type is treated, as suggested by Ribot (2002) more as a cross-cutting 
feature of devolution and deconcentration than as a type per se. Therefore, the 
impact of decentralisation on poverty alleviation will mainly refer to the role 
played by local councils (devolution) and deconcentrated ministerial 
departments. 
 
2.2 Poverty  
The concept of poverty has tremendously evolved in the last two decades and 
today is one of the most important “buzz-words” in development discourse 
and strategies. However, as argued by Ruggeri-Laderchi, Saith and Stewart, 
“Ironically, while the objective of poverty reduction currently has 
overwhelming support, particularly among the donor community, there is 
increasing debate about what this objective means” [...] (2010: 243) 
An idea of this shift is simply captured when comparing a few definitions of 
poverty, which have been published in major development institutional 
publications between the 1990s and 2000. 
(1990s): “This Report defines poverty as the inability to attain a 
minimal standard of living”. […] “Household incomes and expenditures 
per capita are adequate yardsticks for the standard of living as long as 
they include own production, which is very important for most of the 
world's poor”. […] (World Bank, 1990: 24- 38). 
(2000s): “This report accepts the now traditional view of poverty 
(reflected, for example, in World Development Report 1990) as 
encompassing not only material deprivation (measured by an 
appropriate concept of income or consumption) but also low 
achievements in education and health. […]This report also broadens the 
notion of poverty to include vulnerability and exposure to risk—and 
voicelessness and powerlessness” (World Bank, 2001: 15). 
(2000s): “Poverty is multidimensional. Poverty denotes people’s 
exclusion from socially adequate living standards and it encompasses a 
range of deprivations. The dimensions of poverty cover distinct aspects 
of human capabilities: economic (income, livelihoods, decent work), 
human (health, education), political (empowerment, rights, voice), 
socio-cultural (status, dignity) and protective (insecurity, risk, 
vulnerability). Mainstreaming gender is essential for reducing poverty 
in all its dimensions. And sustaining the natural resource base is 
essential for poverty reduction to endure” (OECD, 2001: 18) 
66 
In the 1990s, the main donors57 still used a traditional ‘monetary approach’ to 
describe poverty. Rooted in the pioneering work by Booth (1889) and 
Rowntree (1902), it was manly based on poverty lines, where ‘income’ and 
‘consumption’ were the main variables58. The monetary approach defines 
poverty as “A shortfall in consumption (or income) from some poverty line” 
(Ruggeri-Laderchi et al., 2010: 247). Poverty is considered in its ‘absolute’ 
sense, as it is calculated with regard to the purchasing cost of a minimum 
basket of needs or is linked to subsistence and nutrition (Madden, 2000; Lister, 
2004)59.  Over time, other indicators such as life expectancy, health or literacy 
were acknowledged as important signs and measures of poverty. Nevertheless, 
they were considered as only ‘attributes’ of the main definition (‘income and 
consumption’) and poverty was mainly seen as a development and economic 
growth issue (Lister, 2004; World Bank, 1990). 
This monetary approach to poverty has been extremely successful and became 
popular especially during the 1960s-1980s60. Today, it is still widely used 
                                                             
 
57 The main donors include the World Bank, USAID, the European Union and various UN agencies as ILO, 
FAO, UNDP (Rondinelli & McCullagh, 1981; Conyers, 1983 and 1986). 
58 In 1887, Booth carried out a study on the poverty levels in London, hit often by widespread riots by the 
poor. His approach included also non-monetary dimensions as well as qualitative and quantitative 
methods Few years later, Rowntree, in 1902,used a pure quantitative method based on household 
surveys and elaborated for the first time a poverty line based on the minimum sum of money needed to 
pay for some basic needs as housing, food, light, fuel, clothing, etc. A detailed analysis on the monetary 
approach its tools and evolution of the concept and measurement of poverty is provided in Blackwood 
and Lynch (1994). 
59 This approach is referred as ‘basic needs’ and it has been used by Orshansky (1965)to calculate its 
poverty line. For other studies using the monetary approach, see Joseph and Sumption (1979). On the 
difference between absolute, relative or ‘hybrid’ definitions and measurement of poverty see also 
Hagenaars & de Vos, 1998; Blackwook & Lynch, 1994; Lister, 2004. 
60 According to Scott, seven reasons are the pillars of the success of this approach: “1. The British imperial 
and colonial influence and influence on governments and educational systems in the Empire and 
Colonies (…). 2. The power and attraction of statistics, and their influence on policy and opinion (which 
both Booth and Rowntree experienced). 3. The growing authority of statisticians, statistical 
procedures, and concepts of scientific rigour in the professional analysis of numbers. 4. The training of 
students in statistical, sampling and questionnaire survey methods, and the ease with which such 
training could be routinised, giving an easy task to teachers and providing skills to students for later 
employment. 5. The rise and power of economists and of economics as a profession, particularly after 
the second world war. 6. The ability of questionnaire surveys to generate poverty lines to provide 
comparisons between countries, between geographical and administrative regions, and between 
categories of people and of occupations, and, when in time series, to indicate changes over time. 7. The 
usefulness poverty line statistics for practical and policy purposes: they fulfill the needs of the state to 
simplify and count poverty in order to make it legible, enabling it to grasp a large and complex reality” 
(Scott, 1998 quoted in Chambers, 2007: 15-16). 
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although it is often integrated with other mixed or participatory 
methodologies61.  
As shown by the definitions above, in 2000 the understanding of poverty 
radically changed: the traditional and economic-oriented definition was 
rejected, and the concept of poverty became multi-dimensional, embracing the 
new perspectives introduced in the 1970s by the ‘Sen’s ‘capability approach’ or 
the Townsend’s relative ‘deprivation approach’. In 1962, Peter Townsend 
criticized the ‘absolute’ approach to poverty based on poverty lines with 
income or consumption as main indicators: 
“My main thesis is that both 'poverty' and 'subsistence' are relative 
concepts and that they can only be defined in relation to the material 
and emotional resources available at a particular time to the members 
either of a particular society or different societies. […] “Poverty is a 
dynamic, not a static, concept” (Townsend, 1965: 210 -219).  
Therefore, according to this idea of poverty as ‘relative deprivation’ a 
household is poor when it is “lacking certain commodities that are common in 
the society they are living in” (Hagenaars & De Vos, 1988: 215)62. His definition 
goes beyond the mere consideration of ‘commodities’ availability but 
differentiates between ‘income’ and ‘living standards’, ‘material’ and ‘social’ 
deprivation63. However, according to Amartya Sen: 
"Poverty is, of course, a matter of deprivation. The recent shift in focus 
[…] from absolute to relative deprivation has provided a useful 
framework of analysis. But relative deprivation is essentially 
incomplete […], and supplements (but cannot supplant) the earlier 
                                                             
 
61 See chapter 4 on “Methodology”, where participation and mixed methodologies are discussed. Despite 
the introduction of new methods some authors have also highlighted how, even nowadays, the 
economic approach continue to dominate and “maintain a higher status” if compared with non-
economic measures (Sumner, 2007).  
62 Townsend also introduced the concept of ‘social participation’ that later inspired the concept of 
poverty as “social exclusion”, mainly adopted by the European Institutions (see: Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 
2010). 
63 Material deprivation refers to material goods, the social one to “ordinary social customs, activities and 
relationships’(Townsend, 2007 quoted in Lister, 2004: 22). 
68 
approach of absolute dispossession” (Sen, 1981 as quoted by Townsend, 
1985: 663) 64. 
Sen reconciled the absolute and relative approach and measurement of 
poverty through the introduction of a new concept of poverty: ‘capability to 
function’65: 
“At the risk of oversimplification, I would like to say that poverty is an 
absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it will take a 
relative form in the space of commodities or characteristics”. (Sen, 
1983: 161). “Basic capabilities [are] the ability to satisfy certain 
crucially important functionings up to certain minimally adequate 
levels” (Sen, 1993, p. 41). 
The capabilities approach and, more generally, a multi-dimensional approach 
to poverty, has been formally accepted by international donors in the late 
1990s/2000 (Akindola, 2009; Narayan, 1999; O’Boyle, 1999; Klasen, 2008, 
Saunders, 2004.)  
The shift from an economic to a more social or multi-dimensional approach 
has been well described by Misturelli & Heffernan (2012) in their work that 
outlines the change of the meaning of poverty from the 1970s to the 2000s. 
They first identified three main ‘attributes’ (called, ‘memes’) of poverty (ex.: 
basic needs, multidimensional and deprivation); then, they analysed the 
frequency of their use in the development literature66. As shown by figure 3, 
the concept of ‘basic needs’ exploded in the 1990s, also thanks to the notions of 
                                                             
 
64 The debate over these concepts has been quite animated between Sen and Townsend; see: Sen (1983) 
and (1985) and Townsend (1985). 
65 Sen describes capabilities as a bicycle: “Take a bicycle. It is, of course, a commodity. […]Having a bike 
gives a person the ability to move about in a certain way that he may not be able to do without the bike. 
So the transportation characteristic of the bike gives the person the capability of moving in a certain 
way. That capability may give the person utility or happiness[…].So there is, as it were, a sequence 
from a commodity (in this case a bike), to characteristics (in this case, transportation), to capability to 
function (in this case, the ability to move), to utility (in this case, pleasure from moving). It can be 
argued that it is the third category—that of capability to function—that comes closest to the notion of 
standard of living. The commodity ownership or availability itself is not the right focus since it does not 
tell us what the person can, in fact, do. […]At the risk of oversimplification, I would like to say that 
poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often it will take a relative form in the 
space of commodities or characteristics. (Sen, 1983: 160). However, he does not provide a list of 
specific capabilities (Ruggeri-Laderchi, 2010). 
66 These authors have used the concept of meme as coined by Dawkins (1989). Their results are drawn 
on the review of using 578 documents offered by NGOs, international donors, governments and 
researchers, covering the period (1970-2000). 
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‘basic capabilities’ or the ‘functionings’, as introduced by Sen. In the 2000 the 
two key-words highlighted 
in the poverty debate are 
deprivation and 
multidimensional. 
Deprivation’ was first used 
by Townsend in 1970 but 
only in the 2000s did this 
concept significantly 
expand. 
 Finally, ‘multidimensional’ 
was first used in the 1970s, 
“[…] when 
researchers emphasised that poverty also had social, political and 
psychological dimensions (Hensman, 1971; Streeten, 1971; Osotungun, 
1975). […] The term was further extended in the 2000s, […]. 
Interestingly by this decade, the term was linked to both deprivation 
and basic needs”. (Misturelli & Heffernan, 2012: S12-13). 
Inevitably, this new multidimensional understanding of poverty required a 
shift towards multidimensional strategies to tackle ill-being and deprivation. 
In 2000, the World Bank introduced its new policy, based on three main pillars: 
“promoting opportunities”, “facilitating empowerment” and “enhancing 
security” (World Bank, 2001: 1-12)67.  
Following the World Bank’s rationale, “promoting opportunities” involves 
mainly the “material opportunities”, with a focus on overall economic and 
                                                             
 
67 Some scholars have critically reviewed the enormous shift in the World Bank’s approach to poverty 
and its development strategies by the end of the ‘90s and the beginning of the new millennium. In 
particular, Pender (2001) has focused on conditionality and the new role acquired by the poorest, 
within a new framework that, “relativizes the primacy of economic growth” (2001: 397). In addition, 
Boer (2001) and Wade (2001) has provided some interesting insights on the preparation process of 
the report, highlighting how the “disagreements” between “finance” and “civil society” (as defined by 
Kanbur, 2001) emerged and were resolved. This shift is also a consequence of the failure of the 
structural adjustment policies promoted by the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ during the ‘80s and 
‘90s and accused to have increased poverty and inequalities in the developing countries (see: chapter 
2). 
Figure 4: Frequency of identifies memes (1970-2000) 
 
Source: Misturelli & Heffernan, 2012: S7 
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social growth: “This means jobs, credit, roads, electricity, markets for their 
produce, and the schools, water and sanitation, and health services that 
underpin the health and skills essentials for work” (World Bank, 2001: 6-7). 
“Facilitating empowerment” directly addresses the political dimension of 
poverty, with policies aimed at increasing, on the one hand, the inclusion in the 
decision-making process of the poorest; and on the other, the responsibility, 
and accountability of the public institutions towards the citizens. Finally, 
“enhancing security” aims at “reducing vulnerability to economic shocks, 
natural disasters, ill health, disability, and personal violence” (World Bank, 
2001: 7).  
Decentralisation is a key policy within this threefold strategy, able to “(…) 
reflect local conditions, social structures, and cultural norms and heritage. (…) 
The poor are the main actors in the fight against poverty. And they must be 
brought center stage in designing, implementing, and monitoring antipoverty 
strategies” (World Bank: 2001: 12). The conceptual framework (Figure 3) 
represents the possible ways decentralisation may theoretically contribute to 
the first two pillars of this strategy, namely ‘empowerment’ and ‘opportunities’ 
(Jütting et al., 2004 & 2005. Steiner, 2007. Asante & Ayee, 2008. Crawford & 
Hartmann, 2008)68. 
In sum, the political impact of (democratic) decentralisation on poverty can 
generally be translated in terms of “empowerment”. As Jütting et al. argue: 
“Political or democratic decentralization is expected to offer citizens 
the possibility of increased participation in local decision-making 
processes, from which they have generally been excluded through lack 
of sufficient representation or organization” (2004:11). 
Compared with a centralised system where decisions are taken by a relatively 
small elite, decentralisation guarantees increased opportunities for the citizens 
to get involved in the local decision-making and to influence it (Blair, 2000; 
                                                             
 
68 As already explained, the analysis of the role played by decentralization policies in “enhancing 
security” is beyond the scope of this study (see footnote n° 53).  
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Crook & Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; UNDP, 1997; Chisinga, 2008; European 
Commission, 2007). They also have more chances to hold their representatives 
accountable for their work, for instance though the vote (Blair, 2000; Cohen 
and Peterson, 1999; World Bank, 2007; Yilmaz and Beris, 2010). Therefore, 
decentralisation facilitates the inclusion of the poorest and the most 
vulnerable, ‘bringing the government close to people’ (Crook & Sverrisson, 
2001; Von Braun & Grote, 2002; Crook, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Jutting et al., 2004 
& 2005; Dethier, 2000. Olowu and Wunsch, 2004).  
The socio-economic impact can be translated in terms of improved efficiency 
and targeting at the local level (Manor, 1999; Steiner, 2005; Collier and Dollar, 
2004; Ravallion, 2000). If compared with the central government, the local 
authorities have an ‘informational advantage’ on residents’ preferences and 
needs. Thus, they are better placed to provide public services and goods with 
substantial efficiency gains (Rao and Bird, 1998; Rodden, 2004; Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2001; Vedeld, 2003; Von Braun and Grote, 2001). 
In the following paragraphs, we will define in detail the main elements of this 
framework, using the 3 dimensions identified (political, social and economic) 
and providing: 
- a synthetic overview of the main literature and of their use in the 
development discourse; 
- a definition adopted in this study and the variables used to assess them in 
the two target local districts in Zambia. 
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3 THE POLITICAL DIMENSION: EMPOWERMENT 
In our framework, ‘empowerment’ represents the main political impact of 
decentralisation policies. It addresses the ‘lack of power and voice’, namely the 
political component within the current multi-dimensional understanding of 
poverty (Steiner, 2005 and 2007; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). 
Empowerment has emerged as a priority in the development agenda in the 
2000s. In its influential report in 2001, the World Bank indicated ‘facilitating 
empowerment’ is one of the three strategies for poverty eradication (World 
Bank, 2001)69. According to the World Bank’s rationale, the “potential for 
economic growth and poverty reduction is heavily influenced by the state and 
social institutions” (World Bank, 2001: 9). In order to produce pro-poor effects, 
the states should establish and promote key pillars such as “accountable public 
administration” or the promotion of “inclusive decentralisation and 
community development”70. 
Although the term ‘empowerment’ has been overused in the literature of 
decentralisation, its definition is rather vague and imprecise (Crawford, 2008).  
According with the World Bank, ‘empowerment’ means: 
“[…] enhancing the capacity of poor people to influence the state 
institutions that affect their lives, by strengthening their participation 
in political processes and local decision-making” and 
“making state institutions more accountable and responsive to poor 
people, strengthening the participation of poor people in political 
processes and local decision-making, and removing the social barriers 
that result from distinctions of gender, ethnicity, race, and social status” 
(World Bank, 2001: 33 & 39). 
Scholars have used these concepts synonymously or as an effect of 
‘participation’ and ‘local government capacity’ (Jütting et al., 2005), or they just 
                                                             
 
69 As already explained, the other elements of the new strategy are “promote opportunities” and 
“enhance security” (see: heading 2 in this same chapter). 
70 Others include: Strong “political and legal basis” that foster transparency on the legal mechanisms; 4) 
“promoting gender equity”; 5) “tackling social barriers”, 6) “Supporting poor people’s social capital” 
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do not make so much distinction between ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ 
(Von Braun and Grote, 2002: 73-74).  
In this study, ‘empowerment’ is understood simply as an “increased popular 
control over government” (Crawford, 2008: 108). Along with a pure theoretical 
rationale, the first dimension of poverty, ‘lack of voice and power’ can be 
alleviated through ‘empowerment’, which represents the political impact of 
decentralisation policies. Following the World Bank (2001), as quoted above, it 
is presumed that empowerment contributes to poverty alleviation through 
three main channels: participation, representation and accountability (see 
figure 3). 
First, by bringing the government closer to the population, decentralisation 
may contribute to poverty reduction as it can potentially increase the 
participation and influence of the citizens in public-decision making, mainly 
though elections, campaigning, contacting local representatives etc (UNDP, 
1997; Blair, 2000; European Commission, 2007).  
Second, decentralisation reduces the barriers that usually hinder the access to 
the decision-making process for the poor or marginalised:  it is closer in term 
of distance or less expensive in terms of transport to reach the local 
(decentralized) authority instead of a central government authority. Thus, 
theoretically, decentralisation allows a better representation of all social 
groups, making it easier to mobilise, get involved in local government’s affairs, 
bring the instances of marginalised groups (poor, women, etc.) that are usually 
at the periphery of the public arena and influence the local agenda (Steiner, 
2007). Therefore, giving “voice” to the poor, decentralisation may potentially 
reduce poverty in its political dimension. 
Finally, participation and representation in itself do not yet guarantee the 
representation of all constituencies or the poor/marginalized groups. Only 
accountability mechanisms guarantee that the voice of the poorer and 
marginalised can actually be heard, making the local government actually 
responsive to those demands and instances (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Ribot, 
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2002; Ackerman, 2004; World Bank, 2007; Yilmaz, Beris & Serrano-Berthet 
2010). According to Steiner, accountability mechanisms:  
“[…] form a credible threat to both local politicians and civil servants in 
the sense that they are punished for unresponsiveness and 
misbehaviour, they will have greater incentives to act in the 
population’s interests, encouraging participation and addressing 
demands” (2008: 37). 
In sum, these three elements represent the main theoretical channels that may 
potentially bring pro-poor benefits. However, how are those potential benefits 
measured?  
Again, the literature does not provide a unique framework of analysis. For 
instance, Crook has proposed an analysis based on the “quantity of 
participation”, understood as voters’ turnout, associations etc. and the 
“changes in its social scope”, i.e. real participation of the poor or analysis of the 
participation groups (Crook, 2003: 79). Jütting et al. (2005) have agreed that 
‘participation’ is a first indicator but they also suggest to measure the local 
government’s capacity, understood as real powers, resources availability, etc. 
Usually, the literature and especially the cross-country studies on 
decentralisation do not clearly specify the indicators used to assess 
participation, representation and accountability/responsiveness (Crook and 
Manor, 1998; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Von Braun and Grote, 2002; Vedeld, 
2003). As already stated above, all these terms are overused and sometimes 
used in an interchangeable manner. The same is true for the indicators used to 
measure them71. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
71 This can also be explained by the interconnections among those variables. For example, “contacting the 
local councillors” may be used to measure participation other accountability. 
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3.1 Participation 
Among donors and international organizations, the link between 
decentralization and poverty reduction through participation has emerged in 
the wake of the new millennium. As explained earlier in the discussion72, in the 
1980s the concept of poverty was mainly understood as an economic feature: 
the World Development Report (WDR) of that year never took into 
consideration a similar linkage (World Bank, 1980). In 1990, the WDR titled 
“Poverty” analysed the different causes and features of poverty but the ‘lack of 
voice’ was not among them, although it recognized a correlation between 
poverty and access to public goods and services (World Bank, 1990)73. Only, in 
1997, the concept of ‘voiceless’ emerged in the WDR: 
“In nearly all societies the needs and preferences of the wealthy and 
powerful are well reflected in official policy goals and priorities. But 
this is rarely true of the poor and marginalized, who struggle to get 
their voices heard [author’s emphasis] in the corridors of power. As a 
result, these and other less vocal groups tend to be ill served by public 
policies and services, even those that should benefit them most” (World 
Bank, 1990: 110). 
The report discussed the different mechanisms “to ensure that policies and 
programs better reflect the full panoply of society’s interests” in order to 
achieve “greater accountability” and “responsiveness” (World Bank, 1997: 
111). Among those, electoral participation, inclusion of minorities, the social 
capital and the role of NGOs and other associations as “alternative strategies 
for voice and participation” are explained and discussed (World Bank, 1997: 
111-116)74. For the first time, decentralization was also introduced as a means 
                                                             
 
72 See: heading 2.2 of this chapter 
73 In this regards, the World Bank Report acknowledged, “In general, the poor have less access to publicly 
provided goods and infrastructure than do other groups. On the whole, governments fail to reach the 
poor. […] The poor are often set apart by cultural and educational barriers. […] In many countries 
poverty is correlated with race and ethnic background” (World Bank, 1990: 37).  
74 The WB also acknowledged the need of improving state capabilities in increasing opportunities for 
voice and participation; however: “There is no blueprint for funding the appropriate balance of voice, 
participation, and bureaucratic control in provision of public goods. The solution depends on the 
capabilities of the public agencies in question and other providers and on the characteristics of the 
public good or service being provided” (World Bank, 1997: 116). Among the mechanisms suggested to 
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to increase the public participation and as a strategy “to bring the government 
closer to the people” (World Bank, 1997: 111). However, here political 
participation is mainly restricted to the vote: more importance is still given to 
fiscal and economic aspects while ‘participation’ is mainly linked to the 
management and delivery of social services and goods (World Bank, 1997: 
124-129). 
Although the World Bank Report 1999/2000 (‘Entering the 21st Century’) 
represented already a shift in the development thinking and strategies75, one 
needs to wait until the famous WDR (2001), titled ‘Attacking Poverty’ to have 
the formal integration of ‘voice’ and ‘participation’ in the concept of ‘Poverty’: 
“This report also broadens the notion of poverty to include 
vulnerability and exposure to risk – and voiceless and powerless” 
(World Bank, 2001: 15). 
According to the new framework the “sense of voiceless and powerless in the 
institutions and in the society” represents a key dimension in the concept of 
poverty, together with the traditional “lack of income” and the “vulnerability”. 
(World Bank, 2001: 34)76.  Decentralisation policies started to have an 
important role as key tool to enhance popular participation: 
 “Decentralisation and the creation or strengthening of responsive and 
effective local government structures, with authority over all or part of 
revenue from local taxation, are increasingly seen as important 
elements of participation” (OECD, 1995: 9) 
Therefore, as indicated by the conceptual framework (figure 3), 
decentralisation has the potential to increase popular participation and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
increase and reinforce participation we have 1) mechanisms for informing and consulting (ex.: 
evaluations, consulting users techniques, etc.); 2) mechanisms for design and implementation, which 
involve the stakeholders in the provision of the public services (ex.: management of natural resources 
as wildlife, forests, etc. (World Bank, 1997: 117-119).  
75 Within this new framework: “Plural politics and broad-based participation are rapidly becoming 
features of modern governance” (World Bank, 2000: 43) 
76 This ‘sense of voiceless’ implies “rudeness, humiliation, shame, inhumane treatment, and exploitation 
at the ends of the institutions of the state and society” (World Bank, 2001: 33), “threats of physical 
force or arbitrary bureaucratic power” (World Bank, 2001: 34). Moreover, “unaccountable and 
unresponsive institutions are among the causes of relatively slow progress in expanding the human 
assets of the poor people” (World Bank, 2001: 34). 
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address the “sense of voiceless” that is the main feature of the political 
dimension of poverty (World Bank, 2001). Increased levels of participation 
may enhance pro-poor choices of investment or improve the efficiency of 
public service delivery (Von Braun and Grote, 2002; Jütting et al., 2004 and 
2005)77. Also, it creates a wider and deeper space for a direct interaction 
between the population and the local centres of power, enhancing democracy, 
reducing the barrier for the poor to mobilise, increased involvement in setting 
the local agenda, decision-making and oversight of actual implementation 
(Steiner, 2007; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Chisinga, 2008). In this sense, 
decentralisation directly alleviates poverty as it reduces poverty in its political 
dimension (Steiner, 2007). In short, according to this theoretical approach: 
“decentralisation heralds a permissive and enabling atmosphere for 
communities to effectively realize their full potential for dignified and 
fulfilling lives, as it is not only an institutionalised but also a legally 
underpinned form of participatory development” (Chisinga, 2008: 73). 
To study the popular participation within a decentralised system, the literature 
on the link between decentralisation and poverty alleviation draws mainly on 
the classic works of political participation (Milbrath, 1965; Almond and Verba, 
1963; Nie and Bingham Powell, 1969a-b)78.  
Crook and Manor, define participation as “citizens’ active engagement with 
public institutions which falls into three well-defined modes: voting, election 
campaigning and contracting or pressuring” (1998: 7). According to Blair 
“Participation is to give citizens a meaningful role in local government 
decisions that affect them” (2000: 22). Blair also introduces a “casual formula” 
where the elements are connected through a cause-effect link: thus, popular 
participation may expand the scope of representation; this may empower the 
                                                             
 
77 They also recognize that “Participation to be operational requires first a minimum education, basic 
capabilities and equally based gender, religious or castes. Secondly, empowerment of people at local 
level. Often, these preconditions are not given” (Von Brawn and Grote, 2002: 7). 
78 For instance, Verba et al. define political participation as “those legal activities by private citizens that 
are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the 
actions they take” (1978: 46). 
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local population and bring in the local agenda for development instances that 
concern the different groups, contributing to ‘benefits for all’ and to poverty 
reduction. Other scholars do not provide a definition but they simply study the 
concept in relation to responsiveness or accountability (Crawford, 2008. 
Johnson, 2001). 
Scholars have used different ways to measure popular participation within a 
decentralised system. For instance, Crook and Sverrisson first distinguish 
between the quantity and scope of participation79 and they specify that it can 
occur in three main setting: in “representative government”, the main 
variables are: “voting in elections”, “standing as a candidate”, “taking part in 
election campaigns”, “contacting or trying to influence government authorities” 
and “associational membership”; “direct participation” at community or 
project level and “mobilization from above” (2001: 6-10). They also note that 
“elections are not enough and it is naïve to imagine that simply 
introducing elections for local offices will transform the relationship 
between government and citizens, or empower the mass of the poor” 
(Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). 
Von Braun and Grote recognise that the major tool of the poor is “participation 
in the election process” and they measure it comparing the number of election 
tiers with the national HDI, the national GNP or the data on services improving 
human resources such as the health quality index of WHO (Von Braun and 
Grote, 2002: 9-13). Steiner (2007 and 2008) focuses on both electoral (ex. 
voting, campaigning) and non-electoral forms of participation as the level of 
participatory planning, citizens attendance to meetings or contacting/lobbying 
local governments. Vedeld (2003) simply considers ‘participation’ as an 
“essential precondition” for pro-poor decentralisation but it does not give a 
definition or provides a set of variables from which to measure. Crawford 
(2008), in the Ghana context, applied the following variables: the electoral 
                                                             
 
79 The quality or scope of participation is defined as the degree of representation of all groups in the 
population (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001: 6). In this study, the concept of representation is treated 
separately in the following paragraph. 
79 
participation, the attendance at community meetings and contacting of 
political representatives. Jütting et al., (2004 and 2005) uses ‘participation’ and 
‘local government capacity’ as variables to measure the overall level of 
empowerment; participation is measured again in electoral and non-electoral 
terms but there is not a clear specification of the variables (Jütting, 2004-2005). 
Drawing from this literature, in this study participation is simply defined as 
“Those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to 
support government and politics” (Milbrath & Goel, 1977: 2). 
Participation is measured taking into consideration electoral and non-electoral 
forms of participation. Therefore, when discussing the political impacts of 
decentralisation on poverty alleviation we will first consider the electoral 
forms of participation, in particular,  
- voting and features of the selected candidate  
- standing as candidate, and  
- campaigning 
are analysed as main variables for the electoral form of participation. Secondly, 
also some non-electoral forms of political participation will be considered, 
mainly 
- contacting the councillors,  
- participation in the WDC/ADC system, and 
- attendance at public meetings80. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
80 See: chapter 6. 
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3.2 Representation 
A second channel through which decentralisation may give voice to the poorer 
and most marginalised is ‘representation’. In fact, it is not sufficient to simply 
have more opportunities to participate. You also need to have increased 
chances to have representation where the local decision-making takes place. 
As explained by Harry Blair: 
“Much of DLG’s [Democratic local governance] attraction as a 
development strategy lies in its promise to include people from all 
walks of life in community decision-making. The hope is that as 
government comes closer to the people, more people will participate in 
politics. All sort of constituencies – women, minorities, small 
businessmen, artisans, parents of schoolchildren, marginal farmers, 
urban poor – will then get elected to office […]” (Blair, 2000: 23). 
This is possible because decentralisation reduces the barriers that usually 
hinder access to decision-making process to the poor or marginalised. Local 
opportunities, meaning decentralized authorities, facilitate access to decision-
making places in term of distance; therefore, transit is less expensive. 
Thus, theoretically, decentralisation allows for better representation of all 
social groups, making it easier to mobilise, get involved in the local 
government’s affairs, and include issues of marginalised groups (poor, women, 
etc.) that are usually at the periphery of the public arena and influence the 
local agenda (Steiner, 2007: 117; Dauda, 2006; Ribot, 2007). 
In this study, representation is measured by analysing who usually participates 
directly in the locally elected bodies as the District Council or the Ward or Area 
Development Committees (WDC/ADC). Particular attention is given to the 
representation of traditional leaders, women and to the main occupation of the 
elected representatives81. 
 
                                                             
 
81 See chapter 6, heading 3. 
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3.3 Accountability 
Increased participation and representation cannot be automatically translated 
into empowerment of the poor. Local citizens are empowered if there are 
mechanisms enabling them to make local governments responsive to the 
citizens and accountable for their decisions.  
Accountability is another “catch-word” that is now widespread in development 
discourse. This concept shared a similar pattern of popularity with the concept 
of ‘participation’, as described earlier in this chapter (Ackardt, 2008).  In the 
1980s and early 1990s, although this concept was present in many donors’ 
documents, it did not seem to play a central role in their respective 
development practice. The concept started to become popular at the very end 
of the 1990s with the third wave of democratisation. There was a shift in the 
understanding of ‘poverty’ expanding to become a multidimensional concept, a 
renovated importance of the role of the state, the affirmation of the concepts of 
the ‘new institutional economics’ and the increasing popularity of ‘democratic 
decentralisation’82. 
Within this new framework, only (democratic) decentralisation creates the 
best conditions for more accountable institutions. Crook and Manor clearly 
argument this claim: 
“Elected decision-makers are closer to the citizens who elect them, and 
often live locally. Thus, they face greater pressure than higher-level 
officials to govern according to their constituents' wishes. They worry 
about re-election in a few years, and they receive more direct 
indications of discontent between elections. Bureaucrats operating in 
field offices of line ministries also feel greater pressure because elected 
representatives are now closer and more powerful. Citizens quickly 
                                                             
 
82 The New Institutional Economics (NIE) views institutions as formal rules (ex. constitutions, laws, 
contracts, etc.) and informal rules (ex.: values, social norms). These rules influence the way the actors 
behave, providing directions for eligibility, responsibilities, rewards, or sanctions. The manipulation of 
these rules provokes an ‘institutional change’ that can improve the efficiency in the provision of social 
services and the accountability of the institution. Not surprisingly, donor-funded decentralisation 
reforms in the last two decades have usually been associated with a wider public administration or 
civil service reforms as in Mali, Ghana, or Zambia). For an insightful analysis on NIE, see Eggertsson 
(2013) and Klein (1999) 
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discern this, and apply greater pressure on bureaucrats through elected 
representatives. Thus, despite difficulties in creating and sustaining 
accountability mechanisms, systems can become more accountable 
under democratic decentralization”. (Crook and Manor, 2000: 12). 
Therefore, accountability has been defined as “the most crucial element in 
successful decentralisation” (Crook and Manor, 1994 as cited by Manor, 1999: 
7; Steiner, 2008: 38). Although many scholars take into consideration this 
concept in assessing decentralisation and its impacts, they do not often offer a 
clear definition and use different indicators for measurement. Accountability 
for Blair means that “people will be able to hold local government responsible 
for how it is affecting them” (Blair, 2000). Crook and Manor have used 
accountability as a key concept in the relationship between popular 
participation and performance of the decentralised institutions (Crook and 
Manor, 1998: 10)83.  Jütting et al. (2004 and 2005) also have employed 
accountability as an important variable in their cross-national study but they 
do not give a precise definition of the concept of the variable used to measure 
it. Bardhan and Mookherjee have suggested a political definition of 
accountability as “the ability of citizens to put effective pressure on officials 
who deviate from the expressed wishes of a majority among them” (2006: 5). 
Finally, Agrawal and Ribot have introduced a “relational” understanding of 
accountability where the attention is focused on the actors involved: 
“Accountability is also about the mechanisms through which counter 
powers are exercised by those subject to actors holding decentralized 
power. Accountability in this sense, to paraphrase Foucault, is not in a 
position of exteriority to power, but depends on the exercise of a 
counter power to balance arbitrary action” (1999: 9). 
Different indicators have been used to assess the level of accountability, in the 
most recent works assessing the new wave of decentralisation in the last 
twenty years. First, it is widely accepted by scholars to consider two forms of 
accountability: on the one side, accountability of elected representatives to 
citizens (downward accountability); on the other, accountability of 
                                                             
 
83 Manor (1999) has indicated accountability as the most important elements for a successful 
decentralization reform. 
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bureaucrats to elected representatives (upward accountability) (Manor, 1999: 
66-67; Blair, 2000; Von Braun and Grote, 2002; Crawford, 2008; Steiner, 
2008)84.  
Second, it is also widely accepted that different tools help create an 
accountable system. Through a cross-country study, Blair has identified the 
following: (1) free and fair local elections; (2) strong and competitive political 
parties; (3) strong civil society organisations; (4) media; (5) public meetings; 
(6) formal grievances procedures; and (7) opinion surveys as main tools in 
creating an accountable system of governance (2000: 27-31)85. These tools are 
commonly accepted by most decentralisation scholars who use these variables 
in their works. For instance, Steiner has focused on “competitive elections, 
auditing and evaluation, public hearings, third-party monitoring by a free press 
and procedures of recall”. This highlights the interactions between civil 
servants and political representatives (Steiner, 2005: 11 and 2008: 37-38). 
Crawford (2008) has employed the number of meetings organised by the 
assembly members, the role played by the sub-district committees and the 
inclusion of women as variables to assess the accountability of elected 
representatives to the public. In addition, the institutional regulations and 
relationship models within the different bodies composing the LG (chief 
executive, assembly members, sub-committees) are used to assed the 
accountability of local executives to the public. Finally, Crook and Manor (1998) 
have assessed accountability using different forms of participation (ex. vote, 
                                                             
 
84 In their work, Kaufman et al. (2004) use “voice and accountability” together with other indicators to 
measure the level of governance. Also, Devas and Grant have proposed the notion of “horizontal 
accountability” (of local officials to elected representatives) and “upward accountability (of local 
governments to central government” (2003: 310). Finally, Goetz et al., (2001) have proposed a 
distinction between political, fiscal, administrative and legal or constitutional accountability.  
85 A more comprehensive list of mechanisms that may help in secure downwards and upwards 
accountability is also provided by Agrawal and Ribot: “procedures for recall; referenda; legal recourse 
through courts; third party monitoring by media, NGOs or independently elected controllers; auditing 
and evaluation; political pressures and lobbying by associations and associative movements; providing 
of information on roles and obligations of government by the media and NGOs; public reporting 
requirements for governments; education; embeddedness of leaders in their community; belief 
systems of leaders and their communities; civic dedication and pride of leaders; performance awards; 
widespread participation; social movements; threats of social unrest and resistance; central state 
oversight of local government; and taxation” (1999: 10). More recently, also Ribot (2002) has provided 
a list of accountability mechanisms. 
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turnout, kind of electoral competition, etc.) and institutional arrangements (ex. 
role of the district secretary, the civil service, sub-committees work, relation 
bureaucrats/elected, etc.)86.  
This review on how scholars have used accountability to assess 
decentralisation its pro-poor outcomes shows that there is not a unique 
framework of assessment. This study draws on these previous works and 
therefore accountability is understood as those mechanisms that  
“[…] form a credible threat to both local politicians and civil servants in 
the sense that they are punished for unresponsiveness and 
misbehaviour, they will have greater incentives to act in the 
population’s interests, encouraging participation and addressing 
demands” (Steiner, 2008: 37). 
We also accept Blair’s conclusions on accountability: (1) the absence of a 
unique accountability pattern, (2) absence of a mechanism sufficient by itself; 
(3) no one mechanism is viable in all settings. We also accept the principle of a 
dual level of accountability: civil servants should be responsible to elected 
representatives (administrative accountability) and elected representatives 
should be responsible to the electorate (political accountability). 
Therefore, the following analysis on political accountability will take into 
consideration: (1) the electoral competition and vote; (2) the local information 
flow; (3) the role of the sub-district structures; and (4) the popular perceptions 
towards the local (elected) institutions87. 
 
  
                                                             
 
86 For an insightful critical analysis on the notion of accountability, its main variables that can strengthen 
government accountability see Ackerman (2004). 
87 See chapter 6, heading 4. 
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4 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION: EFFICIENCY & TARGETING 
Poverty entails a condition characterised by “material deprivation (measured 
by an appropriate concept of income or consumptions) but also low 
achievements in education and health” (World Bank, 2001: 15). 
Decentralisation is considered a key tool to fight against the socio-economic 
deprivation. According with the World Bank: 
“It can be powerful for achieving development goals in ways that 
respond to the needs of local communities, by assigning control rights 
to people who have the information and incentives to make decisions 
best suited to those needs, and who have the responsibility for the 
political and economic consequences of their decisions. It is not in itself 
a goal of development, but a means of improving public sector 
efficiency”. (World Bank, 2001: 107). 
Following this rationale, decentralised local governments are more efficient in 
providing social services and they can better target them to reach the most in 
need. Moreover, local governments are also responsible for local development 
and they should take initiatives to increase local economic growth.  
This rationale is based on the assumption that local authorities have an 
informational advantage if compared with the central government. It is 
advocated by some as the “greatest virtue of decentralisation” (Treisman, 2007: 
209)88. For instance, a local councillor or ministry line official may have better 
information on the residents’ needs and preferences, making them more likely 
to respond (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2011). According to Hayek:  
“We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first 
communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after 
integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some 
form of decentralisation. (…) We need decentralisation because only 
thus can we unsure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances 
of time and place will be promptly used (1945: 521). 
Moreover, if compared with the central authorities, local authorities can also 
identify cheaper ways to provide public services and tailor their provisions 
                                                             
 
88 For an insightful analysis on the potential information advantages of local residents and officials and its 
shortcoming see Treisman (2007, especially chapters 7 and 9). 
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according to the residents’ conditions in order to reach the poorest and most 
vulnerable, creating allocative gains (World Bank, 2001; von Braun and Grote, 
2002; Asante, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Jütting et al., 2005)89. 
However, as Steiner has argued: 
“It is the power for decision-making rather than for the final provision, 
which matters. Hence, decentralization is related to poverty eradication if 
the decision-making power for poverty reduction policies is transferred to 
the local government level, which often is the case for social services and 
sometimes for infrastructure”(2005: 13) 
Thus, to be effective, the informational advantage assumption needs the 
transfer of two types of powers from the central authorities to the local 
governments: on the one hand, the revenue-raising power that guarantees a 
stable source of resources (financial and human); on the other hand, the 
decision-making power that allows them to actually allocate and invest the 
resources in a way that actually meets the residents’ demands (Steiner, 2005; 
Ribot, 2002; Bird and Rodrigues, 1999). 
These ‘powers’ are directly related to local taxation theories and the concept of 
fiscal decentralisation, which are often perceived as the central issues for a 
local administration to be efficient and live up to the efficiency expectations90.   
Local taxes are a key tool as they should constitute the main pillar to guarantee 
the functioning and the service delivery of a local government system (Bratton, 
2012). The local authorities should be able to take decisions on local taxes and 
its rates and to collect them. In theory, taxpayers should be more willing to pay 
                                                             
 
89 Although these assumptions are generally accepted by the literature, some scholars have expressed 
some concerns. For instance, Prud’homme (1995) has warned against the “dangers of 
decentralisation”. He has shown that the traditional claims based on the fiscal federalism theories can 
actually work differently in developing countries, with decentralisation increasing inefficiencies, 
corruption practices, and instability. For other critical approaches see: Manor (1999) and Tanzi 
(1995). 
90 For more information on these type or form of decentralization see chapter 2 heading 2. A review of 
the fiscal decentralization theories and debates is beyond the scope of this study. However, here some 
of the major assumption directly related with the assumed linkage between decentralization and 
poverty alleviation are recalled. For an insightful analysis on fiscal decentralization, see Bahl & Linn, 
1994. 
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taxes at the local level as they have better chances to control public officials 
and, to see the results of public resources expenditures (Steiner, 2005; Devas 
and Delay, 2006; Bratton, 2012; )91. 
Strictly linked to the revenue raising power is the design and implementation 
of governmental transfers to the local authorities. Usually, local revenue is 
composed by both the resources raised through the local taxation and by those 
directly received from the central government in terms of grants 92 . 
Governmental transfers are perceived to be “for good or for ill” (Asante and 
Ayee, 2008: 5) a key feature in the design of a system of local governance. The 
fiscal federalism theorists Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) have supported 
the need of local government units and theorised the need to distinguish 
between two types of responsibilities: one the one hand, the 
stabilisation/redistribution and allocation tasks should be done by the central 
authorities; and on the other the provision of public goods and services should 
be a local government responsibility (Steiner, 2005)93. Therefore, within a 
decentralised system, the central government maintains an important role, 
mainly in terms of ‘equity’ and ‘redistribution’94. 
Resources are used by local governments to provide public good and services 
that should better respond to local needs. This assumption draws on the Oates’ 
Decentralisation Theorem: 
“For a public good – the consumption of which is defined over 
geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of 
                                                             
 
91 The linkage between taxation and decentralization has recently attracted major attention from the 
literature. See: Fjeldstad (2001); Schneider (2003); Moore and Schneider (2004); Dickovich (2005); 
Juul (2006), Bratton (2012). 
92 Other forms of resources may derive from Constituencies Funds, investments, loans (Treisman, 2007). 
93 Fiscal federalist theories aims at maximize social welfare, understood as a combination of economic 
stability, allocative efficiency and distributive equity (Schneider, 2003). Interestingly, according to 
Steiner, Fiscal federalist theories have been used as supportive arguments for fiscal decentralization; 
however, “it has never been questioned and re-examined for its relevance and appropriateness. It has 
simply been taken for granted” (2005:14). 
94 Local governments may play a role in guaranteeing an internal equity within the local units, but also an 
inter-jurisdictional equity among the poorest and richest regions in a country (Ribot, 2002; Treisman, 
2007). 
88 
providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the 
same for the central or for the respective local government – it will 
always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments 
to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions” (2006: 3-4). 
This theorem links back to the ‘information advantage’ discussed above as it 
implies that local governments may be even more efficient than (or at least as 
efficient) as the central government in providing public services and goods, 
given the proximity to the final user. In this framework, Steiner (2005) has 
demonstrated that at least theoretically the Decentralisation Theorem and 
holds valid as pro-poor strategy, although practically the assumption is more 
questionable (Steiner, 2005)95. Moreover, the decision-making power on 
public services may facilitate the provision of public good and services 
targeting the most vulnerable (Bird and Rodriguez, 1999: 304)96. 
Finally, local governments can act as economic development agents: for 
instance, they may provide services enabling the improvement of local 
economic activities or even incentive new initiatives; they may contribute in 
creating an optimal environment for business activities (Smoke, 2003; Van Dijk, 
2008, Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010). Also, the improved quality and access to 
public services may indirectly positively impact the poorest residents; 
therefore, providing increased opportunities to engage in productive activities 
(Steiner, 2007). 
The most recent cross-country studies on the linkage between decentralisation 
and poverty reduction have mainly focused on the social aspect (production 
and access to social services and goods), paying little attention on the 
economic side, understood as income and increased business opportunities  
                                                             
 
95 In a recent study, Conyers (2007) has reviewed some case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, showing 
negative (or at least mixed) results on the relation between decentralization and service delivery. 
Mixed results are also coming from ‘national’ studies as Faguet (2002) in Bolivia; Pinto (2004) in 
Senegal; Meyer-Emerick and Mothusi (2004) in Botwana; Kaag (2003) in Senegal; Isiche (2008) in 
Kenya. 
96 The literature does not give a precise guidance on which kind of services should be decentralized 
(Andrews & Scrhoeder, 2003) 
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(Crawford and Hartman, 2008). For instance, Jütting et al. (2004) have taken 
into consideration only the ‘access to social service’. Von Braun and Grote 
(2002) and Vedeld (2003) have also based the analysis on indicators such as 
sub-national spending or the provision of public services.  
In this study, the economic dimension is equally considered as an important 
feature of the condition of poverty. Therefore, this study will try to analyse if 
development initiatives taken by the local authorities in Zambia in the last few 
years have had an impact (positive or negative) in terms of economic growth 
and provision of public services and goods such as water and infrastructure. 
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4  C h a p t e r  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
1 METHODOLOGY 
This study entails three main methodological issues. As the general goal of the 
research is to understand if, and how, decentralisation policies have an impact 
(positive or negative) on poor people, we first need to define ‘what poor is’ and, 
secondly, to identify who is ‘poor’ or ‘rich’ in the target districts. Finally, the 
last issue is how to analyse the impact of decentralisation on the different 
wealth groups (ex.: the ‘poor’, ‘rich’, etc.) given the complexity and the multi-
dimensionality of the notion of poverty as per our theoretical framework. 
In sum, these are the three main methodological questions the researcher had 
to solve at the beginning of this work: 
1. How to define poverty? 
2. How to identify the ‘poor’, the ‘rich’ or the ‘average’ within the target 
districts? 
3. How to measure the impact of decentralisation on the three main 
dimensions of poverty (political, social and economic)? 
A methodological choice on how to approach the assessment of poverty and 
development policy is implied, as the decentralisation reforms applied in the 
developing countries. One possible solution was to use conventional or 
institutional data provided by the international agencies or state institutions. 
However, these data are frequently available aggregated for the national or 
province level, while it is less common to find the data for each district. 
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Moreover, income data was not sufficient to cover the different poverty 
dimensions (political, social, and economic) so other indexes needed to be 
used, which made the comparison particularly difficult, adding more 
challenges in terms of availability and comparability of data97. 
Thus, the solution was to apply, on the one hand, a participatory assessment 
approach and on the other, to use ‘mixed’ methodological tools.  
 
1.1 Participatory Approach to Poverty and Development  
Norton et al. define participatory poverty assessment as “an instrument for 
including poor people’s views in the analysis of poverty and the formulation of 
strategies to reduce it through public policy” (2001: 6).  
In the last decades, the more conventional methods to assess poverty and 
development policies have undergone through a conceptual revision that have 
completely changed the way today we address these concept. The concept of 
poverty has tremendously changed from a traditional approach, based on 
‘income’ and ‘consumption’ as key indicators, to a ‘relative’ approach, where 
other variables are used to build a ‘multi-dimensional’ understanding of 
poverty98. A result from this theoretical shift was the introduction of new 
indicators and tools to define and measure poverty: the Human Development 
Index by UNDP introduced in 1990 is probably the first and most cited 
example of the research of alternative solutions99. 
                                                             
 
97 Some of the indexes/surveys available are the following: a) the “Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys” 
(MICS) by UNICEF that analyses data on household expenditure, income, labour force, child labour, 
water and sanitation, and salt iodization modules; the data available is from 1999. The “Living 
Conditions Monitoring Survey” by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of Zambia with survey data on 
migration, education, health, economic activities of the population, household food production, income, 
assets, expenditure. Although this survey uses a conventional approach it also includes a ‘self-
assessment’ by the poor and it is used as a monitoring source for the achievement of the MDG. 
98 For a more detailed account of the evolution of the understanding of poverty from an ‘absolute’ to a 
‘relative’ and ‘multi-dimensional’ concept, see Chapter 3, heading 2.2). 
99  Other indexes have also been developed, focusing on specific development aspects; among others: the 
State of the World’s Children, the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) by UNICEF or the Social 
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However, some have argued that these efforts are still characterised by a top-
down approach, based on Western perceptions of poverty or well-being which 
does not necessarily match the poor’s perceptions. As Chambers argues: 
“The question is whether concepts and measures that are universal, 
standardised, measurable, generated by and designed for conditions in 
the urban industrial North can be universally applied in the more rural 
and agriculture South, and whether they fit or distort the diverse and 
complex realities of most of the poor” (Chambers, 1995: 185). 
In his influential works, Chambers has criticised the traditional approach to 
poverty measurement and has theorized a “reversal from top-down to bottom-
up, from centralised standardisation to local diversity, and from blueprint to 
learning process” (1994a: 953). He has also greatly contributed to the research 
of new participatory methods that could overcome the “six biases” of the 
“outsiders” and could put “the last first” (Chambers, 1983). These methods 
were first recognised with the spread of the use of  the “Participatory Rural 
Appraisal” (PRA), which “describe a growing family of approaches and 
methods to enable people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life 
and conditions, to plan and to act” (Chambers, 1994: 953)100. 
The use of participatory methods is today widely accepted and used in the 
academia as well as by international agencies. Their evolution is still in 
progress and there is a fast growing literature on the subject101. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Indicators Development by the World Bank. For a complete list, see Sumner (2007: 10). The academic 
debate on these new multidimensional approaches is still ongoing. As example: Chambers (2007a) 
deepens the notion of participation, focusing on some “neglected dimensions of poverty” as ‘place’, 
‘body’.   More recently, others have focused on the ‘Multidimensional Poverty Analysis’ by UNDP 
(Alrike, 2014). Very interesting is also the last work of Vijaya, Lahoti and Swaminathan (2014): they 
criticizes the use of ‘households’ as unit of analysis in the ‘Multidimensional Poverty Analysis’ and 
suggest the ‘individual’ as enhanced unit measure.  
100 For a detailed description on the origin and experience of PRA, see Chambers (1994a, 1994b, and 
1998). For a critical review of the participatory methods in the analysis of poverty see Laderchi (2001). 
101 NGOs, such as ActionAid or Plan International, have been among the pioneers of the participatory 
approaches (Chambers, 2007b). The World Bank has also used participatory methods: the 
‘Participatory Poverty Assessment’ (PPA) constitutes the first attempt to break the exclusive economic 
metric rule and introduces participatory methods. The first round was performed in Ghana in 1993 
and then followed by Zambia (World Bank, 1994). Others followed: South Africa (1995), Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda, etc. Moreover, the new approach to ‘poverty’ introduced by the World Bank Report 
in 2000/01 was based on an extensive participatory consultation, known as “Voices of the Poor” 
(Narayan, Chambers, Shah and Petesch, 1999 and 2000b). See also Narayan, Patel, Schafft, 
Rademacher, and Koch-Schulte (2000a). Some have also criticised the use of ‘participation’ and 
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the use of ‘economic’ indicators is still predominant in the development 
analysis102.  
This research draws on this literature and makes use of participatory 
approaches to assess poverty and decentralisation policies. These methods 
better respond to the need to focus on the specific local experience of Zambia, 
in order to provide additional empirical data to a still lacking literature. 
First, the most recent works concerning the links between decentralisation and 
poverty reduction accept the multi-dimensional understanding of poverty and 
their analysis goes usually beyond the mere use of economic indicators. 
Actually, quite frequently, the economic indicator has been ‘forgotten’, but has 
been correctly re-introduced by Crawford (2008) in his recent contribution to 
this topic. Although the widely quoted cross-country studies focus more on the 
‘empowerment’ and the ‘service delivery’, they usually omit the ‘economic’ 
dimension of poverty103. This study has also used the ‘household income’ as an 
important variable in the assessment of the economic impact of 
decentralisation. 
Second, in this study, the analysis of the data on the impact of decentralisation 
policies is based on a ‘local’ and ‘participatory’ definition of poverty: instead of 
taking the ‘top-down’ data from indexes provided by international or Zambian 
agencies, this study uses a ‘bottom-up’ approach, using as baseline a local 
definition of ‘poverty’ and ‘wealth’, acquired through focus groups. To my 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
participatory methods as panacea in the development discourse, defining participation as the “new 
tyranny” (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). 
102 For instance, in a short paper Sumner goes through a rapid review of the concept of poverty, to 
highlight the “apparent contradiction between the consensus over the meaning of poverty and the 
choice of methods with which to measure poverty in practice” (2007: 4). Moreover, some critical 
authors have also warned against the “dangers of localism”, but nevertheless have found consensus not 
only among the ‘revised neoliberists’ and in the ‘post-marxists’ but also in the “liberal populism of 
Chambers” (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). 
103 Crook and Sverrisson (2001) focus on two main variables “responsiveness and participation” and 
“socio-economic outcomes”. This latter is measured using the following indicators: “pro-poor growth”, 
“social equity”, “human development”, spatial or inter-regional inequity”. Von Braun and Grote (2002) 
use mainly the HDI or other sectoral indexes on health (WHO Index) or literacy (World Development 
Reports), data on per capita income, etc.  to assess the impact of decentralization on poverty. Finally, 
Jütting et al. (2004 and 2005) use indicators on “empowerment” and “access to services”.  
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knowledge, this approach has never been applied in other earlier works on 
decentralisation, which usually refer to the Human Development Index (HDI), 
the World Bank Reports or other statistical data provided by international or 
local institutions. The use of a ‘local’ perception of poverty enables a better 
assessment of the impact of decentralisation through the ‘local eyes’ of those 
directly involved and it constitutes an original contribution of this study. 
Finally, the multi-dimensional understanding of poverty necessarily implies 
the use of a multi-disciplinary approach. Addison, Hulme and Kantor argued: 
“Thus we believe that the next frontier in poverty research is at the 
intersection of dynamics and cross-disciplinarily” (Addison-Hulme-Kanbur, 
“Poverty Dynamics”, 2009: Kindle loc. 101). This approach implies a sort of 
‘revolution’ in the conventional methodology as it goes beyond the traditional 
shift between quantitative and qualitative methods and calls for mixed 
methods of research.  
 
1.2 Mixed Methods Research 
‘Mixed methods research’ implies the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
research tools within a same research project. Traditionally, these two 
methods have been considered incompatible. On the one hand, quantitative 
methods have traditionally used structured interviews or surveys to collect 
data, before proceeding to their statistical analysis; they are mainly number 
based and they mainly use a deductive process. On the other hand, qualitative 
methods has prevalently used focus groups discussions, semi or unstructured 
interviews, participatory observations as data collection methods; they are 
mainly text-based and do not require a statistical analysis (Bryman, 2012). 
In the last decade, mixed methods research has emerged and have slowly 
acquired slowly growing academic recognition. In 2003, Tashakkori and 
Teddlie wrote their “Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural 
Research” and, a few years later, a “Journal of Mixed Methods Research” was 
published. In his recent review on articles on mixed methods research, Bryman 
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(2012) has classified the ways qualitative and quantitative methods are 
combined using 232 academic journal articles, and, although supporting their 
use and validity he has also warned against their ‘overuse’:  
“(…) mixed methods research should not be considered as an approach 
that is universally applicable or as a panacea. It may provide a better 
understanding of a phenomenon that if just one method had been used” 
(Bryman, 2012: 649)104.  
The emergence of a multi-dimensional understanding of poverty as well as of 
decentralisation has created new methodological challenges for researchers, 
which often have been solved using mixed research methods. In fact, talking 
about poverty, Addison et al., pointed out: 
“Over the past decade, there has been growing interaction between two 
stands of, or two approaches to, poverty analysis in developing 
countries – the qualitative and the quantitative. Interaction between 
these approaches has been forced to some extent by the strengthening 
(in some case mandated) requirement by development agencies to 
expand the traditional quantitative base of their poverty assessment 
with a qualitative component. The best-known case of this trend is the 
World Bank’s Poverty Assessments” (2009: Kindle loc. 165) 
Also, the literature on the links between decentralisation and poverty 
reduction has used different kinds of methods, although the qualitative 
methods are probably still predominant. For instance, studying 
decentralisation in Ghana, Crawford (2008) makes use of household surveys 
and focus group discussions. On the other hand, Steiner (2008) mainly uses 
unstructured interviews to collect her data on decentralisation in Uganda. As 
Patton explained: 
“There is no rule of thumb that tells a researcher precisely how to focus 
a study. The extent to which a research question is broad or narrow 
depends on purpose, the resources available, the time available, and the 
interests of those involved. In brief, these are not choices between good 
and bad, but choices among alternatives, all of which have merit” (2002: 
224) 
                                                             
 
104 For a insight on the academic discussion on the mixed method research tools, see also Denzin and 
Lincoln (2011) and Silverman (2011) 
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This study has used mixed research methods for two main reasons. First, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was viewed as the best 
strategy to reach the study’s goals and to help answer the research questions, 
given the complexity of decentralisation and poverty.  
Second, the use of mixed methods could give the opportunity to have a more 
comprehensive account on the impact of decentralisation in the two target 
districts in Zambia.  In fact, on the one hand, the use of quantitative techniques 
through structured household questionnaires enabled the collection of 
quantifiable data, the creation of a ‘wealth index’ and the analysis of the data 
using statistical tools. On the other hand, the use of self-assessment techniques 
and the local perceptions on poverty and wealth have enabled the assessment 
of decentralisation policies using the ‘view’ and ‘perceptions’ of the individuals 
or groups ‘affected’ by those policies. 
Thus, the data gathered though quantitative techniques have been enriched by 
also using qualitative tools. The use of both research methods could give an 
added value in terms of completeness of the information available to the 
researcher. For instance, the focus groups allowed an in-depth discussion on 
some issues, such as the use of development funds or the way development 
projects are undertaken by local institutions. Moreover, follow-up questions to 
the household questionnaire gave the possibility to the respondent to 
elaborate further, providing valuable information to the researcher. 
Thus, first, I have used a qualitative technique as a focus group discussion in 
order to acquire data on the local perceptions and on the definitions of ‘very 
poor’, ‘poor’, ‘rich’, ‘very rich’ or ‘average’ (neither poor, nor rich). As already 
explained, the researcher decided to use self-assessment techniques and rely 
on the local perceptions on poverty and wealth: the communities’ self-
assessment is an added value to the research as it enables an evaluation of the 
decentralisation policies using the ‘view’ and ‘perceptions’ of the groups 
‘affected’ by those policies.  
Secondly, quantitative techniques were also used through the construction of a 
‘wealth’ index (based on the ‘local’ definitions) the classification of the 
98 
households in accordance with their ‘wealth’ status, and the analysis of the 
additional data. 
Thirdly, focus groups discussions were also used to assess both the impact of 
decentralisation policies on the different wealth groups, and the perceptions of 
the ‘local elite’ towards the local institutions (the district council and the 
WDC/ADC). The same perceptions were also collected through the household 
surveys. In this case, the use of the both research methods could give an added 
value in terms of completeness of the information available to the researcher. 
For instance, the focus groups discussions allowed an in-depth analysis on 
some issues, such as the use of development funds or the way development 
projects are undertaken by the local institutions. One the other hand, follow-up 
questions to the household questionnaire gave the possibility to the 
respondent to elaborate further, providing valuable information to the 
researcher. 
 
1.3 Ontology and Epistemology 
This study aims at understanding if and how decentralisation policies have an 
impact (positive or negative) on poor people in two districts in Zambia, by 
using a participatory approach and by highlighting the local perceptions 
towards the main local institutions and development projects. The acceptance 
of a constructivist approach is implied: local institutions are not understood as 
a tangible and as an objective phenomenon that follow their own objective 
rules and that “have a reality external to social actors”, as implied by the 
objectivism approach (Bryman, 2012: 32). Here, we accept a constructivist 
approach by which “social phenomena and categories are not only produced 
through social interaction but they are in a constant state of revision” (Ibidem: 
2012: 38). 
  
99 
2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The following sections will outline in detail how the different qualitative and 
qualitative research methods were used and their purpose. In short, in the two 
districts, the following research methods were used: 
1. Focus Groups discussions: with community leaders based on the PADev 
methodology; the goal was to collect the data to create a bottom-up definition on 
five wealth categories (ex.: ‘very poor’, ‘poor’, ‘average’, ‘rich’ and ‘very rich’) to 
discuss the benefits of the development projects funded by the local government 
and to assess the overall performance of the local councils and the WDC/ADC. 
2. Household survey: 80 respondents were interviewed in the two districts. The goal 
was to collect the data on residents’ political participation, their socio-economic 
situation, and their access to public services105. 
The research was also enriched by key informant interviews and by the 
collection and review of documents stored in the local councils’ archives or 
libraries (ex.: local councils’ budgets, ministerial circulars, etc.). Valuable 
information was also acquired through the ‘participatory observation’ of the 
researcher, who was directly involved in the daily work of the local authorities. 
 
2.1 Focus Groups Discussions: PADev Methodology 
The PADev methodology has been developed by the African Studies Centre in 
Leiden, the Royal Tropical Institute (Amsterdam) and the University of 
Amsterdam, in partnership with three Dutch NGOs s (ICCO Alliance, Prisma 
and Woord en Daad). The original goal of this methodology was to respond to 
the increased needs by development aid agencies for effective and rigorous 
tools to assess the effects and impact of their interventions in the field. Not 
                                                             
 
105 The help of some assistants was also necessary to aid the researcher during the data collection. In 
particular, a translator was usually required for the household questionnaire and sometimes also for 
the focus group meetings. In Samfya and Chipata, community workers attached to the planning 
department were extremely supportive in helping in this task. Every time, the translator was 
somebody already familiar with the local government functioning. He/she received additional 
explanations on the goals of this study prior to the survey rounds or focus group meetings. 
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surprisingly in the last 10-15 years, the attention (also in the academia) on the 
monitoring and evaluation methods have been steadily increasing, triggering 
both the development and use of different methods by international donors 
(ex.: EU, USAID, and to a lesser extent, UN agencies and the World Bank)106. 
Thus, this methodology has been developed with the primary goal to assess 
development projects. According to Dietz et al.: 
“PADev is an approach to development assessment that is holistic and 
participatory, and at the same time rigorous, and frequently makes use 
of both qualitative and quantitative data. It aims to add both context 
and depth by building up a big picture of development and change in an 
area over time. This is done through a more inclusive approach, which 
gives a clear voice to the beneficiaries of development interventions. 
Additionally it can be used as a set of tools for participatory history 
writing at local levels of scale” (2013: 7). 
PADev Methodology has been tested in four rounds of workshops in Burkina 
Faso and Ghana between 2008 and 2012107. The complete methodology 
consists of nine participatory exercises, to be run during a three-day workshop 
with different groups (men, women, youth, etc.): 1) Events, 2) Changes, 3) 
Wealth group categorisation, 4) Project recall, 5) Project Assessment, 6) 
Best/worst projects, 7) Relationship between changes and projects, 8) Wealth 
group benefits, 9) Assessment of agencies (Dietz et al., 2013).  
 
2.1.1 RELEVANCE OF PADEV METHODOLOGY FOR THIS RESEARCH  
The use of the PADev methodology perfectly fulfilled the needs of this research 
work and also provided answers to some challenging methodological issues. 
A first issue in this study was “how to define poverty”. Different methods could 
be used: for instance, we could use the data provided by international 
                                                             
 
106 Bamberger & White (2008); Chambers, Karlan, Ravallion & Rogers (2009); Banerjee & Duflo (2011); 
Forss, Kruse, Taut & Tenden (2006). 
107 The research project is now finished. All the data, the analysis and guidebook are available for 
consultation in a dedicated website (www. padev.nl).  
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institutions, such as the World Bank or used other economic–based tools. 
However, as already discussed, these tools were not considered sufficient by 
the researcher, also because in the Zambian case, data is not available at 
province or district level108. 
A second issue was to find or elaborate tools for a focus group discussion, with 
the goal of gathering data on the overall performance of the local institutions 
(local council and WDC/ADC) and the impact assessment of local government’s 
projects on the different wealth groups. The PADev methodology addressed 
these issues, thanks to ad hoc exercises aimed at gathering this information 
and with the added value of a participatory approach. 
Moreover, it also responded to a third issue: the need to have a tool able to 
assess the variables used for this study (ex.: participation, representation, 
efficiency, etc.) and their evolution over the time. The original project proposal 
aimed at creating an historical comparison between the actual decentralised 
institutional framework and the centralised one before the establishment of 
the local councils. This scheme could perfectly apply for a country like Mali, 
characterised by a long history of centralised government during the colonial, 
post-independence period and the shift in 1992 with the establishment of both 
a new democratic constitution and a local government system109. 
However, the same scheme could not apply for Zambia, which is characterised 
by a longstanding local government tradition also found in rural areas. Lacking 
the ‘shift’ between a ‘before’ and ‘after’, the historical comparison was not 
longer relevant anymore. For this reason, the PADev methodology could not be 
used as developed by the scholars at the Afrika Studiecentrum as first planned, 
but needed to be adapted following the features of the Zambian experience. 
                                                             
 
108 See heading 1.2 in this chapter. 
109 The intended research proposal was to pursue the study of local government system in Mali by 
drawing from a previous research undertaken in 2008. However, the military putsch in March 2012 
created unsuitable conditions for the research. For an insightful description of the setting of this 
research see heading 3.1 in this chapter. 
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2.1.2 CHANGES IN THE METHODOLOGY  
Different changes were applied in the actual implementation of the PADev 
exercises110.  
1. Participants and timing 
“To be sufficiently representative, a workshop should consist of 
participants from all relevant categories of the local population. In 
practice, this means sampling participants in a way that does justice to 
the demographic, social-cultural and social-economic composition of 
the community”. (Dietz et al., 2013: 7-8). 
It has been suggested to hold different workshop at the same time by grouping 
specific groups (ex.: women, man, etc.). In the two districts, it was not possible 
to find suitable assistants to help the researcher to carry out additional focus 
group discussions in each ward. It was therefore decided to hold only one 
workshop per ward, regrouping only community leaders identified through 
the help of the local councils (ex. traditional and religious leader, WDC member, 
members from the professional/gender associations, teachers, etc.)111. This 
choice was driven by the consideration that, if a choice had to be made, priority 
should be given to those groups that had presumably more information on the 
local authorities, their functioning and activities, and were therefore able to 
provide additional information to the researcher. 
2. Exercises and timing 
As already explained, the PADev methodology needed also to be adapted to the 
features of the Zambian local government tradition. Five out of nine exercises 
were used, skipping those that were more time-related aimed at creating a 
                                                             
 
110 As suggested by Dietz et al. (2013), the PADev methodology can be used in its entirety, or by using 
selected exercises and components to complement the other evaluation tool (2013: 9). 
111 More information on the sampling process is provided in heading 3.2 in this chapter. 
103 
historical comparison between the performance of previous system and the 
actual one, or more focused on NGOs project implementation (ex.: Exercises 1 
and 2, “Events” and “Changes”, exercise 6 “Relationship between Changes and 
Projects” or exercise 9 “Historical assessment of best/worst projects”).  
The use of fewer exercises also reduced the time necessary to carry out the 
focus group discussions. Instead of a three-day workshop as planned in the 
original methodology, a three/four hour one was sufficient to gather the data, 
the organisation of which proved to be cost and time-efficient. The workshops 
were always organised in the afternoon to maximize the participation of the 
community members.  
 
2.1.3 THE FOCUS GROUP EXERCISES  
The focus group discussions were firstly aimed at developing a bottom-up 
definition of poverty, according to local and not Western standards. The 
definitions were to be used during the data analysis to built a wealth index and 
to classify the survey’s respondents according to this ‘local’ definition of wealth 
and poverty. 
Secondly, during the focus groups additional information was collected on the 
major developments of the projects implemented in the last few years by the 
local council in order to assess their impact on the wealth groups identified 
during the first exercise. Finally, the focus group participants helped assessing 
the performance of the local institutions, namely the local council and the 
WDC/ADCs. 
Thus, using the PADev methodology, five exercises were used to collect the 
data, as outlined below112: 
 
                                                             
 
112 The results for each exercise are available in Annex 1. 
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1. Wealth Group Categorization 
Question: “Please describe the things that make a person ‘very rich’, ‘rich’, 
‘average’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’. Using 10 stones can you estimate the 
proportion of very rich, rich, average, poor and very poor people in your 
community?” 
This exercise was particularly useful not only to acquire the local perceptions 
on the different wealth groups but also as ‘easy’ start of the workshop. It 
allowed the participants to ‘break the ice’ and to get familiar with the 
researcher and the exercises. Moreover, the researcher paid attention that 
each participant had the opportunity to get involved in the discussion from the 
beginning of the meeting. 
2. Project Recall and Assessment 
During this exercise the participants were asked to recall the projects that 
were realized within the ward 
in the last years by the district 
council. Three options were 
provided here: either the 
project was funded directly by 
the local authorities (district 
council or line ministry 
departments) or it was 
implemented by the District 
Council through CDF funds. 
Sometimes, the participants 
mentioned projects 
implemented by NGOs. For 
each project, they were also 
asked to assess its impact, 
choosing between the 
Figure 5: Focus Group Discussion (I) 
 
Source: Author’s caption 
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following options: ‘big positive’ impact, ‘small positive’, ‘no impact’, negative 
impact’ or ‘cannot assess’. During the exercise, a simple list of the recalled 
projects was created to be used for the following exercise. 
3. Best 3 / Worst 3 Projects 
Question: “What are the best/worst projects that have come to your 
community? Why is 'Project X' one of the best/worst projects?” 
This exercise was held in two sequences. During the first one, the participants 
were asked to think about the list of projects produced during the previous 
exercise and were then reported in an ad hoc sheet. Each of them were also 
given a stone and then asked to place it on the sheet, inside the ‘case’ that 
represented the project they considered as the best executed in the ward. The 
top three ‘best projects’ were therefore identified and ranked according with 
the number of stones attributed to each of them. The same exercise was then 
repeated for the ‘worst projects’. 
4. Wealth Group Benefits 
Question: 1) “How much does a ‘very rich’ / ‘rich’ / ‘average’ / ‘poor’ / ‘very 
poor’ person benefit from project X? Please use a big stone for big positive 
benefits; a small stone for small positive benefit; and no stones for no benefit”. 
2) “How much has a ‘very rich’ / ‘rich’ / ‘average’ / ‘poor’ / ‘very poor’ person 
suffered from project X? Please use a big stone for an important negative harm; 
a small stone for small negative harm; and no stone for no harm”. 
During this exercise, a big sheet was placed on the ground, listing the five 
wealth categories identified with the first exercise, using the local language 
terminology (ex. ‘poor’ = ‘aba pina’, etc.). A participant was then given both big 
and small stones and asked to consider only the first best project. In addition, a 
big or small stone was to be placed on each of the wealth group categories in 
accordance with the ‘amount’ of benefit they had received from the project and 
they were then required to explain his/her choice. This first distribution was 
then discussed with the other participants. Sometimes the first choice was 
confirmed by the other participants, together with additional comments and 
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explanations. Some other times, a debate started and different distributions of 
stones were finally agreed upon. The exercise was repeated for each ‘best’ and 
‘worst’ project, requesting every time a different participant to propose a first 
distribution of the stones. 
5. District Council and WDC/ADC assessment 
Question: “Read the statements below to participants and for each of then ask 
if the statement is “always”, “usually” or “sometimes” true or “usually not true” 
(also possible: “unable to assess”). 
Statements: 
1. Commitment: “They 
care about our 
development and 
they work focus on it” 
2. Realistic 
expectations: “They 
fulfil their promises” 
3. Honesty: “When 
something goes 
wrong, they tell us 
honestly”. 
4. Relevance: “They 
really addressed the problems that affect us” 
5. Participation: “We can give our opinion on the types of projects they do and how 
projects are done. The traditional leaders & community are involved” 
6. Efficient: “The projects are managed in a good and transparent way. No corruption 
or mismanagement” 
7. Trustworthiness: “We feel we can trust them” 
8. Impact: “The results really improve the lives of many people in the area” 
The different answers were also available on a big sheet visible to everybody 
to facilitate the understanding of each participant. The technique of the 
previous exercise was also used: for each statement, a participant has to 
propose a first answer to the statement, which was then debated and agreed 
Figure 6: Focus Group discussion (II) 
 
Source: Author’s caption 
107 
upon with the others. It is important to note that this way of proceeding is 
coherent with the local ways of debating and taking collective decisions. A 
same pattern was observed by the researcher during the three-day workshop 
for the draft constitution in Samfya. 
 
2.2 The Household Survey 
The household survey has a twofold purpose. It was intended to acquire 
information on the households in the target communities in order to make 
possible their classification in accordance with their ‘wealth’, as defined during 
the focus groups discussions. Secondly, each respondent was asked questions 
aimed at gathering information on the possible political and socio-economic 
impacts of decentralisation on poverty. The categories outlined in the 
‘Theoretical Framework’ were therefore used within the household survey. For 
instance, “empowerment” was assessed using electoral and non-electoral 
behaviours, the type of representatives sitting in the local council, etc113.  
The household survey is divided in five main parts and needed around 20 to 30 
minutes to be completed. A first part is dedicated to general information on the 
family (ex.: age, religion, education, etc.); a second part focuses on the ‘socio-
economic situation of the household (ex. job of the wife or husband, income, 
land, animals owned, etc.). The third and fourth parts are devoted to acquire 
information on the ‘political dimension’ of decentralisation policies for the 
local elected council and the sub-district structures (WDC/ADC). Finally, the 
last part focuses on the provision of services114.  
 
 
                                                             
 
113 More information on the variables used to assess the political and socio-economic impact of 
decentralization has been already outlined in chapter 3.  
114 The household questionnaire is available in Annex 2 
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2.3 Key informants 
Interviews with key informants were also used in order to acquire additional 
information on the functioning and on the perceptions having regard to local 
institutions and their role in the local development. No structured red 
questionnaire was used and interviews were mainly adapted to the 
respondents’ role and expertise. In the two districts, key informants involved 
councillors, executive and clerk officials in the local authorities and line 
ministries (Health Board, Luapula Water and Sewage Company, Agriculture 
Board, Department of Education and Standard Office – DESO, DEBS). It was not 
always easy to meet the councillors as they are mainly located in their wards, 
often far away from the district centre. In Chipata, the meetings were easier as 
a full council meeting was held during the field research period and the 
researcher could participate in the works. In Lusaka, the main key informants 
involved professors working in the university and officials working in the Local 
Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ),  
Table 1: List of key informants 
Name Institution Date 
Prof. Lolojih UNZA 27/09/2012 
Maurice Mbolela Director - LGAZ 28/09/2012 
Prof. Momba UNZA 05/10/2012 
Brian Musama Community Worker - Samfya District 
Council 
Various 
Chibwe Albert Councillor  Masonde ward 22/10/2012 
Albert 
Chungutunawe 
Councillor Chinkutila ward 22/10/2012 
- Councillor Kasansa ward 26/10/2012 
Ignatius Phiri Administrative Assistant - Bangweulu 
Constituency Office 
01/11/2012 
James Mulenga Acting director - District Commissioner 
Office 
06/11/2012 
Charles Mwandila Vice-chairperson – Local Government 
Service Commission 
09/11/2012 
Brian Chumpuka Assistant Director - Decentralisation 
Secretariat 
13/11/2012 
Various Full council meeting - Chipata 19/11/2012 
Various CDF Committee meeting – Luangeni 
Constituency 
21/11/2012 
Various CDF Committee meeting – Chipata 
Central 
26/11/2012 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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2.4 Documents and Additional Sources of Information 
During the field work, great attention was also paid to the collection of 
relevant documents concerning mainly the work of the target local councils, 
the sub-district structures or ministerial regulations. These documents were 
fundamental to understand:  
1. The resources available to the local councils (ex.: general grants, special 
grants, CDF, local taxation, etc.); 
2. How the resources available are used for pro-poor or development needs;  
3. The functioning of the sub-district structures as a tool for the inclusion of 
the populace in the decision-making process. 
Chipata was particularly resourceful due to the fact that the Municipal Council 
has a dedicated archive. In Samfya, it was far more complicated as there is not 
a proper archive and the documents are stored either within the personal files 
or computes of the different officials or staked upon the floor or randomly on 
the shelves. Thus, in Chipata it was possible to collect documents such as the 
CDF minutes, the budgets (2011, 2012, 2013) or the Councils’ meeting minutes 
(2011, 2012). In Samfya, it was possible to collect only few of these documents. 
However, the planning office had a little archive with the minutes of the 
WDC/ADC meetings, which was very helpful to understand how the sub-
district structures work in that area. In Lusaka, the following 
libraries/achieves were particularly resourceful: the Civil Society for Poverty 
Reduction (CSPR), the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), the 
Local Government Association of Zambia (LGAZ). 
The data collected though the focus groups discussions and the survey were 
also compared and analysed taking into consideration the results of the 5th 
Afrobarometer round in Zambia (2013) and the Governance survey (2010). 
The Afrobarometer is an independent research project that collects political, 
economic and social data on African countries. This research has greatly 
expanded since its first round was implemented in 1999 - covering 12 
countries – to currently reach 35 countries in its 5th round in 2013.  A 6th round 
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has been recently launched in March 2014. The researchers collect data on 
topics such as ‘Democracy and Politics’, ‘Participation and Civic Engagement’, 
‘Citizenship and Identity’, ‘Taxation’, etc. using standardized questionnaires 
that allows a comparative analysis of data among the countries and over 
time115. . Zambia has completed 5 rounds up to this date (in 1999, 2003, 2005, 
2009 and 2013)116. 
The Governance Survey was organized by the Governance Secretariat in 
collaboration with the Zambian Central Statistical office, the Governance 
Institutions and the CSOs. The goal of the survey is to “effectively and 
systematically monitor governance in the country and to assess it in terms of 
its effect on development and on the link to poverty reduction”. The data used 
in this research refer to the last round in 2010. 
 
3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
3.1 The Units of Analysis: Setting 
The data used for this study were mainly collected during a three months field-
work period in Zambia from September to May 2012. 
It must be noted that the original setting for this research was two cercles in 
Mali (Segou and Kolokani) 117. However, after the unforeseeable events in 
                                                             
 
115 Additional information on the Afrobarobeter project, its history and the results is available on its 
dedicated website: “Afrobarometer.org/homepage” 
116 “From 21 January 2013 to 8 February 2013, the Afrobarometer surveyed a nationally representative, 
random, stratified probability sample of 1200 adult Zambians. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
in the language of the respondent’s choice” (RuralNet Associates, 2013: 2). 
117 The intended research proposal was to pursue the study of the local government system in Mali by 
drawing from the results of a previous research undertaken in 2008 and by using the connections 
inside the country to organise the work and to collect the data. A first two-week visit was organised in 
Bamako in March 2012 to establish a direct contacts with the University of Bamako, some local 
research centres and the target local councils. The visit was initially very fruitful as the researcher was 
immediately able to have the support of the Faculty of Social Sciences and the ODHD (“Observatiore du 
Dévelopment Humain Durable et de la Lutte Contre la Pauvreté”). Unfortunately, the military putsch 
occurred before any contact with the local authorities could be established compelling the researcher 
to leave the country as soon as the airport reopened for civil transportation. An account of the results 
111 
March 2012, it was no longer viable to pursue the study as originally 
planned118. Zambia was chosen as an alternative setting to carry out the 
research. It can be argued that the shift between the two countries is huge 
given the completely different historical experience and traditions. On the one 
hand, Mali was influenced by the Muslim expansion in the pre-colonial area 
and by the French centralised administrative style; it has always been at the 
bottom of the human development index; it went through a long period of 
authoritarian rule before starting its democratic experience in 1992 and 
establish, for the first time, a system of local government. On the other hand, 
Zambia was heavily influenced by the Church Missionaries from the first 
colonial explorations, where the British established an indirect rule based on 
the inclusion of traditional chiefs in the colonial system as Native Authorities; 
at independence it “was one of the most industrialised and urbanised” (Rakner, 
2003: 44); finally, at local level, it experienced the democratic rule throughout 
the post-independence period, except during the 1981-91 decade, when the 
state and party apparatus were merged and elections abolished for the district 
councils. 
In sum, the two countries are completely different under an economic, ethnic, 
religious, historical and administrative perspective. Zambia was finally chosen 
because it could address the main challenges raised when Mali was definitively 
rejected as an option: the lack of direct knowledge of the country, the lack of 
local contacts or key informants, and the relevance of the research. 
First, the researcher had a first opportunity to visit Zambia in May/June 2013 
during an evaluation mission of two EU funded projects to support the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
of this first study on decentralization can be found in Serrenti (2012a), “Il decentramento in Mali: dal 
teorema dei testi alla pratica delle collettività territoriali”, in Pavanello, M. (ed.) (2012). 
118 First, the combination of the political instability in Bamako, the occupation of the northern regions by 
a foreign militia and the French military intervention in January 2013 constituted serious problems in 
terms of security. Second, from a scientifically standpoint, the research could not be accurate as the 
data collection would have been negatively affected by the ongoing events. Third, the local government 
system basically collapsed or stop working given the confusion and the uncertainty at national level 
For a critical overview of the events in Mali during and after the putsch see Serrenti (2012b), “Mali: un 
problema spinoso per la sicurezza internazionale”. 
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decentralisation reform. This first visit provided precious information to the 
researcher on the decentralisation process, and it was used as a first 
assessment of the viability of the doctoral research in the country. It was found 
that despite the delays in the implementation of the last decentralisation 
reforms, the country has the minimum requirements needed for the research 
(ex. legal framework on local government since 1991, decentralisation policy 
(2004) and implementation plan (2009), etc.). 
Second, two local councils gave their consent to host the researcher during the 
field work phase, with direct access to elected representatives, administrative 
officials and local communities. Moreover, in Zambia, the researcher could rely 
on the support and contacts of a Zambian national, graduate at the University 
of Cagliari, and on the contacts within the European Delegation in Lusaka. 
Third, it was found that Zambia has almost been neglected in the studies on 
local government in Africa as, at least in the last two decades, studies have 
primarily focused on other important topics (ex.: health related issues 
(HIV/AIDS). More generally, Gewald, Hinfelaar and Macola explained the weak 
academic literature on post-independence Zambia: 
 “In contrast with the rich tradition of academic analysis and 
understanding of pre-colonial and colonial history of Zambia, the 
above-sketched post-colonial trajectory has been all but ignored my 
historians. The teleological assumptions of state-led developmentalism, 
the cultural hegemony of UNIP and its conflation with national interests, 
and a narrow focus on Zambia’s progressive diplomatic role in 
Southern African affairs, have all contributed to a dearth of studies 
centring on the reverse lived experience of Zambians” (2008: 3). 
Other options were rejected. For instance, Ghana or Uganda went through 
more advanced and ambitious local government reforms and have been 
carefully considered by the researcher. However, they are also quite popular in 
the academic and donor-funded studies on decentralisation. In these cases, the 
relevance of an additional study on this topic could be quite marginal. 
Moreover, the researcher could not rely on previous experiences in these 
countries and no valuable contacts were available. 
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Figure 7: Major settlements in Samfya District 
 
Source: Samfya District Council (2010) 
Thus, the field phase started in Zambia in September 2012 for a three months 
period and it was followed by a third short visit in May/June 2013. Most of the 
time was spent in the two target ward (4 weeks in Samfya and 3 weeks in 
Chipata) where the researcher was integrated within the Planning 
Departments. The remaining weeks were used to collect other valuable 
information and documents in Lusaka (ex.: Governance Secretariat, Ministry of 
Local Government and Housing, Local Government Association of Zambia, etc.). 
 
3.1.1 SAMFYA  
Samfya district is located in Luapula province, in the northern part of the 
country, 700 km from Lusaka.  From Lusaka, it is accessible through a quite 
busy and bumpy highway, after a trip of at least eight hours by car or much 
longer with the public transports. Samfya, and the province, are also connected 
to the Copperbelt province through the Congolese corridor (the Pedicle road). 
The first White settlements were 
established by the churches: in 
1905, the White Fathers opened 
two mission posts in Lubwe and 
Kasaka and later, in 1937, the 
Christian Mission in Many Lands 
joined with an additional 
mission post. The first 
development of the district 
under the colonial 
administration started when the 
British decided to establish a 
harbour in 1941 to help the 
transportation of supplies to the 
Copperbelt. During this period, 
Samfya was still ruled as Native 
Authority; it is only in the 1950s, 
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that the area was upgraded to a permanent settlement and in 1959 it became a 
Rural Council, headed by a permanent District Commissioner. (Samfya District 
Council, 2010). Today, Samfya has the status of District Council under the 1991 
Local Government Act. 
The Samfya District’s main 
geographical feature is the 
presence of Lake Bangweulu, 
which makes the district quite 
unique in terms of vegetation, 
landscape and economy. In 
fact, two thirds of the district 
is covered by wetlands 
(swamps and dambos) and 
other water bodies (ex.: rivers 
and lakes) (Samfya District 
Council, 2010).  
198.911 residents are today 
living in Samfya (20% of the 
whole province) with a 
growth rate in the period 
2000/10 of 2% (CSO, 2012b: 
23). Three main ethnic groups are present within the district and each of them 
is ruled by a Paramount Chief a network of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen: the 
Kabende, (mainly in Samfya Central), the N’gumbo (in the area North of Samfya 
town) and the Unga (mainly in the Bangweulu swamps)119. Many churches are 
                                                             
 
119 The respondent to the household questionnaires were 52.5% Kabende, 40% N’Gumbo and 7.5% Unga. 
Figure 8: Celebration for the election of a new Paramount 
Chief 
 
Source: Author’s caption 
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also established in the district with a majority of them being Catholic, the 
Seventh Day Adventists and the CMML120. 
Fishing and subsistence farming are the main activities of the area, but no 
commercial farmers are present in the district121. Trade is also a common 
occupation, mainly in charcoal, fish, transportation and other essential 
commodities. 
In 2012 the district had 33 Health Centres. In 2010, the first causes of mortality 
were malaria, followed by respiratory tract infections and diarrhea122. HIV 
prevalence is also important, a reported rate infection of 13.2%, although this 
represents a better rate if compared with other provinces and it is below the 
national percentage (14.3%) (CSO and MoH, 2009). The most recent data on 
education are not encouraging. In 2010, Samfya district has 100 basic schools 
which means “on average one school in every 100 km2” (Samfya District 
Council, 2010: 68). Community schools are also available but with very poor 
                                                             
 
120 The household survey showed that 53.4% of family members were Catholic, 15.6 of which belonged to 
CMML and 11.3% to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Other denominations also active in the district 
include the Pentecostal and the New Apostolic. 
121 The main crops harvested are cassava, millet, maize, groundnuts, and sweet potatoes (Samfya District 
Council, 2010) 
122 The 33 Health Centres were distributed as follows: “27 Rural Health Centres, 1 stage II Health Centre, 
1 Health Post, 2 Hospital Affiliated Health centres and 2 first level Mission Hospitals (Samfya District 
Health Office, 2012). 
Figure 9: Samfya 
 
Source: Author’s caption 
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education standards. The provincial net school attendance for grades 1-7 is 
77.1% (primary school) but it falls at 36,8% for grades 8-12 (secondary school) 
(CSO, 2012a). Drop-outs are also frequent during the school year123.  
No recent data is available on the access to water, whether terms of number of 
water points available or in terms of quality of such water points in the Samfya 
district124. In Samfya town, pipe water is available for the residents, the 
proportion of which represents 9% of the district population125. The rest of the 
population uses mostly open and unprotected water points, especially in the 
swamps and islands (Samfya District Council, 2010). As also observed by the 
researcher, water and electricity disruption are quite common.  
 
3.1.2 CHIPATA  
Chipata Municipal District is part of the Eastern Province and it is located along 
the international borders with Malawi. From Lusaka it is accessible by flight, 
although buses or other forms of car-sharing are the most common way to 
reach the district. The district is divided in 22 wards and composed by three 
constituencies as shown by figure 10. 
Chipata is densely populated, with a population of 455.783, and a growth rate of 
2.2% in the period between the last two censuses, 2000-2010 (CSO, 2012b). Until 
1964, the date of the creation of the Chipata Rural Council, the District had 
been divided in three Native Authorities (the Nona, Chew and Kunda Native 
authorities), covering a wider area when compared to today’s size. In 1974, the 
district was divided in separate units to create the Chipata, Chadiza and Katete 
                                                             
 
123 The main reasons for dropouts are usually: economic, due to the death of the parents, pregnancy or 
marriage. (Samfya District Council, 2010; CSO, 2000 and 2012). In 2012, the mean years of schooling in 
Zambia was 6.7 (UNDP, 2013) 
124 The most recent data are those provided in the Integrated Development Plan, with data dating back to 
1997 (Samfya District Council, 2010). 
125 Since 2009, pipe water services are provided by the Luapula Water and Sewage Company. Before, the 
District Councils were in charge of water provision. 
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Districts (s.d., 1972). Today, the District has reached the status of Municipality, 
despite the fact that 80% of the population still live in the rural areas.  
There are two major 
ethnic groups in the 
district, namely the 
Ngoni and the Chewa126. 
There are two 2 
Paramount Chiefs, 
supported by two 
senior chiefs and 
several other chiefs and 
headmen. The religious 
composition in Chipata 
is more variegated and 
fragmented if 
compared with Samfya. 
Among the household 
members, the majority belonged to the Catholic Church, the Reformed Church 
of Zambia and to the Pentecostal127. 
Chipata’s economy is also more variegated if compared with Samfya, as former 
benefits from its position as the last Zambian town before the Malawian border. 
Subsistence farming represents the main occupation for most of the residents. 
The district is one of the major producers in the country of maize, cotton and 
tobacco. However, small scale trading and transport are also important 
component of the local economy. Moreover, many NGOs or donors are located 
in Chipata and have an office in the district. The municipality is also often 
                                                             
 
126 50% of the respondents were Ngoni and 30% Chewa. Other ‘tribes’ included in the household survey 
include the Tongas, the N’Kunda, the M’Bemba and the Timbuka. 
127 In the household sample 27.2% family members belonged to the Catholic Church, 14,7% to the 
Reformed Church of Zambia, and 11.4% to the Pentecostal. It is worthy to notice that a Muslim 
community is also present in Chipata but completely absent in Samfya (5.1% in the household sample). 
Other denominations are also present, such as the Baptists and the New Apostolic. 
Figure 10: Chipata District – Constituencies and Wards 
 
Source: UNDP (2008) 
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chosen as conference centre, thanks to the presence of a five-star hotel (Protea) 
and a commercial centre (Shoprite). 
In 2012, the district had 43 health facilities and 69% of the population could 
access safe water supplies. However, as in Samfya, the first causes of mortality 
were Malaria, followed by respiratory tract infections and diarrhoea (Chipata 
DHO, 2012)128. Chipata has a high rate of HIV prevalence, reaching a rate of 
26.3% in 2004 (UNDP, 2008). The Chipata Water and Sewerage Company 
guarantees the provision of water in the urban area; the majority of the 
population living in the rural area may supply its needs through wells or 
boreholes.  
The district in 2012 had 135 basic schools in addition to different secondary 
schools. Community schools are also quite common in Chipata District. The 
literacy level is quite low and it reached 54.9% of the population; 44.2% of 
children were not enrolled at school mainly due to the unavailability of schools 
or the need to walk long distances to reach the nearest one (UNDP, 2008). The 
provincial net school attendance for grades 1-7 is 64% (primary school) and it 
falls at 25% for grades 8-12 (secondary school) (CSO, 2012a). As in Samfya, 
drop-outs are also frequent during the school year.  
 
3.1.3 WEALTH PERCEPTIONS  
The previous paragraphs have shown that poverty is a widespread condition of 
the majority of the population living in the target wards.  According to the 
focus group discussions, poverty is a common condition in the two target 
districts (table 2) 129. This high proportion of ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ is 
consistent with the official data on poverty in the rural areas in Zambia and in 
the Luapula and Eastern Provinces in particular (CSO, 2012a). However, it is 
                                                             
 
128 The under-five mortality rate in Zambia is still 69/1000 and the life expectancy at birth is 49.4 years 
(UNDP, 2013a). 
129 See chapter 4, heading 2.1.3 and 6.1. 
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also possible that in some cases, the hope for more funding coming through the 
researcher or the ‘elite’ belonging of the participants could have played as bias 
in the assessment of the wealth distribution. 
The participants are also consistent in arguing that the ‘very rich’ are absent or 
almost absent in the ward. They often argue that this category of household do 
not live in the ward as they prefer to settle in more ‘advanced’ or urban areas, 
with better access to services. In some cases, as in the Chiparamba or Djilika 
wards, the focus group participants decided to assign to this category ‘half a 
stone’ to highlight that this type of household is present but they are very few 
in the ward130.  
  
                                                             
 
130 At the beginning of the exercise, it was explained that 1 stone could be considered as 10% of the 
population. 
Table 2: Perceived distribution of the population across the wealth groups 
WARD VERY 
RICH 
RICH AVERAGE POOR VERY POOR 
1. Chimana 1 1 3 4 1 
2. Mano 0 0 1 6 3 
3. Chifunabuli 1 1 2,5 2 4 
4. Masonde 0 0 2 5 3 
5. Katansha 0 2 3 2 3 
6. Dilika 1 2 4 2 1 
7.  
Chiparamba 
0,5 1,5 2 2 4 
8.  Kanjiala 0,5 1,5 1,5 2,5 4 
9. Mkowe 0 1 2 3 4 
Total 0,4 1,1 2,3 3,2 3 
% 4 11 23 32 30 
The table shows the outlier values. Orange = 1 stone from average. Red = 2 stones from average. Source: 
Author’s elaboration from Focus Group discussions 
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3.2 Sampling  
3.2.1 FOCUS GROUP  
This study has used focus group organized in nine wards (five in Samfya and 
four in Chipata). This study uses a purposive sampling, which is by large the 
most used in qualitative research and is part of the non-probability family. It 
implies that the sample is selected strategically because “those sampled are 
relevant to the research questions that are being posed” (Bryman, 2012: 418).  
Participants have been selected using a mix of snowball and accidental 
techniques. Usually, in the two districts the key contact person in the wards 
was either a WDC/ADC member or the head teacher. The latter has involved 
other participants with the profile required by the researcher and that 
happened to be available for the meeting during the selected afternoon.  The 
target participants were usually the main community leaders in the ward: 
religious leader, ADC/WDC member, a traditional leader, members of the 
farmer or business association, teachers, etc131. In two cases in Chipata, the 
participants were chosen among the community leaders already selected to 
participate during a meeting organized by the council to prepare a 
‘participatory development plan’ (table 3). 
In eight cases, the rule of maximum 8-10 participants’ group size was 
respected. In one case, a numerous delegation from the women’s association 
was also invited, without previous consultation with the researcher. The 
selection of participants was usually done by a WDC/ADC member, after 
careful instructions and explanation of the academic (i.e.: not ‘official’ or 
‘public’) goals of the workshop. 
                                                             
 
131 More information on the sampling process is available under heading 3.2 in this chapter. Quite 
interestingly, no religious leaders were involved by the contact persons in focus group discussions. 
This may partially be explained by their unavailability due to previous commitments. In addition, as 
confirmed by the results and by the history of the churches in the country, the religious leaders are 
perceived as neutral with respect to the political power. As the focus of the meeting was to acquire data 
on the functioning of local government, sub-district structures and decentralization, the religious 
leaders were probably excluded as perceived not relevant by the contact person. 
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The participation of each community leader was also encouraged, following as 
much as possible a ‘cycle’ order in the interventions or stimulating the 
participation of the less vocal members. The ‘stone method’, as outlined in the 
PADev methodology was also used: the use of ‘stones’ enhances greatly the 
discussion and the engagement of the participants as it is perceived as an 
element of ‘fun’. It make the discourse less abstract, especially when some 
quantitative data (ex.: percentage of families per wealth group in the 
community”) needed to be discussed.  
Table 3: Focus Groups – List of Participants 
WARD DATE 
N° of 
Partici
p. 
List of participants Male 
Femal
e 
Chimana 
17.10.201
1 
10 + 
1) Community leader 
2) Cooperative leader (x 2) 
3) Business person 
4) Women’s Association (x 20) 
5) ADC (x 4) 
6) Headman 
7) Teacher 
10 20 
Mano 
18.10.201
2 
8 
1) Women Club (x 2) 
2) Headman 
3) ADC Member 
4) Health Office Adm + ADC 
5) Youth Association 
Representative 
6) Farmer Association member 
7) Business community member 
5 3 
Chifunabul
i 
20.10.201
2 
6 
1) Teacher + ADC Member 
2) Constituency Assistant 
3) Farmer Association member. 
4) Women Association member 
5) Headman 
6) Business community member 
5 1 
Masonde 
26.10.201
2 
7 
1) Farmer Ass. member (x2) 
2) Women Association member 
3) Teacher 
4) Headman 
5) Business Association member 
6) ADC member 
5 2 
Katansha 
27.10.201
2 
9 
1) Fishers community member 
2) Headman 
3) Trader 
4) Fish trader 
5) ADC (vice-chairperson) 
6) ADC Chairperson 
7) Headman 
8) Farmers’ cooperative member 
9) Headwoman 
5 4 
Dilika 
29.11.201
2 
6 
1) PTE Chairman 
2) Works chairperson 
3) Farmers’ cooperative member 
3 3 
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(x2) 
4) Traditional birth attendant 
5) Head teacher 
Chiparamb
a 
30.11.201
2 
8 
1) Community member 
2) Headman 
3) Zone member (x 5) 
4) ADC member 
4 4 
Kanjala 
01.12.201
2 
8 
1) RCZ Association 
2) Peace Corp Volunteer 
3) Women club (x 3) 
4) Headman 
5) Head teacher 
6) Farmers’ Association member 
4 4 
Mknowe 
04.12.201
2 
8 
1) Village representative 
2) WDC 
3) Farmers’ Association member 
and councillor 
4) Teacher 
5) Zone member (x 2) 
6) Farmers’ Association 
7) Officer at Ministry of Agriculture 
6 2 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
3.2.2 SURVEY  
This study has used survey data gathered using a non-probability sample of 
respondents of the type ‘convenience sampling’ (table 4). A convenience 
sample is “one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its 
accessibility” (Bryman, 2012: 201). A clear limitation of this method is that 
generalization of the results is not possible; however, this research did not aim 
to provide a general understanding of the impact of decentralization on 
poverty alleviation in Zambia or even in the two selected district. This would 
be impossible given the geographical distances to be covered and the 
limitations in time and resources. The aim here was to provide a trend of the 
sample’s perceptions towards decentralization in two Zambian districts: 
although it is not representative of the entire population of the district, it 
provides valuable information on some issues and features of the local 
government system in Zambia, which deserves more attention by the scholars 
and can be the basis of future investigation. 
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A household questionnaire has been administered to 80 heads of households 
(ex.: the wife or the husband)132. Geographically the respondents are equally 
distributed between the two districts: Samfya (Luapula Province) and Chipata 
(Eastern Province). The districts have been chosen randomly. The choice of 
Samfya and Chipata was mainly determined by the fact that the researcher had 
already established personal contacts with the district administration during a 
first short visit in the two districts in May-June 2012133. 
The researcher decided to target 5 wards134, following discussions with the 
two contact persons in each districts135. Their choice was generally taken 
following practical considerations, such as geographical distances, costs, 
transport challenges, and accessibility. In Chipata, the Municipal Council had 
organized a round of meetings in each ward to prepare the “Integrated 
Development Plan” so the researcher followed a few times the council’s team 
during the visits as it could guarantee an easier access to the communities in 
terms of costs and practical organization136. 
The villages and households have been chosen within the rural or semi-rural 
setting. In Samfya, due to the presence of fishermen, due attention was given to 
visit some villages where they could be located. Moreover, it was tried 
whenever possible to avoid households adjacent to the WDC/ADC office137.  
                                                             
 
132 This covers 565 family members. 
133 This visit was part of a monitoring and evaluation visit organized by the Delegation of the European 
Union in Lusaka. 
134 The wards are the sub-districts units in Zambia. The wards are also sub-divided in ‘zones’, which 
represent a smaller geographical unit and are composed by a group of adjacent villages. For more and 
updated information on the districts and their subdivision, see the Ministry of Local Governance and 
Housing’s website: www.mlgh.gov.zm. 
135 In each district, the contact point was an official working in the Planning Unit. 
136 The visits organized by the Municipal Council failed the first three times due to communication failure 
between the ward community and the council. The researcher had to quickly organize two additional 
visits, using as main practical rules already stated. Despite the additional challenges, as these failures 
provoked delays in the collection of data, they were extremely useful for the researcher to have a direct 
experience on how activities are organized within the council and directly observed the challenges and 
issues affecting the good functioning of the local authority. 
137 Both districts had launched the constructions of offices for the sub-districts committees in each ward. 
However, in some wards, it was found that the constructions had already been somehow finalized 
while in some others, they were still ongoing or had not started yet. 
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Finally, respondents have been chosen randomly, according to the availability 
of the person. It was tried as much as possible to maintain a gender balance. In 
total, the survey involved respondents from 11 wards and 27 villages; 38 men 
and 42 women were interviewed. A face-to-face approach was chosen, most of 
times given the high level of illiteracy rate; only in a few cases, the respondent 
was asked to fill the form, which was reviewed at the end, together with the 
researcher, to verify a good understanding of the questions or to provide some 
missing information. Here below, I provide the full list of the target wards and 
villages: 
Table 4: Household survey – Target wards, constituencies and villages 
District Ward Constituency Village 
Samfya Chimana Bangweulu 
- Kabanga  
- Chimana Market 
- Mwanfuli  
Samfya Mano Bangweulu - Chakuyela 
Samfya Chifunabuli Chifunabuli 
- Mbwili 
- Ntolele 
- Bwacha 
Samfya Masonde Chifunabuli - Miponda 
Samfya Katansha Bangweulu 
- Ivor 
- Muchinshi 
- Katansha 
Chipata Dilika Chipata Central - Kachingule 
Chipata Chiparamba Kasenengwa - Chiparamba sub-centre 
Chipata Kanjala Chipata Central 
- Kagunda 
- Kalonje 
- Dumisa 
Chipata Mkowe Kasenengwa - Chikuwe 
Chipata Nthope Chipangali 
- Kambani 
- Katawa 
Chipata Kasenengwa Kasenengwa 
- Mudongo 
- Masiwa 
- Madzimawi 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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4 ETHICS  
Because ethics is critical in every research effort, and ethical considerations 
should be the leit motiv “at every stage – before, during and after” the research 
work (David and Sutton, 2011: Kindle 839). In this research, special attention 
was given to the main principals that should be followed in social science 
research, namely “voluntary participation and the right to withdraw, 
protection of research participants, (…), obtaining informed consent” 
(Silverman, 2013: kindle loc. 4143).  
In this research, special attention was also given to obtain an informed consent 
from the institutions or participants involved. The Councils in Chipata, Samfya 
and Choma138 were duly informed on the focus and goals of the research and 
the researcher asked for their authorisation to hold her work in the district 
and the procedure they require to formalise it. In Samfya, no formal 
authorisation was asked by the Districts’ officials, while Chipata asked the 
researcher to send a request letter to the Town Clerk for his consideration and 
approval, which was duly prepared. In both cases, the first visit upon arrival in 
the two districts was paid to the Town Clerk, and the same was replicated 
before departure. The same rule was followed for the preparation of the focus 
group discussions and the household interviews. In particular, households 
were approached by asking the permission of the husband or wife, as well as 
their availability for a 20/30 minutes interview, considering their daily duties.  
Moreover, confidentiality of information was guarantee to the districts and to 
the focus group and household participants. In these two last cases, the 
researcher highlighted that no names should be asked or noted during the 
interviewing process, which the respondents could directly verify during the 
discussion, adding an element of trust and facilitating the research work. 
                                                             
 
138 Choma district in Southern Province was also targeted at the beginning of the fieldwork as another 
possible location for the data collection. However, due to the time and resource constraint the research 
was limited to Samfya and Chipata. Upon arrival in Lusaka, the researcher had the chance to meet two 
officials working in the Planning Office in Choma and directly explain her research work and needs. 
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Moreover, it was also stressed that they had the right to withdraw or to ask 
additional information on the purpose and content of the research. The name 
of the districts will only be changed in the event of the publication of this study, 
so as to guarantee their anonymity139. 
Moreover, the preparation of the household survey and the focus group 
discussions also involved a specific analysis of possible issues related with the 
cultural differences or the relation with some vulnerable groups.  
 
5 LIMITATION OF THIS RESEARCH 
The sudden change of target country for this research constituted a 
tremendous challenge for the execution of this study, in terms of preparation, 
background knowledge and logistics. Zambia and the Southern Africa region 
were somehow new to the researcher, as no previous field work had been 
carried on prior to this study. 
This sudden change has constituted a serious challenge, especially in the 
preparation of the household survey and the focus group discussion. Moreover, 
in the short time left between the first visit in Zambia in May 2012 and the 
field-work in September 2012, maximum efforts have been used to acquire a 
good understanding of both the regional context and the Zambian governance 
system. However, this has also allowed the researcher to reach a higher level of 
understanding of local governance issues both under a former French and 
British colonial rule. 
Another limitation of the study is linked to the limited geographical scope. This 
research intends to highlight the impact on two districts in Zambia, without 
intention of generalisation. The results of the focus group discussion and the 
household survey can give a preliminary view of the local perceptions towards 
                                                             
 
139 The real names of the districts are used in the following pages and it will be limited to the purpose of 
the PhD defense.  
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the local government and on the impact of decentralisation policies on the 
poorest. However, more comprehensive studies on the different aspects 
highlighted in this research are absolutely needed, especially in the actual 
context where the Patriotic Front’s government is launching a new 
‘decentralisation campaign’. 
However, on the other hand, this limitation is also inherent to decentralisation: 
in fact, decentralisation is a complex phenomenon and many scholars have 
warned against easy generalisations (Bossuyt and Gould, 2000). In fact, “The 
essence of decentralisation is that it does not occur in general but rather in a 
particular context, so that decentralisation takes many different forms in 
different countries at different times” (Bird and Rodriguez, 1999: 299).  
 
6 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WEALTH INDEX 
6.1 The Index: Goal and Meaning 
The wealth index is a composite measure of a household’s cumulative living 
standard. The variables used to build the index have been identified and 
defined using the focus groups, as already explained in the previous 
paragraphs.  
The first exercise of the focus group was divided in two main steps: firstly, the 
participants were asked to provide a definition of ‘very poor’, ‘poor’, ‘average’, 
‘rich’ and ‘very rich’ families within the district. Secondly, they were asked to 
quantify the five different groups using the ‘stone’ technique, as described by 
the following:  
“Please describe the things that make a person very rich, rich, average, 
poor and very poor in your district. Using 10 stones, can you estimate 
the proportion of very rich, rich, average, poor and very poor people in 
your community?” (Dietz, 2013) 
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The table 5 shows, as example, the results of the exercise held in Chimana 
Ward on 17.11.2012140.  It was explained to the participants that the 10 stones 
should be considered as representing the whole population in the district, with 
one stone representing therefore 10%, two stones 20%, etc.  
Table 5: Focus Group, exercise 1: “Wealth groups’ definition” 
Group Category 
Local 
Name 
Description 
Distribution 
(10 stones) 
% 
WARD 1 
 
CHIMANA 
WARD 
Very rich 
ABA 
KANKALA 
SANA 
They are usually commercial farmers and they hire cheap labour 
(community leader). They are hard workers (cooperatives). 
Farmers have tractors and other machines for agriculture. They 
have kettos, pigs, goats and they own 200 hectares of land. They 
can access loans and invest their money (businessperson). They 
have billions of kwacha, buses, cars, and tracks. They own a bus 
mansion. Children are very educated, they go in private schools 
and sometimes they study overseas. They are not dependent, they 
dress well, they have high quality shoes, and they eat 4 meals a 
day. For funerals, they use many cars and they are buried in big 
caskets. 
1 5% 
Rich 
ABA 
KANKALA 
Farmers have no machinery and they use small materials. They 
own a car and sometimes a bicycle. They can have one shop, 2 
houses and 20-50 hectares of land. They eat sweet potatoes, 
cassava, beans, groundnuts and peanuts. They have 2 meals a day. 
Their children go to high school. They buy clothes. 
1 5% 
Average PAKATI 
They have a big land (10-20 hectares). They go for second hand 
clothes. They eat 2 meals a day. Children go to public school. 
They own one simple house topped with a grass roof or even iron 
sheets. Some have a car. They own a boat or canoes. 
3 30% 
Poor ABA PINA 
For funerals, people hold them on their shoulders. They have a 
"grass house", and one bike. They have two meals a day. They 
own 2-4 lima (one hectare) of land, and a canoe. Only some 
children go to school because they cannot afford to pay the fees 
for each of them. 
4 40% 
Very 
poor 
ABA PINA 
SANA 
They beg for money and for food. To eat is a problem for them. 
They are dependent from others. They have street kids that 
sometimes steal. They have handicaps. If they have one, their 
house is very poor, they sleep on the floor without blankets and 
they have poor toilets. They do not have shoes. They do not have 
soap or water so they have problem to wash themselves.  
1 10% 
Source: Focus group held in Chimana Ward, Samfya District on 17.10.2012 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
140 The data collected during the Focus Group exercises are available in Annex 1. 
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6.2 Preparation of the wealth index 
The wealth index ranges from 0 as minimum value to 100 as the maximum 
value: 0 corresponds to the maximum level of poverty (or the minimum of 
wealth) while 100 implies a maximum level of wealth (or the minimum of 
poverty). 
The preparation of the wealth index followed different steps, as follows: 
1. Choice of variables identified using the definitions of the different wealth groups 
provided by the participants of the focus group discussions. The participants were 
left free to provide their contribution, with minimum input by the researcher. 
Thus, they used different variables to describe and define the state of poverty and 
wealth (ex.: the house’s features, the vehicles, etc.).  
2. The definitions of each wealth group have been elaborated by the researcher, in 
order to identify the main variables used by the participants of the focus group. 
The researcher has identified these variables and aggregated the definitions, as 
showed by the table in annex 1.2. Every focus group has identified the following 
macro-variables: ‘Food’ (ex.: number of meals a day); ‘House’ (ex.: size, type, 
facilities, etc.); ‘Job’ (ex.: farmer, civil servant, businessman/woman, etc.); 
‘Dressing Style’ (ex.: quantity and quality of clothing available for the family); 
‘Access to School’ (ex.: number of children in school, type of school, grade reached, 
number of drop-outs, etc.); ‘Land & Livestock’ (ex.: quality and type of land and 
livestock owned); ‘Vehicles’ (ex.: quantity and types of vehicles owned by the 
family); access to ‘Water’ and ‘Health’ facilities. 
3. The questionnaire did not cover all the variables identified by the focus group 
participants due to time constraints. Ten variables have been identified and used 
for the construction of the wealth index. Priority was given to those variables that 
had the smallest amount of missing data. 
4. A value has been assigned to the different modalities. The maximum and 
minimum value is not identical for each variable but changes according with the 
modalities. 
5. Definition of the standard score of the value of the variables, as identified in (3). 
All the variables have therefore the same minimum value (‘0’) and the same 
maximum value (‘10’). 
6. The sum of the standard score of the variables amounts to a value between 0 and 
100, which represent our final score in the wealth index. 
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7. Each family interviewed through the questionnaire is attributed one of the 
following labels in accordance with the standardized score: very poor’, ‘poor’, 
‘average’, ‘rich’ and ‘very rich’. 
 
6.3 Variables 
The following variables have been identified; by analyzing the definitions given 
by the participants of the focus group discussion (see point (2) in the previous 
paragraph): 
- Type of house (ex.: iron/grass roofing, mud or bricks.) 
- Access to electricity 
- Radio or TV available at home 
- Income 
- Job of the wife 
- Job of the husband 
- Quantity of livestock owned by the family 
- Type of livestock owned by the family 
- Quantity of land used 
- Quantity of land owned 
- Education of the children 
- Access to safe water 
- Age of the mother at first pregnancy 
- Number of family members 
- Number of wives 
Among those variables only those with a quantity of missing data smaller than 
20% have been considered. Thus, the following have not been used: ‘water’ 
and ‘number of wives’. The use of these variables could also present specific 
issues: in the two districts visited families with their own borehole or who can 
access pipe water are quite rare. The common pattern is to take water from 
public boreholes or directly from the lake (in Samfya) or from other 
unprotected sources. Therefore, ‘water’ can be used to distinguish the ‘very 
rich’ or sometimes the ‘rich’ but the other groups are usually ‘equal’ in terms of 
the quality of water accessed. Moreover, also the number of wives can be 
misleading. Polygamy is usually associated with wealth: often traditional 
leaders or politicians have an official wife and one or more ‘unofficial’ ones. 
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However, especially in the 
rural setting, men often 
decide to have a second 
wife just to ‘show’ his 
wealth to society although 
it does not correspond to 
his real economic situation. 
In this case, instead of 
being rich, the family will 
become even poorer, given 
the increasing number of 
people depending on a 
single source of revenue. 
The other variables have 
been divided in sectors, as 
showed in the following: 
1ST SECTOR: HOME  
The variables taken into consideration are the type of house, the access to 
electricity or other 
type of facilities (table 
7).  
2ND SECTOR: 
‘INCOME’  
The family income is 
taken into 
consideration. The 
modalities have been 
defined by the author, 
after consultation with 
key informants both in 
Lusaka and in the 
districts (table 6). 
Table 7: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: sector ‘Home’ 
HOME 
House 
Mud 
Bricks 
Roof 
Grass 
Iron 
Electricity 
Yes 
No Electricity 
Facilities 
No 
Radio 
TV 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 6: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: sector ‘Income’ 
INCOME 
They beg / They work for food < 
200K (Very Poor) 
201-300k (Poor) 
301-500k (Pakati) 
501-1000k (Rich) 
>1000K (million/billion of ZKW) 
(very rich) 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Table 8: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: sector ‘Job’ 
JOB 
No Job 
Housewife 
Piece-Work 
  
  
  
Business 
Small Business  
Small Grocery Shop- Restaurant Keeper 
Big Shops (Ex.: Shoprite) 
Self- 
Employed 
 Ex.: Carpenter, Mechanic, Welder, Cook 
And Construction Worker 
Miner   
Civil Servant 
Teacher (Community School) 
Teacher 
Head Teacher 
Nurse 
Agriculture/Health Officer 
PA (Constituency Officer) 
Agriculture 
Simple Farmer 
Commercial Farmer 
Herder 
Fisher 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3/4TH SECTOR: ‘JOB’ (HUSBAND AND WIFE) 
One takes into consideration the husband’s job. It is possible for a person to 
have more than one job. Here, the following two cases are considered: 
1.  a ‘main occupation’ plus a ‘secondary occupation’; 
2.  a ‘main occupation’ plus up to three ‘small jobs’. 
The same rules are used to analyse the wife’s job (table 8). 
 5TH SECTOR: ‘ACCESS 
TO EDUCATION’:  
This indicator has been 
calculated in two phases 
(table 9). 
1) An index is calculated as 
a ratio between the degree 
of education actually obtained and the potential degree the child could reach at 
his age at the moment of the interview.  This allows, for instance, taking into 
consideration the drop-outs due to inability of the family to pay school-fees. 
According to the law, every 7 years old child must be enrolled in the primary 
school141. 
2) A mean is calculated based on the degree of education reached by each child: 
the scores obtained in (1) have been summed up and divided by the number of 
children in the family, obtaining an indicator of the access to education in the 
family.  
6TH SECTOR: ‘LIVESTOCK’:   
One takes into consideration both the type (ex.: chicken, goat, cattle, pig or 
sheep) and the quantity of livestock owned by the family. 
                                                             
 
141 Sometimes, richer families manage to send their children to school at an even earlier age (5 or 6 years 
old). 
Table 9: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: sector 
‘Education’ 
ACCESS TO 
EDUCATION 
No school 
Primary only (1-7) 
Basic (8-9) 
Secondary School (10-12) 
University 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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7TH SECTOR: ‘LAND’ 
One takes into consideration 
both the land ‘owned’ and 
the land actually ‘used’ by 
the family for farming. The 
modalities have been defined 
by the author, after 
consultation with key 
informants both in Lusaka and in the districts. It was calculated as following: 
1. Land ‘owned’ 
2. Land ‘used’ as percentage of the land ‘owned’ 
3. Standardization of the two indexes 
4. The mean of the two indexes represent the final value for this sector. The 
modalities have been defined by the author, after consultation with key 
informants both in Lusaka and in 
the districts. 
8TH SECTOR: ‘VEHICLE’ 
The type of vehicle owned by the 
family is taken into 
consideration.  The boat and 
canoe are viable options only in 
Samfya, given the presence of the 
lake. The modalities have been 
defined by the author, after consultation with key informants both in Lusaka 
and in the districts. 
9TH SECTOR: ‘HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE’:  
The number of member 
composing the household is 
taken into consideration. The 
dependants are also included. 
Table 10: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: sector 
‘Land’ 
LAND  
No Land 
<2 Lima 
<1 Arc (3 Lima) 
2,1-4 Lima 
3,1 Arc-1h 
1,1-5 Hectares 
5,1-10 Hectares  
> 10 Hectares 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 11: Wealth Index – Variables and Modalities: 
sector ‘Vehicle’ 
VEHICLES 
No Vehicle 
Bicycle 
Motorbike 
Car 
Boat 
Canoe 
Oxcart 
Tractor 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Table 12: Wealth Index - Variables and Modalities: 
sector ‘Household size’ 
HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE 
1-2 members 
3-4 members 
5-6 members 
7-8 members 
9 members or + 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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The modalities have been defined by the author, after consultation with key 
informants both in Lusaka and in the districts. 
10TH SECTOR: AGE OF THE 
WIFE AT FIRST PREGNANCY. 
The modalities have been 
defined by the author, after 
consultation with key informants 
both in Lusaka and in the 
districts. 
 
6.4 Variables: Scores’ Assignment  
The scores have been attributed to each modality according to the definition of 
each wealth group in the focus group and taking into consideration the 
feedback received by different resource-person both in Lusaka and in the 
districts.  
1ST SECTOR: HOME  
The house in the rural 
areas can be built with 
mud or bricks, covered 
with grass or iron sheets 
and have access to 
electricity or other 
appliances such as the TV 
or radio. The sum of each 
modality gives the total for 
the sector ‘Home’ (table 14). 
The missing data have been recovered using a method called ‘matching’ (table 
15). This method is based on the assumption that two statistical units having 
some identical variables are likely to perform in a similar way or have similar 
habits. Following the researcher’s experience and the suggestions of the 
Table 13: Wealth Index - Variables and Modalities: 
sector ‘Age of the wife at first pregnancy’ 
AGE AT 
BIRTH of 
FIRST 
CHILD 
> =21 years old 
21-19 
19-16 
< 16 years old 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 14: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Home’ 
HOME 
House 
Mud 0 
Bricks 10 
Roof 
Grass 0 
Iron 10 
Electricity 
Yes 10 
No Electricity 0 
Facilities 
No 0 
Radio 10 
TV 20 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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resource persons in Zambia, the other variables used for the index have been 
ranked as follows: 
- Income 
- Job (wife + husband) 
- Land 
- Livestock 
- Vehicles 
- Education 
One assumes that two families with similar income and job, and owning the 
same typology of vehicles and the same quantity of land and livestock, live in a 
similar house. When a full matching was not possible, priority was given to the 
first three variables. The missing units have been replaced as follows: 
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Table 15: Missing data (Home) and matching units 
Missing data  Matching unit Value Explanation 
1 64 0 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock 
2 60 0 
Same: Income, Land, Livestock, Vehicle, 
Education 
3 34 60 Same: Income, Livestock, Vehicle, Education 
4 14 & 36 60 Same: Income, Job, Land 
5 50 0 
Same: Income, Land 
Very similar: Job, Livestock 
6 51 10 
Same: Income, Land 
Very similar: Job, Livestock 
7 58 40 
Same: Income, Job, Livestock, Vehicle, 
Education 
8 66 10 Same: Income, Job, Livestock 
9 61 10 Same: Income, Job, Vehicle, Education 
10 72 40 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock 
11 56 10 Same: Income, Job, Livestock 
12 76 10 Same: Income, Land, Livestock, Vehicle 
13 38 10 Same: Income, Job, Livestock 
14 34 60 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock 
15 63 60 
Same: Income, Livestock 
Very similar: Job, Vehicle 
16 64 0 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock 
17 38 10 Same: Income, Livestock, Vehicle 
18 19 - 33 60 
Same: Income, Vehicle, Education 
Very similar: Job, Land, Livestock 
19 33 60 Same: Income, Job, Land, Education 
20 38 10 
Same: Income, Job 
Very similar: Livestock, Vehicle, Education 
21 18 - 33 60 Same: Income, Job, Land 
22 17 - 38 10 
Same: Income, Job, Vehicle 
The researcher has also used her own notes 
on the house (“grass roof, house made by 
bricks, sofa at home) 
23 64 0 Same: Income, Job, Livestock, Vehicle 
24 77 20 Same: Income, Job, Livestock, Vehicle 
25 53 0 Same: Income, Land, Vehicle 
26 45 30 Same: Income, Job, Livestock, Vehicle 
27 57 20 
Same: Income, Job 
Very Similar: Land, Livestock, Vehicle, 
Education 
28 53 0 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock, Vehicle 
29 43 10 
Same: Income, Livestock, Education 
Very similar: Job, Vehicle 
30 64 0 Same: Income, Job, Land, Livestock, Vehicle 
31 71 50 Same: Income, Job, Vehicle 
32 34 60 
Same: Income, Job 
Very similar: Land, Livestock, Vehicle 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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2ND SECTOR: ‘INCOME 
The modalities for the 
variable ‘Income’ have 
assigned the scores 
according with the table. In 
this case, there was only one 
missing data (interview n° 77) which was assigned the lowest score (table 16). 
3/4TH SECTORS: 
‘JOB’ (Husband 
and Wife) 
The husband’s 
and wife’s job has 
been taken into 
consideration, 
giving different 
scores according 
to the type of job 
(table 17). The 
case of multiple 
jobs is also taken 
into consideration 
and they are attributed to the interviewed. There were no missing data. 
5TH SECTOR: ‘ACCESS TO EDUCATION’  
This indicator has been calculated in two main phases:  
1. Firstly, an index is calculated as a ratio between the degree of education 
actually obtained and the potential degree the child could reach at his age 
Table 16: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Income’ 
INCOME 
They beg / They work for food < 
200K 
0 
201-300K  10 
301-500K  20 
501-1000K  30 
>1000K (million/billion of ZKW) 
(very rich) 
40 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 17: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Job’ 
JOB 
No Job 
Housewife 
Piece-Work 
  
  
  
0 
Business 
Small Business  10 
Small Grocery Shop- Restaurant Keeper 20 
Big Shops (Ex.: Shoprite) 30 
Self- 
Employed 
 Ex.: Carpenter, Mechanic, Welder, Cook 
And Construction Workers 
20 
Miner   20 
Civil Servant 
Teacher (Community School) 10 
Teacher 
30 Head Teacher 
Nurse 
Agriculture/Health Officer 
50 
PA (Constituency) 
Agriculture 
Simple Farmer 10 
Commercial Farmer 30 
Herder 10 
Fisher 10 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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at the moment of the interview. The following reference table has been 
used for the calculation (table 18)142: 
 
According to the law, every 7 years old child must be enrolled in the primary 
school. Sometimes, families decide to start their children’s education earlier, at 
5 or 6 years old. Others prefer to send them even later (ex.: 8 years old). The 
decision usually follows the family’s wealth level, with the richest families 
following the first pattern and the poorest the second one. However, the 
survey data show that every family tries to send their children to school, at 
least for a few years. For this reason, the first modality (7-11 years old – Grade 
1-5) covers the first four years of formal education. 
For every child the score is calculated as follows: 
- 1st Example 1: The child is 8 years old and he/she has completed a school 
grade between 3° (real score: 20). Given the age, his/her potential 
education level equals ‘20’ as score. The final score is calculated as a ratio 
between the potential and the real education:  (20/20)*100 = 100 
- 2nd Example: The child is 15 years old. His/her potential education level 
should be between the 8°/9° degree in the Basic Junior School. However, 
he has reached grade 6° (score: 40). Therefore, the ratio is: (40/60)*100 = 
67 
For each child the index will range between 0 and 100. 
                                                             
 
142 The modalities for the ‘pupil’s age’ and the ‘potential degree obtained’ have been selected taking into 
consideration the Zambian laws and the education system. This scheme has also been used by the 
Central Statistical Office in a recent survey (CSO, 2012a) 
Table 18: Wealth Index – Reference table ‘Education’ 
Pupil’s age Potential degree 
obtained 
Type of school Score 
7-11 1-5 Primary school 1 20 
11-14 5-7 Primary school 2 20 
14-16 8-9 Basic junior 20 
16-19 10-12 Basic upper secondary 20 
20-24 University Degree University 20 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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2. Secondly, the mean is calculated (score obtained by each child / total 
number of children in the family). The final score is the indicator of the 
mean education level in the family. 
Obviously, many children in the family had not yet attained the school age. 
Therefore, in families with children younger than 7 years old, the mean (as 
described at point 2) is calculated taking into consideration only the children 
in school-age and not the total number of children. 
In some cases, all children are less than 7 years old. In this case scenario, the 
data is considered as missing. In this case, one possible option could be to 
assigned the score ‘0’; but it would penalize the family that cannot objectively 
send their children to school not because they cannot afford the school fees but 
only because they have not yet reached the school-age. Moreover, the survey 
data showed that all families try to send their children to school, in their early 
age of education. Therefore, the score assigned to these cases was calculated as 
the mean of the other families with children in school-age: ‘70’. The missing 
data was 17 (17.5%). 
6TH SECTOR: ‘LIVESTOCK’ 
Another important variable to understand the well-being of a family is the type 
and quantity of livestock owned. This data was calculated as follows: 
1. Chicken and goats: in this case scenario, a score is assigned only on the type of 
animal and not on the quantity. In fact, according with the focus group’s 
definitions, the ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ may have only these two types of livestock 
and cannot have access to others. 
2. Other types of livestock: In this case, the quantity becomes relevant. According to 
the focus group discussions, a way to distinguish between ‘average’, ‘rich’ and 
‘very rich’ families is to look at the number of livestock owned: the ‘average’ 
families may have ‘a small quantity’, etc. Therefore, for cows, pigs, sheep and 
ducks the quantity is also taken into consideration. 
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As shown by the table 
19, the scores have been 
assigned with 
consideration paid to 
the value of each type of 
livestock. It is evident 
that the cost of a chicken 
is not the same as that of 
a pig or a cow. Therefore, 
the scores have been 
attributed following the 
prices level as 
determined by the 
Farmers’ Association 
(www.farmproces.co.zm) and following the feedback of the resource persons 
in Lusaka or in the districts. 
In 9 cases (11, 2%) the data were incomplete because the number of livestock 
owned was missing143. In this case, the lowest amount for the typology of 
livestock owned was attributed so to avoid overestimation. 
Ducks were considered as chicken (questionnaires n° 14, 15 and 32). Doves 
were indicated only by one respondents and they were not considered for the 
attribution of the score (questionnaire n°45). Questionnaire n° 54 had an 
atypical, although correct, data: the interviewed individual, a lady living in 
Chipata district whose main occupation was chicken rearing, owned an 
important amount of these birds that the researcher could even verify.  Being 
an irregular and unique data if compared with the sample, it was considered as 
an ‘outlier’ and therefore only the type of livestock has been considered with 
an assigned score of ‘10’. 
                                                             
 
143 The missing data are linked to the questionnaires n° 13, 14, 15, 22, 24, 29, 32, 40, and 45. 
Table 19: Wealth Index – Reference table ‘Livestock’ 
LIVESTOCK 
 
No Livestock 0 
Chicken 
 
10 
Goat 
 
20 
Cow 
n° 1 30 
n° 2-3 40 
n° > 4 50 
 Pig 
n° 1 20 
n° 2-3 30 
n° > 4 40 
Sheep  
n° 1-5 20 
n° 6-10 30 
n° > 10 40 
Duck 
n° 1-5 10 
n° 6-10 20 
n° > 10 30 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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7TH SECTOR: LAND 
As already explained in the 
previous paragraph, the 
calculation of this indicator 
followed two main phases, 
taking into consideration 1) the 
land available to the family and 2) 
the quantity of land actually used for farming (ex.: a family may have a big 
quantity of land available but be able to use only a small part due to economic 
constraints) (table 20)144. 
In the first index, the scores are assigned according to the quantity of land 
available to the family. In this case, the data are complete and there are no 
missing data. 
The second index considers the ratio between the quantity of land actually 
uses by the family for farming and the quantity available. In this case, the 
missing data were 29 out of 80 (36%). 
The missing data have been estimated following the ‘Likelihood Principle’, 
taking into consideration the most frequent and most likely scenarios: 
- The missing data for the modalities 2 and 3 (<2 Lima 
<1 Arc (3 Lima) and 2.1-4 Lima / 3.1 Arc-1H) were replaced with the score 
of the quantity of land available to the family. In fact, it was observed that 
all families interviewed had access to modality  
- The survey data show that every family uses all the land available if they 
have access to modality 2 and 3 (ex.: the family has access to 1 lima and 
they cultivate 1 lima). 
                                                             
 
144 It is important to remember that Land issues are regulated in Zambia by the Lands Act (cap. 184 of 
1995), by the Land Acquisition Act (cap. 189 of 1970) and the Agricultural Lands Act (cap. 187 of 
1994). In Samfya, there are two main categories of land: ‘Customary’ and ‘State’ land. The first one 
represented 90% of the land in Samfya and it is directly managed by the chiefs; State land is controlled 
by the Council, as an agent of the Ministry of Lands. 
Table 20: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Land’ 
LAND  
1. No Land 0 
2. <2 Lima 
     <1 Arc (3 lima) 
10 
3. 2,1-4 Lima 
     3,1 Arc-1h 
20 
4. 1,1-5 Hectares 30 
5. 5,1-10 Hectares  40 
6. > 10 Hectares 50 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
142 
- The missing data for the 4th (1.1 - 5 hectares) and 5th (1.1 - 5 hectares) 
modalities have been replaced by calculating the mean of the data 
available for each modality. In fact, it was observed that in this case there 
is no common pattern for modalities 2 and 3. Therefore, the missing data 
in modality 3 were replaced by ‘80’ (mean of data available for modality 3) 
and the ones missing in modality 4 were replaced by 62 (mean of data 
available for modality 4). 
8TH SECTOR: VEHICLES 
The typology of the vehicle is taken into consideration when calculating this 
variable (table 21). The vehicles may be divided between those that have as 
pre-eminently a 
personal/transport use (ex.: 
bicycle, motorbike, car) and those 
mainly used for production 
activities (ex.: boat, oxcart, 
tractor). This distinction has been 
used to calculate the maximum 
score for this variable: ‘70’, i.e. 
maximum ‘40’ for vehicle for 
personal transport (ex.: car = 30 + bicycle = 10) and maximum ‘30’ for 
production vehicles. Data for this variable were complete. 
 9TH SECTOR: HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE 
The focus group discussions have 
highlighted a positive relation 
between the size of the household 
and poverty (table 22). The 
modalities have therefore been 
defined using some recent studies published by the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO). First, according to these surveys, the mean household size is 5.2 
members. 
Table 21: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Vehicles’ 
VEHICLES 
No Vehicle 0 
Bicycle 10 
Motorbike 20 
Car 30 
Boat 20 
Canoe 10 
Oxcart 20 
Tractor 30 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 22: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Vehicles’ 
HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE 
<=2 Members 100 
3-4 Members 75 
5-6 Members 50 
7-8 Members 25 
>= 9 Member 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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The level of poverty of the family is correlated with the household size and the 
modalities have been defined as follows: (1-2 member(s), 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9 e + 
members). In this study, it was decided to adopt the same pattern as the 
definition of the modalities145. 
10TH SECTOR: AGE OF THE WIFE 
AT FIRST PREGNANCY 
 According to the legal framework “A 
marriage between persons either of 
whom is under the age of 16 years 
shall be void” (Marriage Act, Part 5, n° 
33 (1). Therefore, the legal age for marriage is 16 and ‘0’ was the score 
attributed to this modality, as they represent the cases of ‘early pregnancies’. 
The scores assigned to the other modalities have taken into consideration that, 
according to the last surveys, half of the women have already given birth to 
their first child when reaching 18 years old. Finally, “If either party is under the 
age of 21, the written consent of the father shall be provided” (Marriage Act, 
Part 3, n° 17). There were 10 out of 80 missing data and they were scored ‘0’ as 
in this case, there were no valid assumptions that could be considered (table 
23). 
6.5 Standardisation 
Table 24 shows for each 
variable, the maximum 
and minimum scores. 
The standardisation 
allows to translate these 
scores in a value between 
                                                             
 
145 CSO (2012a and b). In this study, it was also highlighted that between 2006 and 2009 the poverty 
levels had increased for the families composed of 7-8 members. 
Table 23: Wealth Index – Scoring: sector ‘Age of the 
wife at first pregnancy’ 
AGE AT BIRTH of 
FIRST CHILD 
> =21 years old 20 
21-19 15 
19-16 10 
< 16 years old 0 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Table 24: Wealth Index - Standardization 
Variable n° Minimum Maximum 
1 0 60 
2 0 40 
3 0 60 
4 0 60 
5 0 100 
6 0 190 
7A 0 50 
7B 0 100 
8 0 70 
9 0 100 
10 0 20 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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0 and 10146. The sum of each standardized value is the final indicator of the 
family’s well-being, and it can be a number ranging between 0 and 100. 
 
6.6 Label assignment 
A label has been assigned to each family in order to easily identify its status 
(table 25). The distinction between the standardized values has been decided 
taking into consideration the definitions of well-being and ill-being provided 
by the participants to the focus group discussion. Finally, for the purpose of the 
analysis, the ‘very poor’ and ‘poor’ were considered as a homogeneous group, 
given the limited number of households belonging to the first category. No 
household were identified as belonging to the ‘very rich’ group. This data is not 
surprising and it is coherent both with the wealth group definitions provided 
by the focus group participants and by the socio-economic data available for 
the two districts (CSO, 2008).  
Table 25: Wealth Index – Label assignment 
Score Label Sample % 
0-20 Very Poor (VP) 4% 
20-35 Poor (P) 48% 
35-55 
Average (not rich – not poor; 
A) 
39% 
55-80 Rich (R) 10% 
80-100 Very Rich (VR) 0% 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
  
                                                             
 
146 The formula to calculate the standardized score is the following: (normal score*10)/maximum normal 
score. 
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5  C h a p t e r  
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA 
 
 
 
1 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN ZAMBIA 
1.1 The ‘Long March’ of Decentralisation in Zambia 
Zambian decentralisation has a long history, rooted in the colonial and even 
pre-colonial times147. Since its independence, in 1964, decentralisation has 
been high in the government agenda. Kaunda, the first Zambian president, 
explained the concept of ‘participatory democracy’ as follows: 
“Our Party Programme can only be implemented successfully if it is a 
people’s programme (…) we have therefore decided to have the type of 
democracy in which citizens participate not only through their freely 
elected representatives but also by their direct involvement in the 
decision-making process (…). Hence the importance we attach to the 
decentralisation of all forms of power institutions. This is what a 
people’s participatory democracy means” (Kaunda, 1971 as quoted in 
NIPA, 1981: 1). 
                                                             
 
147 A critical analysis of the local government system is beyond the scope of this research. This chapter 
will briefly outline the local government evolution in the post-independence period and its current 
legal framework. This will be used in the following chapter to understand some of the trends and 
bottlenecks highlighted by this study (see chapters 6 and 7). The literature offers a quite good analysis 
of the local administrative and political framework under the first two local government reforms in 
1965 and 1980 (Tordoff, 1974 and 1980. Mulford (1967). However, given the current ‘rush’ towards 
decentralization, studies on the legal evolution of the local administration, on the changes in the power 
relations among local actors during the time (ex. district councilors, district governors, council 
secretaries, chiefs, etc.) would be very helpful to have a better understanding of the current 
implementation of the decentralization policies in Zambia. The most recent literature has focused more 
on the democratic changes in the ‘90s but little attention has been given to the local government 
reform. (Berlett, 2000.  Bjornlund and Collier, 1993. Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994. Carcangiu, 
1998; Bratton, 1999. Burnell, 2001 and 2002b. Gulhati, 1991. Van de Walle and Chiwele, 1994). For a 
review of the late colonial administration and politics, see Davidson (1948), and Tordoff (1974). 
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The administrative system inherited by the colonial times was characterised 
by a fragmentation and overlapping of functions and it was perceived as 
inadequate by the new Zambian rulers. Thus, the colonial government system 
was immediately abolished and, only one year after its independence, in 1965, 
the first Local Government Act was approved. However, as discussed below, 
the local administration was deeply influenced by the national political events, 
and especially by the adoption of a one-party system in 1972, the merger of the 
party and government’s structures in 1980 and the return to a multi-party 
democracy in 1991. 
 
1.1.1 DECENTRALISATION IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE YEARS  
At independence, in 1964, Zambia inherited by the British a local government 
system geographically divided in 8 provinces and 44 districts (Mukwena, 
2001). As shown by table 26, each province was headed by a Provincial 
Commissioner, responsible to the Minister of Decentralisation and in charge of 
the good administration, the maintenance of the law and order, and the socio-
economic development of the province (Tordoff, 1980). Similar functions, but 
on a smaller geographical unit were covered by the District Commissioner in 
the rural areas, who was generally the most senior official at district level:  
Table 26: Local government system inherited at independence (rural areas) 
LEVEL POLITICAL AUTHORITY ADM. AUTHORITY TRADITIONAL 
PROVINCIAL 
(8) 
 PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER 
- accountable to the Minister 
- good administration, 
preservation of the law, 
development planning 
 
DISTRICT (44)  
 
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER 
- accountable to the Provincial 
Commissioner 
 
 
SUB-DISTRICT   NATIVE 
AUTHORITIES 
- accountable to 
the District and 
Provincial 
Commissioner 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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This system was found inadequate by the new independent government. As 
observed by Tordoff: 
“One of the most urgent tasks in 1964 was to transform the inherited 
structure of provincial administration – the focal point of the colonial 
system of government – into an instrument of economic development” 
(Tordoff, 1980:185). 
Few months after the independence, the previous system of local government 
was abolished. In 1965, a new law, the “Local Government Act” (LGA, 1965) 
was approved (table 27). The new act established three different types of local 
authorities: municipal, township in urban areas, and rural councils (LGA, 1965: 
art. 7)148. In 1966, the first local elections occurred under the new legal 
framework and, for the first time in the history of the country, the local 
administrators were chosen by universal adult suffrage. A Mayor, elected 
among the councillors, was the representative of the Council for one year office; 
rural and township councils were headed by a Chairperson.  The 
                                                             
 
148 During the colonial period, the Municipalities were managed by a “Municipal Council” and it was 
regulated by the Municipal Corporations Ordinance (1927). The Townships fall under the Township 
Ordinance (1929) and they were administrated by a Management board, composed by elected and non 
elected members. The last level of administration was constituted by 75 ‘Native Authorities’, 
established with the ‘Native Authorities Ordinances’ between 1929 and 1936 (LGAZ, 1997). In this 
study, we focus more on the rural administration. For more information on administration in the urban 
areas in the first 20 years of independence see Rokadi (1988) and Torfoff (1980, especially chapter 7). 
The reforms echoed those implemented in Tanzania in the same period (Tordoff, 1965).  
Table 27: Local government system in 1965-71 
LEVEL POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY 
ADM. AUTHORITY COORDINATION & 
DEVELOPMENT 
TRADITIONAL 
PROVINCE 
(8) 
RESIDENT MINISTER 
(OR STATE MINISTER) 
 
 
 
RESIDENT SECRETARY - PROVINCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEES 
 
DISTRICTS 
(44) 
MAYOR – 
CHAIRPERSON 
 
DISTRICT GOVERNOR 
DISTRICT SECRETARY - DISTRICT  DEV. 
COMMITTEE 
 
SUB-
DISTRICT 
BODIES 
(ward – 
zone) 
 WARD COUNCIL - WARD DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEE (WDC) 
- VILLAGE 
PRODUCTIVITY 
COMMITTEE (VPC) 
CHIEFS 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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administrative head of the Council was the Council Secretary, selected within 
the civil service and it was by far the most prominent personality within the 
district. In fact, once the former position of ‘District Governor’ was abolished 
together with the previous colonial administration, it was not replaced by 
anyone, at least initially149.  
“At independence, Zambia inherited a fragile tradition of local 
government, based upon different principles of English municipal 
authority and colonial indirect rule. Nevertheless, this tradition served 
as a foundation for a relatively uniform system of representative local 
government councils and the desirability of such a system has never 
been seriously questioned by the Government” (Greenwood and Howell, 
1980: 163). 
In 1969, a series of reforms started to change the shape of the local 
administration, towards an increased centralization and politicization. A 
representative of the central government was finally introduced in January 
1969, with the ‘District Governors’ appointed directly by the president to 
whom they were accountable150. They were regarded as the district’s political 
and administrative representatives and their main task was the promotion of 
the governmental policies, especially towards the implementation of the socio-
economic initiatives.  
At district level, as well as at provincial level, coordinating committees were 
also established in 1965 to help the implementation of the Transitional 
Development Plan (Chikulo, 1981). The District Development Committees 
                                                             
 
149 A directive of President Kaunda of 19 June 1966 assigned to the Council Secretaries the role of “chief 
Government coordinating officers (…) with particular reference to the work of economic development” 
(Presidential Circular of 19 June 1966 as quoted by Tordoff, 1980: 186). The role of the Council 
Secretary was weakened when the government decided to appoint the regional secretary of UNIP as 
chairperson of the District Development Committee (DDC) and, finally, its representative at local level, 
in 1967. The situation was different at provincial level where the Resident Secretary was accountable 
to the stronger political figure of the Resident Minister. The Council Secretary was therefore more 
involved in political affairs than its provincial counterpart was. For details on the local administration 
in the early years of independence, see Tordoff (1968 and 1980).  
150 The introduction of the District Governor was part of a wider reform of the public administration that 
also involved the provincial and national levels. These reforms, that increased the control of the 
government on the local administration, were the result of the Mulungushi Conference in 1967, which 
produced a deep divide within the major ethnic groups composing the party. For a critical account of 
the Mulungushi Conference and the early years of UNIP rule, see Tordoff (1974), Macola and Marmer 
in Gewald, Hinfelaar and Macola (ed.) (2008). Most of the time, the District Governors were members 
of the UNIP, and only in rare cases they were civil servants (Tordoff, 1980).  
151 
(DDC) were composed by civil servants working in the ministerial local 
departments, UNIP regional officials, councillors and other stakeholders in the 
district and, starting from 1969, it was chaired by the District Governor151. The 
DDC tried to play a coordinating role, to booster the development initiatives at 
local level and to monitor the progress of the projects’ implementation. 
However, the lack of a clear legal backing and of real executive powers 
transformed these entities in mere ‘talk shops’, with limited influence on 
policies and decision-making (Tordoff, 1980. Chikulo, 1981).  
In 1977, the Registration and Development of Villages Act (RDVA, 1971) tried 
to formalise a participatory system of governance up to the village level, 
composed by Ward Development Committees (WDC) and Village Productivity 
Committees (VPC)152. This latter was composed by the headman and up to nine 
other elected members for a period of three years (RDVA, 1971: art. 6-7); the 
WDC is also chaired by the ward councillor and composed by up to nine 
members (RDVA, 1971: art. 11). The main function of these bodies was the 
promotion of development in the area, and of the well-being and security of the 
residents153. Sometimes, a Ward Council was also present: composed by two 
representatives from each VPCs and chaired by the ward councillor, this 
council had more a coordinating and information role among the WDC and the 
VPCs154.  
                                                             
 
151 Conyers considers the introduction of similar coordinating committees as the “most notable feature” 
(1981: 112) of administrative reforms in some developing countries, mainly Zambia, Tanzania and 
Papua New Guinea. She argues that these committees have been traditionally established to overcome 
the shortcomings of a too rigid vertical structure inherited by the colonial administration. However, 
the observes that the these countries “have gone one step further and established new structures in 
which horizontal linkages between departments within a geographic area are at least as important as 
vertical linkages within each department” (Ibidem, 1981: 112). 
152 These committees were first promoted by Kaunda since 1967. However, it is only in 1971 that they 
received a formal legal backing (Tordoff, 1980). 
153 Although this law has not been fully applied for the parts concerning the development committees, 
this is important because it is still formally in force and it constitutes the legal framework for the Ward 
and Zone Development Committees. 
154 Kaunda has introduced these development committees in his “Humanism” as a pillar of the economic 
and development strategies of the new independent state. Later, when their existence was formalized, 
they were also used to extend the influence of the party and the control of the government up to the 
ward and village level. An excerpt of Kaunda’s Humanism is provided in Annex 6.2. 
152 
It is quite adamant that the system created by the LGA in 1965, as described so 
far, appears overly redundant and inefficient. This is also the reason why the 
government built up different expert teams to assess the bottlenecks and how 
they could be corrected155.  
Some main features can be identified here. First, especially in the 1970s, the 
reforms were mainly dictated by the need to pursue the state-building and 
implement the development programs. Centralism and not a real 
decentralization was the root of the reconstruction of the local administrative 
system, especially towards the beginning of the one-party state in the late 
1960s (Conyers, 1981)156. Quite understandably, the government’s priority in 
the early years of independence was not the delegation of power towards the 
local institutions but the consolidation of the central power under a united and 
independent state. Decentralization has to be only a tool to reach this goal. In a 
public statement in 1968, Kaunda called it “decentralise in centralism”157:  
“I define, this decentralization in centralization as a measure whereby 
through the Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize 
most of our Party and Government activities while retaining effective 
control of the Party and Government machinery in the interests of unity. 
In short, you decentralize to avoid regionalism (…) we should integrate 
more the Party and Government activities” (as quoted by Tordoff, 1980: 
205). 
In this context, participatory bodies, such as the VPC and the WDC, that were 
supposed to involve the citizenry in the decision-making process were instead 
used as instruments of control: 
                                                             
 
155 The first Working Party was set up as early as 1968 and it was composed by civil servants. A second 
one was leaded by A.J.F. Simmance in 1971/72 (Tordoff, 1974. Chiculo, 1981. Conyers, 1981) 
156 The ‘One-Participatory Democracy’ was launched by Kaunda in 1972 (Tordoff, 1974. LGAZ, 1997. 
Carcangiu, 1998; Conyers, 1981). The reforms were mainly dictated by the need to protect the unity of 
the country (and of the Party) against the centrifugal forces created by an unstable political and 
economic context (Rakner, 2003). Chikulo has highlighted how “Political realities at independence 
alone made centralization of power imperative” (1981: 63). He has also argued that centralization was 
a result of the distrust of the Zambian politicians towards the bureaucracy that has been the most 
powerful instrument of control during the colonial time (Ibidem, 1981).  
157 Some authors identified this centralization through decentralization as one of the root of the economic 
and political crisis experienced by many African states in the late 1970s and 1980s (Olowu, 2001; 
Wunsch and Olowu, 1995). 
153 
 “For instance, officers of local representative bodies such as Rural 
Councils, WDCs and VPCs are overwhelmingly recruited from UNIP 
constituency officials. Councillors, both elected and nominated, are 
usually selected from among the Party’s constituencies and are 
themselves selected by the Party hierarchy from among the Branch 
officials, and as a result villages have little to say in the matter” (Chikulo, 
1981: 63). 
Second, the legal framework was not always clear as in the case of the DCC or 
the District Governor. These latter lacked a clear definition of their roles and 
they had no real power at local level to hold the other authorities accountable 
or able to deliver according to their decisions.  
Third, the role and integration of the sub-district committees into the district 
level has to pass through the rural council and not directly through the DCC. 
Moreover, at this level there is a clear overlapping of bodies, especially when 
the Ward Council was also present158. These issues deeply affected the 
efficiency of the local administration and considerably reduced the capacities 
of the local authorities in delivering the public services and promoting local 
development initiatives (Tordoff, 1980). 
This redundancy of personalities and institutions with gappy legal provisions 
on the roles and responsibilities increased the chances of frictions, especially 
between the Council Secretary, the Council Chairperson and the District 
Governor. 
Despite these shortcomings, this period it is considered as the “most stable and 
successful in the local government financial history” (LGAZ, 1997: 14) because 
the local councils were granted different types of grants (ex.: housing, roads, 
police, heath grant, etc.). 
The Local Government Act of 1965 stopped working in 1981, when it was 
repealed with the new legal provisions of the Local Administration Act. 
                                                             
 
158 To rationalize these authorities, the Simmance Working Party has suggested transforming the DCC to 
a committee integrated into the Rural Councils. In fact, it is this latter that keeps the contacts with the 
sub-district committees and they play as the intermediary between the villages and the DDC (Tordoff, 
1980: 197).  
154 
However, the features and issues of the 1965 Act’s are extremely important to 
read the current local government system. In fact, in 1991, when the local 
administration was reformed again to meet the exigencies of the multi-party 
democracy, the government basically re-established the ’65 Act’s system. 
 
1.1.2 THE 1980S:  THE MERGER OF THE STATE AND THE PARTY  
During the 1970s the local government system was gradually modified, 
following the introduction of the one-party ‘participatory democracy’ by 
President Kaunda in November 1972159.  The financial resources were also 
gradually eroded: for instance, the housing unit grant was withdrawn in 1973, 
and the police grant severely reduced; in 1975, the land levy was suspended 
and the electricity undertaking were transferred to the Zambian Electricity 
Supply Corporation (ZESCO) (LGAZ, 1997: 14-15).  
In terms of responsibilities, the Zambian local government system in these first 
years of independence was based on devolved powers to a mix of locally 
elected and centrally appointed representatives (Conyers, 1983: 103) 160.  
In 1980, the Local Administration Act (LAA) was approved resulting in the full 
merger of the administrative and party institutions, therefore creating a sort of 
‘one stop solution’ for the political and developmental issues161. Elections at 
local level were abolished together with the positions of Mayor or Chairperson. 
                                                             
 
159 For an insightful analysis of the political events during the first twenty years of independence, see: 
Tordoff (1974, 1977) and Carcangiu, 1998. Annex 6.1 shows the local governance and the party system 
in 1978 and after the introduction of Local Administration Act in 1981.  
160 The reforms undertaken in Zambia in these years were partly inspired and influenced by the 
experience of Tanzania. Both countries moved away from a strict British local government style, 
creating a ‘quite revolution’ within their administrative structures. However, unlike Tanzania, in the 
late ‘70s, reforms in Zambia where introduced without the assistance of overseas consultants 
(Conyers, 1981). 
161 The reform was officially motivated by political and developmental needs, stressing the increase in 
local participation and coordination at local level (Conyers, 1986). It is also worth recalling that 
Zambia was not alone in introducing a reformed local government system: in the late ‘70s and ‘80s, 
other countries such as Ghana and Malawi adopted new decentralization policies, as result of the debt 
crisis and the launch of the Structural Adjustment Policies (Olowu, 2001). 
155 
The District Governor became the chairperson of a Council composed by party 
members, mainly coming from the UNIP Branch and Constituency sections 
(LAA, 1980: art. 11). The District Governor was the political head of the district, 
with the statutory responsibility of “the supervision of the day-to-day 
functions of the council” (LAA, 1980: section 77 and 79). Moreover, the District 
Governor chaired also the District Committee, which was had similar tasks as 
the District Development Committees (DDC)162. Finally, the administration was 
always headed by the District Secretary, currently called under the new law 
‘District Executive Secretary’. Its powers were increased and included the 
coordination of a wide range of departments and the day-to-day 
administration, the preparation of annual reports, budgets and development 
plans for submission to the council (LAA, 1980: Schedule Part III, Section 79; 
Conyers, 1981).  
Mukwena (1992 and 2001) explained how this structure responded to the 
UNIP’s need to gain stronger control over the rural areas in a moment 
particularly critical for the regime: on the one hand, it was urgent to respond 
to the “loss of morale” among party officials that, after almost two decades 
after independence, could not see any benefit coming from their support to the 
Party. On the other side, the economic decline which had characterised the 
1970s created a growing disillusion within the provinces and increased the 
need of an increased local participation to the implementation of the 
development plans (Conyers, 1981)163. Thanks to this new legal framework, 
the party members became directly involved in the district and provincial 
administration and had direct access to the sitting allowances, use of vehicles 
and other benefits. 
However, this system was also highly dysfunctional. First, conflicts between 
the District Governor and the District Secretary became common as their 
                                                             
 
162 The District Committee had the responsibility of supervision and guidance in the development 
activities, of preparing of the development plans; mobilizing the grassroots and publicizing the Party 
policies and programs (LAA, 1980: Schedule Part II, Section 77). 
163 See Rakner (2003) for an insightful analysis of the evolution of the Zambian economy. 
156 
responsibilities were quite similar and boundaries were not clearly detailed by 
the law (LGAZ, 1997: 7). Moreover, the reform entailed a significant increase of 
responsibilities and functions of the local authorities, at least on paper 
(Conyers, 1986). Wider responsibilities were not followed by the transfer of 
adequate financial resources, although more power was attributed in terms of 
revenue collection (Hampwaye, 2008; Chikulo, 1985). In fact, resources in this 
period decreased also due to the failure of the government to transfer the beer 
surtax or to pay the salaries (LGAZ, 1997: 16). 
In fact, most of these resources were mismanaged and used to support UNIP’s 
activities or members, with a consequent decline in the service delivery: 
It is true that the decline in service delivery began to be more 
pronounced this time partly due to a shortage of funds and the calibre 
personnel and councillors and owing to the absence of accountability. 
The rulings party however greatly benefitted from these institutional 
arrangements. (LGAZ, 1997: 7). 
Moreover, considering the ‘decentralisation in centralism’ was still the 
leitmotif and the real decision-making power was well established in Lusaka, 
the local administration only had real powers on minor issues (Saasa et al., 
2002; Conyers, 1986)164. This system was strongly contested by the Parliament 
since its “stormy” approval in 1980, but it met the increasing opposition from 
the population, especially in the copper-belt areas (Mukwena, 2001: 13).  
 
2 THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The current system of local governance in Zambia is based on the new legal 
framework, which has reintroduced a multiparty system in 1991. The 
Constitution of Zambia (1991) stated for the first time in its post-independence 
                                                             
 
164 The decentralization system that emerges from the Local Administration Act of 1981 has in reality 
designed a deconcentrated (or administrative) type of decentralization as described by Rondinelli 
(1981), Manor (1999) and Parker (1995), where the “The central government is not giving up any 
authority. It is simply relocating its officers at different levels or points in the national territory. In such 
circumstances, it tends in practice to constitute centralization, since it enhances the leverage of those 
at the apex of the system” (Manor, 1999: 5). See Chapter 2, heading 2.2. 
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history that “There shall be such a system of local government in Zambia as 
may be prescribed by an act of Parliament” […] and “based on democratically 
elected councils on the basis of universal adult suffrage” (art. 109) 165. In the 
same year, the law regulating the local government system was also reshaped, 
with the approval of the Local Government Act (n° 22 of 1991), which repealed 
the previous legal framework established in 1980166.  
Decentralisation is also a key reform, introduced in 1993 in the Public Sector 
Reform Programme, launched by the President Chiluba.  This programme 
aimed at creating an efficient, professional, and well motivated civil service, 
able to respond the people’s demands in terms of public services. 
Decentralisation was included a third key component, and it focused on the 
strengthening of the local government and its capacity to plan and deliver167. 
As a result of these internal and international demands, in November 2002, a 
‘Decentralisation Policy’ (NDP) was approved by the Parliament and then 
finally adopted by President Chiluba in August 2004. In 2009, although a 
‘Decentralisation implementation Plan’ (DIP), covering the years 2009-2013, 
was approved, it basically remained largely unaccomplished, due to the lack of 
political will to pursue the Decentralisation Policy. The Patriotic Front (PF) has 
made decentralisation one of its goals, and it introduced it in its political 
Manifesto168. A revised ‘National Decentralisation Policy’ (NDP) was launched 
                                                             
 
165 Interestingly, in the previous constitutions of post-independent Zambia, the local government was not 
mentioned in the Constitution although a local government system has always been in place. Thus, in 
1991, the local government reached constitutional status. For a comparison between the previous local 
government systems, see the Local Government Act (1965 and the Local Administration Act (1981). 
166 This law is included in the Volume 16, Chapter 281 of the Laws of Zambia. special boards have also 
been created during that time to manage specific functions (ex.: National Housing Authority (NHA), the 
Road Development Agency (RDA), the Water Facilities, and the Local Authorities Superannuation Fund. 
167 Some authors have highlighted the bottlenecks in the implementation of this program, mainly due to 
the resistance of the central government officials to concretely devolve functions and funds. For 
instance, see: Hampwaye (2008). Tordoff and Young (1994) have also provided a detailed analysis of 
the decentralization reforms within the PSRP framework. 
168 At page 19, the Manifesto states: “The Patriotic Front recognizes the critical role of local government 
as an engine for delivering services, infrastructure and development to the community. As a signatory 
to the Habitat Agenda and the Istanbul Declaration of 1996, Zambia committed itself to promoting 
decentralization through democratic local authorities and work to strengthen their financial 
institutional capacities”. The Manifesto (2011-2016) is available online 
158 
under the new PF government in 2013. The revised policy contains some new 
elements, such as a special mention of the role of the traditional Chiefs within 
the decentralised system (RoZ, 2013). 
The figure 11 clearly represents the Zambian local government system. The 
whole structure appears quite redundant, with overlapping of competences 
and roles. In addition, it appears as it is a mix of decentralised and 
deconcentrated structures. 
On the one hand, the local councils represent the decentralised component, 
and they are composed mainly by elected councillors and administration 
officers. On the other hand, the central government has its own administrative 
offices, which represent its own ramifications at provincial and district levels 
(ex.: Deputy Minister, District Commissioner and sectorial Boards). Finally, 
coordinating bodies, the Development Coordinating Committees, have been 
introduced in 1995 in order to harmonize and coordinate the work of these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
(http://www.ngocc.org.zm/index.php/publications/relevant-publications/doc_download/9-pf-
manifesto).  
Figure 11: Zambian decentralisation structure. 
 
Source: Saasa O.S. et al. (2000) in Chileshe, K.C. (2012 : 19). 
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institutions and the other development actors (ex.: NGOs) present at provincial 
and local levels. 
This structure is today mainly based on three levels: the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing, ten provinces and 102 local authorities169, whose 
details and relations are outlined in the following paragraphs. 
Till 2012 the district was composed of 22 wards and 3 constituencies, which 
were reduced to 18 and 2 respectively with the creation of a new Lunga 
District170. The head of administration is the District Commissioner, who chairs 
also the District Development Coordinating Committee (Samfya District 
Council, 2010). 
 
2.1 Political Decentralisation 
The district represents the focal point of the new system. The Local 
Government Act establishes a unique tier with three main types of local 
authorities: ‘City’ and ‘Municipal’ Councils in urban areas and ‘District Councils’ 
in rural areas171. 
                                                             
 
169 At independence the number of provinces was 8 and 35 had the status of rural district (Saasa & 
Carlsson, 2002). The number of provinces and districts has gradually increased and it has been 
particularly evident in the last few years. Still in 2008, the number of district was 72 and 9 provinces 
(Kamanga, Chitempo, & Philips, 2008). Today, Zambia counts ten provinces (Muchinga province has 
been recently created) four cities (ex. Lusaka, Ndola, Livingstone, and Kitwe) and 14 Municipal 
councils and 84 rural districts (102 local authorities in total). A full list of the local authorities is 
available at www.mlgh.gov.zm. The increase in the number of districts is not unique to the Zambian 
experience, and it is usually a result of political pressures. For instance, Ayee has highlighted a similar 
trend in Ghana where “agitations for more districts (…) led the creation od 28 additional districts in 
addition to the current 110 districts” (2008: 10). 
170 Interestingly, during the researcher’s fieldwork, the Lunga district did not have the infrastructure to 
host the new administration (ex. council buildings, etc.) and adequate executive officials to run the 
administration; thus, Samfya District Council was still temporary used to guarantee the start up of the 
activities in the new administrative unit. An interesting article, which appeared in 2013 in the Daily 
Mail was not surprisingly titled: “New Lunga District: place of desolation” (Nawa, 2013). 
171 As explained by many key informants working in the local government institutions or at national level, 
the main difference between the three types of councils is linked with the degree of development 
reached by that area. However, to my knowledge, there in no law, circular or other legal tool clearly 
establishing the requirements a council should have to reach the status of Municipality or City. The 
President grants these statuses by statutory proclamation (Local Government Act, art 4).  
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The councils are composed by elected and non-elected members. Each sub-
district area (called ‘ward’) is entitled to be represented by one councillor, 
elected by universal suffrage under a first-past-the-post electoral system for a 
period of five years172. The non-elected members include the members of the 
Parliament (MP) in the districts, two representatives of the Chiefs, and by 
Aldermen173. 
Each council is headed by an elected ‘Mayor’ (city or municipal council) or 
‘Chairman’ (district councils)174 for a period of two years and half175. The 
mayor has mainly representative and ceremonial powers: for instance, he/she 
is the first citizen of the district, may convene special council meetings and 
presides at them, signs the adoption of the council’s minutes and by-laws, and 
receives dignitaries visiting the council (RoZ, 1991: art. 16). 
The councils have to meet at least once every three months for an ‘ordinary’ 
meeting, but  special meetings can be called any time by the mayor or 
chairperson (LGA, art. 22) where decisions are taken by majority of the 
councillors present (LGA, art 26.1). All full council meetings are open to the 
public and a special notice is posted to publicize them among the populace.  
                                                             
 
172 Elections are regulated by the “Local Government Elections Act” (n° 21 of 1991 and amendments). 
Since 2001, elections for the local authorities are held together with the presidential and national 
assembly elections for a five years term. The main qualifications to become a councilor are: To hold a 
Zambian citizenship, to have attained the age of twenty-one years old and; to be an ordinary resident 
in the area. However, an employee of the council or those who have not paid all pending taxes and fees 
due to the council or any other public  authority (art. 14) 
173 The ‘Aldermen’ is “any person who has held office as a councillor of that council for a period or periods 
amounting in the aggregate to not less than ten years” and their number cannot exceed one third of the 
total number of councillors. The council may also have a ‘honorary freeman’: “any persons of 
distinction and persons who have rendered eminent services to the city or municipality” is entitled to 
acquire this status (Local Government Act, art 73 and 74).  
174 According with the law, a MP or a chief is not eligible for the position of mayor or chairperson (art 16 
(1) (b)).  
175 This term has been recently changed, with the Local Government (Amendment) Act, n° 16 
(12/04/2010). Before 2010, the Mayor and Chairperson were elected for one year term. Following the 
new regulation, the MLGH has recently called all local authorities to hold new elections for the position 
of mayor, deputy mayor, chairperson and vice-chairperson “on any date from Tuesday 1st April 2014 to 
Saturday 4th April 2014” (MLGH, 2014). Moreover, the Mayor or the Chairman can be elected for only 
one term (Republic of Zambia, 2010: art 3(4) 
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Full council meetings are usually preceded by committee meetings, which 
discuss and vote specific matters to be then presented for final approval during 
the full council meeting. Councils are free to establish or abolish any committee 
except for the Finance Committee, which can never be eliminated and it is 
always headed by the Treasurer176. Unlike the full council meetings, the 
committee meetings are never open to the public and even the researcher was 
never invited or admitted to attend such meetings.  
The functions of the local authorities are multiple and various and are 
precisely listed under section 61 of the Local Government Act. In short, the 63 
functions assigned to the local authorities cover sectors such as general 
administration, agriculture, community development, education, public 
amenities, public health, water and sanitation, registration (ex.: births, deaths, 
marriages) (MLGH, s.d.: 20)177. They are supposed to be the main drive of 
socio-economic development at local level,  
                                                             
 
176 These committees are usually headed by the director of the respective council’s unit. Other key 
committees are ‘Works’ headed by the Director of Works and the ‘Establishment Committee’ usually 
headed by the deputy council’s secretary (MLGH, 2008: 35). 
177 For instance, the local authorities may establish and maintain public roads, lighting in the streets, take 
measures to store, market or preserve agricultural produce, to protect local forests, to establish and 
maintain a public transport system, schools, colleges and nurseries or environmental and public health 
services. 
Figure 12: Full Council meeting at Chipata Municipal Council 
 
Source: Author’s capture 
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Figure 13: Organization Chart – Chipata Municipal Council (2012) 
 
Source: Chipata Municipal Council, Revenue and Capital Estimates for the year 2012 
The local authorities have also the power to make by-laws for “the good rule 
and government of its area”. However, before gaining its legal force, the by-law 
has to be sent to the Minister for its confirmation and approval (art 81 and 82). 
Moreover, the Minister can also amend, revoke or refuse to confirm a by-law 
(art. 82.4 and 83). 
The councillors do not receive a regular salary but they are entitled to receive a 
sitting allowance for any meeting as well as additional fees to cover the 
expenses occurred during their duties as councillors (ex. travelling, 
subsistence, etc.) (LGA, art 71). 
 
2.2 Administrative Decentralisation 
Zambian local administration is articulated in two levels: one that is directly 
linked to the local authority and represents its administrative wing; the other 
is an expression of the presence of the central government at local level.  
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Table 28: Main departments established within the Councils and functions. 
ADMINISTRATION DEP. 
WORKS OR 
ENGINEERING SERVICES 
DEP. 
FINANCE DEP. 
PLANNING DEP. OR 
UNIT 
Headed by the Director 
of Administration 
 
- Personnel matters 
- General functioning of 
the council 
Headed by the Director 
of Works 
 
- Works and physical 
development 
- Supervision and 
direction of 
infrastructure works 
and maintenance 
Headed by the Director 
of Finance 
 
- Finances and 
accounts of the council 
- Preparation of 
budget, receipts and 
payments  
Headed by the District 
Planning Officer 
 
- Development 
planning of the 
council’s area 
- Secretaries 
Source: MLGH, (2006: 63-64) and author’s own elaboration through direct observation and informal talks with the 
councils’ administrative officers. 
The Council’s administration is headed by the Town Clerk or the Council 
Secretary, (in urban and rural areas respectively) and composed by different 
departments. As Principal Officer and Chief Executive of the Council, the Town 
Clerks are directly accountable to the council178 and they are responsible for 
the overall coordination, planning and organisation of the departments (table 
27)179. 
Usually, ‘Administration’, ‘Works’, ‘Finance’ and ‘Planning’ Departments are 
always established to perform the basic duties of the local authorities (table 
28). They are headed by a Director and they are accountable to the Town Clerk 
and the elected councillors. Other departments are also sometimes present, 
especially in larger councils180.  
The councils may also appoint officers and other employees to assist the local 
authorities in carrying out their duties (LGA, art. 90). However, after the Local 
Governance (Amendment) Act came to force in 2010, this power is limited only 
to lower divisions (I and II), which include drivers or social workers. The ‘high 
                                                             
 
178 This statutory position is regulated by the LGA (section 2) and by Statutory Instruments n° 115 of 
1996 (“Service Regulation”) and n° 56 of 1992 (Functions of the Secretariat).  
179 They assure the legal compliance of the decision taken by the council; they provide guidance to the 
Mayor/Chairperson sitting on the administration of the council.  The Town Clerk/Council Secretary 
acts also as liaison officer between the government and local administration and assures the custody of 
the main documents (MLGH, s.d.). 
180 In Samfya, for instance, only the four basic departments were in place. Chipata Council has an 
additional department: ‘Public Health, Environment and Social Services’.  
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level’ positions within the council, such as the Town Clerk or the 
administrative directors are now appointed directly by the Local Government 
Service Commission in Lusaka. Among others the powers of this Commission 
include the appointment of officials considered “necessary for the performance 
of the functions” of the council and their transfer from one council to another 
(RoZ, 2010: art. 93 and 94)181. 
Figure 14 clearly synthesises the main difference between the administrative 
and political staff within the local councils, in terms of duties, responsibilities, 
accountability and selection process. 
The MLGH and the presidential Cabinet Office have their own ramifications at 
local level. At national level, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
(MLGH) is responsible for the administration of the local government 
                                                             
 
181 Interestingly, given some confusion among the local authorities, a MLGH’s Circular has recently 
repeated, “the Ministry is not the employment authority of the Council staff. As things stand, it is the 
Local Government Service Commission that recruit staff on behalf of the employing Councils. In 
essence, the staff is Council employees who should be disciplined by the Councils themselves. The 
Ministry has nowhere to take these officers appointed to serve in your respective Councils, because the 
Ministry is NOT the employer” (MLGH, 2012: MLGH/101/8/13). 
Figure 14: Organization Chart – Chipata Municipal Council (2012) 
 
Source: MLGH (2006: 62) 
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system182. Each province is politically headed by a Deputy Minister and he is 
assisted by a Permanent Secretary responsible for the coordination and the 
administration of the province183. Provincial Heads of Departments are also 
appointed to carry out functions assigned to them by the respective sector 
minister (ex.: heath, education, planning, etc.) and they are accountable to 
those ministries directly. At district level, since 2000, the District 
Commissioner is the head of administration and the representative of the 
government at local level184. He is appointed by the President and he reports to 
the Provincial Minister. He is in charge of supervising and coordinating the 
political and administrative institutions operating within the district. Finally, 
field ministerial departments are also in place at district level and they report 
to their respective provincial departments or directly to the ministry (RoZ, 
2002: 8)185.  
 
2.3 Coordinating Bodies and Deconcentrated Departments  
As established in the previous paragraphs, the Zambian decentralised model is 
characterized by a redundant system of political and administrative bodies, 
with a mix of decentralisation and deconcentration, together with a strong 
presence of the central authority at local level. In order to facilitate the 
coordination among the different institutions and the harmonisation of 
development activities, the MLGH has established in 1995 the “Development 
Coordinating Committees” at national (NDCC), provincial (PDCC) and district 
                                                             
 
182 The main duties assigned by the law to the MLGH coordination of the local government authorities, 
urban and regional planning, provision of social amenities, valuation of properties, provision of public 
houses, water supply, municipal infrastructure, feeder, community and urban roads. More information 
about the duties and mission of the ministry are available in its website (www.mlgh.gov.zm). 
183 The Provincial (or Deputy) Minister Report directly to the President. 
184 As in the case of the provincial Minister, the District Commissioner is chosen by the President through 
political logics and he/she usually is a member of the ruling party. Before 2000, the district has not a 
ministerial representative, except for the different departments (Saasa et al., 2000). 
185 The Ministry of Health or Education is represented by the “District Health Office” and the “District 
Education Office”. Other Ministries (ex.: Agriculture) have also offices at local level. 
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(DDCC) levels186. The Provincial and District Development Coordinating 
Committees (PDCC and DDCC) are ‘forums’ in charge of the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of development activities at provincial or 
district levels. A similar body is also established at national level (NDCC) for 
the horizontal coordination among the different branches of the public service. 
At district level, the District Commissioner (DC) is the chairperson of the DDCC; 
the Council’s Planning Unit guarantees the secretariat duties and oversees the 
preparation and coordination of the DDCC’s meetings187. The DDCC members 
include the heads of line ministries departments, the council, NGOs and other 
actors involved in local development activities. During the DDCC meetings, 
each authority presents a summary of its own activities and its forecast for the 
following months. The DDCC lies on a very weak legal framework and it is not 
effective in pursuing its mandate. As explained by a council’s official to the 
researcher during an informal talk: 
“In theory the DDCC is the best way to guarantee coordination among 
the departments. In reality, the coordination is not good and each 
department plans for its own. You are not accountable to the District 
Commissioner and the DDCC is more a ‘talk shop’ than a real 
coordinating body. In any case, even when a resolution is taken, there is 
never a follow up”188. 
 
2.4 Sub-Districts Bodies 
The role and functions of sub-district bodies are in theory regulated by the 
“Village Development and Registration Act” as approved in 1971 and amended 
                                                             
 
186 These committees have been established with the Cabinet Circular n° 1 of 1995. 
187 The position of District Commissioner has been introduced in 1999 and they replaced the Town Clerks 
in the coordination of the DDCCs but they are accountable to the Provincial Permanent Secretary 
(Chileshe, 2012:19). This decision, according with Mukwena (1992) is driven mainly by political 
considerations. Not surprisingly, the new appointees were namely members of the MMD (Sikazwe, 
2010: 11). 
188 At provincial level, the PDCC is chaired by the Permanent Secretary and headed by the Deputy 
Minister. It has features similar to the DDCC with the difference that the administrative scope is wider 
as it includes all the councils, ministerial departments, service facilities and other development bodies 
established in the province. The PDCC suffers of the same weaknesses already outlined for the DDCC. 
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in 1994189. This act regulates the roles and duties of the chiefs and headmen 
and establishes a system of participatory bodies: a ‘Village Productivity 
Committee’, a ‘Ward Council’ and a ‘Ward Development Committee’. However, 
this system has never been completely operational. The current framework is 
based on the National Decentralisation Policy, which states that “At sub-
district level, Area Development Committees (ADCs) will be established in each 
ward. The nature of ADCs will vary between urban and rural districts” (NDP, 
art. 5.2.3). Moreover, the Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP) 
describes the ADC as a 
“formal multi-functional developmental institutions that shall be run by 
citizens at the ward level. ADCs are intended to facilitate local-level 
dialogue on developmental matters and are primarily intended to 
facilitate practical involvement of people in project formulation and 
implementation. They will also support Councils through the 
generation of timely, reliable, and accurate data for service delivery 
planning” (DPI, 2009: 10). 
The ADC is intended to be a-political and focuses on development issues, 
proposing projects, prioritizing the needs, participating to the implementation 
and the monitoring process. Therefore, they are supposed to play an important 
role in the developing planning, guaranteeing a bottom-up and participatory 
approach: 
“ADCs’ mandates shall include the preparation and approval of 
integrated ward development plans and budgets before they are 
transmitted to the district level, where they will form a key input into 
the district planning and budget processes” (DPI, 2009: 10). 
Finally, the ADCs should also be involved in the resources mobilization and 
revenue collection.  
                                                             
 
189 The Village Development and Registration Act has been amended by the Act n° 13 of 1994 and it is 
part of the Volume 16, chapter 289 of the Laws of Zambia. 
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After the approval of the DIP, the (re-)establishment of the ADCs has gained 
new momentum, with the enthusiastic support of many donors190. According 
with the guidelines, the ADC’s should include elected and non-elected 
members. The elected members come from the Zones Development 
Committees (ZDC): the ZDC members should be democratically elected by the 
community and then, its members should choose one or two members to sit in 
the ADC as their representatives. The ex-officio members with no voting 
powers include a chief representative, political leaders (ex.: councillor or MP), 
CBOs operating in the ward or government officials (Petauke District Council, 
2012). 
 
2.5 Fiscal Decentralisation 
The main source of revenue for the councils is constituted by local taxes and 
fees or by government grants or loans. 
The government can assign ‘general’ or ‘specific grants’ to the councils. The 
general grant is usually assigned annually by law, as a share of the national 
revenues to the local authorities, and it can be used according with their own 
priorities (ex.: to cover their functioning costs or to support specific 
development projects)191.  However, they represent a still small proportion of 
the total expenditures of the Republic (figure XXX); moreover, most part of it is 
used to cover the administrative costs as salaries and functioning (Kamanga, 
Chitembo, & Philips, 2008). 
The special grants have some ‘conditionalities’ attached and usually they are 
assigned to the local authority to finance specific projects involving the 
                                                             
 
190 For instance, the European Union has supported projects in the two districts visited under this 
research but also in Choma (Southern Province), Petauke (Eastern Province), and Ndola (Copperbelt 
province).  
191 The ‘General’ or ‘Recurrent’ Grant has became mandatory since 1992, whereas it was discretional 
prior to that date. However, it has been granted quite irregularly in the last years, both in terms of 
timing and amount (MLGH, 2008; Chileshe, 2012 and author’s informal interviews with key 
informants).  
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provision of public services or the payment of the officers’ salaries (RoZ, 1991: 
art 45.3; RoZ, 2010: art 5).  
A share of the local authorities’ revenue comes from the imposition of levies, 
taxes or charges on property, trade or licences, as regulated by the Local 
Government Act192. The local authorities may also impose levies on property, 
business, trade, purchase or sale of commodities through by-laws (LGA, art 
69.1). They may also impose additional fees or charges on “services provided 
or goods or documents supplied by the council” or on licences or permits. 
However, the council cannot impose personal levies or fees on owners’ rates 
                                                             
 
192 Except for the legal provisions included in the Local Government Act, additional laws constitute the 
financial framework of the council. These include: the ‘Rating (Amendment) Act’ (n° 12 of 1997 as 
amended in 1999) regulating the owners’ rates; the ‘Personal Levy Act’, (cap. 329 of the Laws of 
Zambia); the ‘Market Act’ (Cap. 290 of the Laws of Zambia) regulating the market levies; the ‘Liquor 
Licensing Act’ and the ‘Traditional Beer levy’ (Cap. 167 and 168), regulates the sale and production of 
liquors; the ‘Trades Licensing Act’ (Cap 393), regulating the granting of trade licenses. In 2009, the 
‘Crop Levies’ have been abolished through by the MLGH through the Circular MLGH/101/23/1 of 12th 
October 2009. 
Table 29: List of main Commercial and Non-Commercial Taxes 
TYPE OF TAX OF FEE DESCRIPTION 
Property tax Local tax calculated as a share of the value of a 
property located inside the district (ex: house). 
Personal levy Local tax calculated as a lump sum paid twice a year 
by those with a formal employment and earning an 
income above a certain ceiling. 
Rent from Council 
properties 
This constitutes a quite marginal part, as most of 
the properties have been sold. However, usually 
they are rented at a quite low rate, making 
impossible to provide the proper maintenance of 
the buildings.  
Fees and Charges Local taxes on the use of specific services provided 
by the local authority (ex. market fees, fish levy, 
cattle levy, charcoal levy, bus stations, etc.) 
License and Permit 
Fees 
Local taxes on any type of business operating in the 
district (ex.: Building permits; building and health 
inspection fees; trading licenses; health and burial 
permits, etc.). 
Other taxes Local taxes include the fees or charges imposed for 
the delivery of specific documents by the council, as 
marriage or burial certificates, plans approval, dog 
license, etc. 
 Source: author’s elaboration from different sources (MLGH, s.d.; MLGH, 2008) 
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without the approval of the minister (LGA, art 70.1). The local authorities are 
also allowed to borrow money, but never from a foreign institution.  
Since 1991, the resources available to the local authorities have been steadily 
decreasing, due to the withdrawal of the Motor Vehicle Licence and the grants 
from City and Municipal councils, and the obligation to sell the council’s 
housing stock at very low rates. In 1991 the government allowed the civil 
servants with more than 22 years of service to access the retirement, resulting 
in the collapse of the Local Authorities Superannuation Fund (LASF). Moreover, 
in 2000, the water undertakings were transferred from the local councils to the 
commercial utilities and, in 2001, the government decided a 50% salary 
increase for unionised workers without a matching budgeting increase (LGAZ, 
1997; Kamanga, Chitembo, & Philips, 2008). 
Finally, the local authorities are also involved in the management of the 
Constituency Development Funds (CDF)193. This is defined as a “locally-based 
development funding arrangement that channels money from central 
                                                             
 
193 The Constituency Development Funds are regulated by the Circular n° MLGH/102/28/1 of 26th 
December 2006 (see also: Annex 4.1). 
Figure 15: Intergovernmental transfers as percentage of the total government's expenditure 
 
Source: Kamanga, Chitembo, & Philips (2008: 14). 
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government directly to the 150 electoral constituencies for local infrastructure 
projects” (Caritas Zambia, 2012: 11)194. 
The CDF have been introduced in 1995 with the purpose of financing “micro-
community projects for poverty reduction” (MLGH Circular, 2006). The CDF 
are granted by the MLGH to the Constituencies; however, they are managed 
directly by the local authorities and are part of their Capital Budgets. Project 
proposals are presented once a year to the Planning Unit of the Council by sub-
district structures, as the WDC/ADCs, CBOs or other registered clubs, societies 
or associations within the constituency195. The granting procedure follows 
different steps and involves different institutions: firstly, the projects are 
scrutinised by the Constituency Development Committee (CDC)196. The CDC 
has the task of analysing the financial viability and approving the projects 
eligible for funds. Then, the approved list of projects is sent to the Planning 
sub-committee of the District Development Coordinating Committee that has 
to appraise the project, provide technical support and recommendations and 
check there is no overlapping with other initiatives already undertaken by 
other governmental departments or civil society organisations. Finally, the 
projects are approved during a full council meeting and they are supposed to 
be implemented within 12 months197. Given the meagre resources usually 
available for development projects, CDF are the most important and reliable 
tool for the Councils to realise their Districts Development Plans (if available!) 
                                                             
 
194 A district may be composed by one or more constituencies. For instance, Samfya is divided in three 
constituencies (Bangweulu, Chifunabuli e Luapula); Chipata has four constituencies (Chipangali, 
Chipata Central, Kasenengwa, Luangeni). 
195 Projects are sometimes sponsored directly by a councillor or by the MP for the constituency. 
196 According to the CDF Guidelines of 2006, the CDC is constituted for three years in each constituency; it 
is formed by the MP or its representative (usually the Particularly Assistant of the Constituency Office), 
two councillors nominated by the council’s assembly, a chief representative appointed by all Chiefs in 
the constituency, the Director of Works of the council and four community leaders selected by the MP 
or the councillor. 
197 The CDF guidelines provide a list of projects that are potentially eligible for funding. The main sectors 
include: water and sanitation (ex.: construction or rehabilitation of boreholes); roads (ex.: bridge 
construction and maintenance); agriculture project: (ex.: irrigation); other social amenities (ex.: 
markets and bus shelter, education and health programmes, sport and recreational activities); other 
economic activities (ex.: income generating activities). A full list is provided in Annex 4.1 
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and finance projects directly aimed at supporting poverty reduction initiatives 
through a participatory approach198.  
CDF funds, together with the other sources of income, are included in the 
‘annual estimates’ of revenue and expenditures, which the Councils have to 
prepare annually and have to be validated by the Minister before the beginning 
of the financial year (LGA, art 39).   
 
 
  
                                                             
 
198 The CDF have enormous limitations and their potential impact is often limited by mismanagement and 
strained power relations within the district. For an insightful analysis on the CDF system in Zambia, 
see Caritas Zambia (2011).  
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6  C h a p t e r  
DECENTRALIZATION – POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN ZAMBIA: 
POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Empowerment represents the main political impact of decentralisation policies. 
In chapter 3, it was highlighted how ‘empowerment’ has emerged as a priority 
in the development agenda in the 2000s, and it is now a quite popular concept 
in the development discourse. Decentralisation can alleviate the ‘lack of power 
and voice’ that characterises the political dimension of poverty by creating a 
wider space for participation at local level, providing a better representation of 
the most marginalised or poorer groups of society. 
Bringing the government closer to the population, decentralisation may 
contribute to poverty reduction as it can potentially increase the popular 
participation and the influence of the citizens in the public-decision making 
process (Blair, 2000). Moreover, decentralisation reduces the barriers that 
usually hinder the access to the decision-making process to the poorest or 
most marginalised:  it is closer in terms of distance or less expensive in terms 
of transport to reach the local (decentralized) council instead of a central 
government authority. Thus, theoretically, decentralisation allows a better 
representation of all the social groups, making easier to mobilise, to get 
involved in the local government’s affairs, to bring the instances of 
marginalised groups (poor, women, etc.) that are usually at the periphery of 
the public arena and influence the local agenda (Steiner, 2007: 117). 
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In sum, decentralisation may potentially reduce poverty in its political 
dimension as it can give a ‘voice’ to the poor, creating channels to bring their 
needs up in the local debate and influence the decision-making. 
However, it is not enough ‘to be able to speak’. You also need to make sure that 
your ‘voice’ will be heard, so that the local authority is actually receptive to the 
poor’s needs and priorities and takes actions to provide adequate solutions. 
Therefore, only accountability mechanisms – creating a system of incentives 
and sanctions - can guarantee that the voice of the poor and marginalised can 
actually be heard, making the local government responsive for those demands 
and instances. These three elements – participation, representation and 
accountability – will be the focus of the analysis in the following paragraphs. 
 
2 PARTICIPATION 
2.1 Electoral participation 
2.1.1 LOCAL ELECTIONS AND FEATURES OF THE SELECTED CANDIDATE  
The introduction of local governments’ elections provides a first element of 
immediacy and ownership between the local institutions and the citizens. 
Zambian local government traditions date back to the colonial period under 
the British indirect rule. However, participation through direct election of the 
local councillors has not always been the rule and, as witnessed in most 
African countries, Zambia witnessed a highly centralised and authoritarian 
rule, especially during the Second Republic: between 1980 and 1991 the local 
councils were basically composed by nominee belonging to the UNIP. Since 
1991, when the multi-party democracy was reintroduced, elections for the 
local councils based on universal suffrage have been regularly held199. The last 
                                                             
 
199 See Chapter 5. 
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local government elections were held in 2011 together with the elections for 
the Presidency and the Deputies at the National Assembly (tripartite elections).  
Data from the household interview show that the electoral registration and 
electoral participation in the two districts were particularly high: all except 
one respondent said they did not register. In September 2011, only 4 
respondents did not vote to the tripartite elections, the reason being either a 
health condition or a job impediment200. However, contradictions emerge 
when these data are compared with the official results. In fact, according to the 
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ, 20111) in 2011, the voter turnout at 
Local Councils elections was not so impressive: in Samfya, it was 56.48% while 
in Chipata, it was 52.43%201. 
This difference can be explained in two ways: on the one side, the electors 
could vote at the same time for the President, the MP and the local councillor. 
The voter turnout can be positively influenced by the concurrent holding of the 
national and sub-national elections. On the other side, studies have highlighted 
how the respondents try to “adjust” their voting behaviour when interviewed 
(Blair, 2000).  
The data on electoral participation seem particularly low, taking into 
consideration that the voter turnout for the president was 53.65% and only 
42.25% of the voting age population turned out202.  
                                                             
 
200 A high participation to the vote is observed also in the 2001 and 2006 tripartite elections. 
201 In detail, the turnout in the ward visited was the following in Samfya: Chimana: 47,42%;  Mano: 
57,31%; Chifunabili: 59,50%;  Katanshya: 54,10%;  Masonde: 57,01%, average 55,06%. In Chipata 
these were the target ward voter turnout: Dilika: 51,46%;  Chiparamba: 57,05%; Kanjiala:  53,01%;  
Mkowe: 54,75%;  Nthope: 42,45 % (EISA, 2011). 
202 The voter turnout during the Third Republic has not always been high, even for the presidential 
elections. For instance, the first presidential election as multi-party country in 1991 had a turnout of 
45%. Bjornlund, Bratton and Gibson have defined this result as “surprisingly low” given the 
expectations and the drive for a political change convincely supported by the population. They argued 
this rate is the result of “errors in the voter rolls, but also, among voters, the fear of violence on 
Election Day and general unfamiliarity with plural politics” (1992, p. 431). 
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The survey’s respondents were 
also asked the gender of the 
candidate they voted for in their 
ward and why. Not surprisingly, 
the majority of the survey’s 
respondents voted for a male 
candidate. The majority have not 
given a reason for choosing a male 
candidate, reflecting probably 
reality of the voter turnover 
(Figure 16). The 28% chose a 
male candidate simply because there were no women running for office in 
their ward and it was therefore not possible to consider other options. In 5 
cases only, the respondents have stressed the capacity of the candidate as their 
main reason of their choice, no matter the gender (but only one from Samfya). 
In 5 more cases, the response is linked to a stereotype about the gender203: 
R25 (F): “Men are more fitted to development because they are more 
committed” 
R27 (M): “Men are more intelligent than women” 
R40 (M): “Men are more energetic” 
R51 (M): “There were no female candidates up to that calibre for 
standing” 
R73 (M): “Only men can bring development” 
One female respondent explained why there were only male candidates: 
R34 (F): “Women don’t involve themselves in politics. We don’t commit in 
leadership positions”. 
These answers introduce the issue of the role of women in the Zambian 
political life that will be analysed in more detail in the following chapter on 
‘Representation’.  
                                                             
 
203 ‘M’ or ‘F’ corresponds to the respondent’s gender. 
Figure 16: Reasons of choice for a candidate’s gender 
 
Source: Household questionnaires 
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The 3 main features that have guided the choice of the respondent have been 
the political affiliation (29% of responses), the commitment (27%) and 
honesty (26%) (Figure 17). 
Wealth, education or the 
religious belonging of the 
candidate do not seem to have 
an impact on voters’ decision-
making. In 3 cases the 
respondent said to have decided 
following the promises of the 
candidate, while in the 3 they 
confessed to have picked one 
randomly, just for ‘the sake of voting’. 
 
2.1.2 RUNNING FOR OFFICE AND CAMPAIGNING  
The number of candidates running for the local government office is another 
indicator of measuring political participation (Crawford, 2008). The number of 
those contesting council elections seems quite low among the respondents 
both at district, ward/area and zone level, without significant differences 
among the wealth groups. Only 1 out of 80 respondents stood as candidate for 
the Local Council in 2011 and 1 for the zone committee. The official results of 
the 2011 local elections confirm a rather low number of candidates at ward 
level: usually 2 or 3 candidates stood in each ward and they usually belong to a 
political party, although independent candidates are also accepted by the 
law204. In Samfya, only 4 wards out of 21 had more than 3 candidates running 
                                                             
 
204 In Samfya, only 4 wards out of 21 had more than 3 candidates running for office and only 6 candidates 
out of 58 were independent; in Chipata, the ratio is 6 out of 19 wards with 11 independent candidates 
out of 61. (EISA, 2011). This data is particularly relevant, as it reveals the entrenchment of political 
parties at local level and it suggests a major role played in the decentralization system. Unfortunately, 
very few studies have involved the analysis of the political parties and of the local elections in a 
decentralized system. The most advanced work to my knowledge is Gary Bland’s analysis on ‘Elections 
and the Development of a Local Democracy (Bland, 2010) where he has provided a framework of 
Figure 17: Features of the selected candidate 
 
Source: Household questionnaires 
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for office and only 6 candidates out of 58 were independent; in Chipata, the 
ratio is 6 out of 19 wards with 11 independent candidates out of 61. (EISA, 
2011)  
The active support to a candidate 
standing for the local elections 
also implies an active involvement 
and participation of the 
voters/citizens. The survey data 
shows that 28% of the 
respondents have actually 
campaigned for one candidate in 
the 2011 local council election 
(Figure 18). There is a high 
inclination to campaigning in 
‘poor’ or ‘medium income’ families, as around half of them in the survey 
sample actively supported a candidate. However, this high percentage does not 
imply a genuine interest of these two categories in local politics: most of the 
candidates’ campaigning activities are directly financed by the party and they 
usually reward the ‘followers’ for their active support during the campaign. 
Campaigning is therefore seen by the local population more as an 
income/service-generating activity than a pure ideological motion. Moreover, 
as Crook and Manor highlighted, there is also a difference in the way 
‘participating in an election campaign’ is understood: in Western countries, it is 
usually associated to formal activities directly involving the ‘volunteers’ (ex. 
distribution of leaflet, preparation of a political rally, etc.); in the four countries 
covered by their study in West Africa or South Asia205, people usually feel to 
have participated to the campaign even if they only “become involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
analysis and a cross-country comparison that includes Zambia. Some interesting considerations on 
political participation and the role of political parties in Zambia can also be found in Bratton and 
Alderfer (1997), Bratton (1999 and 2007). However, these works focus mainly on the national level. 
205 The countries are India, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast and Ghana. 
Figure 18: Campaigning 
 
Source:  Household questionnaire 
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processions or been touched by the election events in some way” (Crook and 
Manor, 1998: 272).  
 
2.2 Non-Electoral Participation 
2.2.1 PARTICIPATION AT WARD LEVEL:  ADC/WDC 
Another channel of participation at 
ward level should also be assured by 
the Ward (or Area) Development 
Committees (WDC/ADC) (Petauke, 
2012). In theory, each zone elects 
directly the zone representatives 
through a public election open to the 
community; one person is then 
selected to represent the zone at the 
WDC/ADC, often the chairperson or the 
secretary. Their main role is to 
promote development activities but they may also represent a potential link 
between the local council and the residents. The WDC/ADC may discuss and 
propose development initiatives directly to the council through the ward 
councillor or to the Constituency Development Fund Committee. Three aspects 
need to be analysed to understand the quantity and quality of participation at 
this level: (1) the community’s awareness on the existence of these structures, 
(2) the vote procedures and (3) the actual participation to their election. 
Figure 19: Awareness on the WDC/ADC (per 
wealth group) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
POOR AVERAGE RICH 
23% 
24% 
5% 
30% 
14% 
5% 
YES 
NO 
180 
Firstly, a community member 
should be aware of the existence of 
these bodies to be able to 
participate. The figures 19 and 12 
show the awareness level of the 
survey respondents on the 
presence these development 
committees at ward level. Only half 
of the interviewees (51%) are 
aware of their existence while 49% 
completely ignore it. Moreover, 
most of the respondents who 
answered positively have only a 
vague knowledge of their role or 
they just know they exist without 
any other kind of information. In 
Samfya the respondents show a 
higher awareness than in Chipata. 
Also, the data analysis per wealth 
groups highlights that the ‘poor’, 
which represent the biggest group 
in absolute number in the selected 
rural areas, have a lower awareness 
level about the WDC/ADC then 
‘medium-income’ families.  
Secondly, it was important to 
understand the overall level of 
residents’ understanding about this 
bodies and how they get involved. 
Among those who are aware of the 
existence of the WDCs/ADCs (51% 
of the sample) only the 49% 
Figure 22: Awareness on the WDC/ADC (per district) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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Figure 20: Awareness on selection procedures of 
WDC/ADC’s members (per district) 
 
 
Figure 21: Awareness on selection procedures of 
WDC/ADC’s members (per wealth group) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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correctly answered that “they are elected by the ‘villages’”, while the 39% did 
not know or had a wrong understanding of how it works (ex.: appointed by the 
DC or by political parties).  In other words, less than ¼ of the survey sample is 
aware of the ‘rules of the game’ to chose their zone/ward members in the 
WDC/ADC (figures 20 and 21).  
When discussing this aspect with the interviewees and focus groups’ 
participants, the researcher noted firstly some emphasis on the concept of 
‘community’ and, secondly, a clear contradiction between this concept and the 
reality of the data survey. 
First, when asked “who chooses the WDC/ADC members?” the survey 
respondents usually reply without hesitation “the community”, stressing the 
participatory approach of the process. The same happens in informal 
discussions with WDC/ADC members, other officials or the focus group 
participants. They all describe the following procedure for the Zone or 
ADC/WDC elections: “a general meeting is publicized among the community, 
everybody can participate to the discussion and to the vote and even get 
elected”. So described, the process seems really democratic and participatory, 
with meetings at village level where all the residents can participate.  
However, this statement represents a clear contradiction with the general 
“community’s ignorance” about WDC/ADCs as shown by the data. Moreover 
only 9 respondents out of 80 have actually participated to the elections. This 
contradiction can be explained by (1) the uncertainty of the WDC/ADCs bodies 
that have been created and recreated different times (2) the influence of 
political parties and leaders in the choice of the members. First, the Ward 
Development Committees were an old idea of the president Kaunda that, in 
1967, theorized their creation in “Humanism” (Part 1). 
According to this early formulation, ward committees would engage in 
such basic economic functions as allocating and enforcing agricultural 
production targets, supply farmers with fertilizers, credit and 
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marketing facilities, and planning economic investment for the ward 
(Tordoff, 1980: 202-203)206. 
However, since the early years, these structures did not always survived or 
function properly and they were severely influenced by the political parties 
and the local administrators. The Ward Development Committees were 
recently re-introduced in the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) 
developed and approved in 2002 and in the Decentralisation Implementation 
Plan (DIP), approved in 2009. However, most part of the NDP and DIP were not 
actually implemented mostly because of a general governmental unwillingness 
to devolve powers and resources to district level (Bland, 2010). The WDC in 
Samfya and Chipata were therefore created by the district/municipal councils 
mainly with the donors’ support. In Samfya, they were lately given new life in 
2007 thanks to a project funded by MS Zambia – Danida. The WDCs, renamed 
“Area Development Committees” were re-elected in all 22 wards, a 
coordinating structure (ADC Forum) was created with the task of analysing 
and consolidating reports from the ADCs for submission to the DDCC and the 
council. ADCs’ members were also trained and the population sensitized on the 
new structures and on how they could be used for poverty reduction 
purposes207. In Chipata, the 22 wards were re-created in 2000, mainly with the 
support of UNDP-funded projects. However, in both cases, the projects 
discontinued and many WDC/ADCs dissolved or stayed in stand-by for some 
time before being re-created again208. This uncertainty may explain the data on 
the lack of awareness: simply put, these structures have not proved – at least 
recently – to be really able to promote the local development and their 
presence was not visible to the eyes of the population. 
                                                             
 
206 In this framework, the Village Productivity Committee constituted the basic institutional level. This 
structure was further developed with the Registration and Development of Villages Act (1971) and the 
Pocket Manual for Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees (Tordoff, 1980). See also: 
Kaunda (1968). 
207 This information was collected by the author through an unstructured interview with Brian Musama, 
ADC Coordination Officer in Samfya (10/10/2012). 
208 During the fieldwork research, both districts had recreated the ADC/WDCs thanks to a European 
Commission’s project aimed at supporting the local authorities in the decentralization process. 
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Secondly, the participation to the zones or WDC/ADCs elections is somehow 
restricted by the influence of political parties. Although, everybody stresses 
emphatically their non-political nature, often the members are chosen through 
political affiliation. The reality of zone elections is therefore more similar to the 
following one: a public meeting at zone level is called by the ward councillor 
and the planning director in the council; however, people close to the most 
prominent public figures are keener to be informed and to participate. During 
the meeting, a person stands and proposes the name of a resident as candidate 
to the Zone Committee; others will do the same. No open discussions are 
usually involved in the choices. Most often, if nobody disagrees, the proposed 
candidate will be elected. Obviously, it is quite easy for the political parties to 
push for the election of their supporters and use it as a tool to reward them. In 
some cases, a WDC/ADCs member managed to get eventually elected as 
councillor for the ward. 
 
2.2.2 ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS  
Another important indicator in assessing the participation is the community’s 
attendance at public meetings (ex.: full council meetings or ward/zone 
meetings).  
The majority of respondents 
(56%) never attended a public 
meeting in 2012 (Figure 23). 
Differences can be noticed 
between the two districts: in 
Samfya, the participation is 
higher (29%) than in Chipata 
(15%), where the majority of the 
respondent did not participate 
to any public meeting (35%). Moreover, the data per wealth group suggest that 
the economic status of the family does not influence the participation trend of 
a family in public meetings in rural areas (figure 24). Finally, the zone meetings 
Figure 23: Attendance at meetings per district 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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are the most attended (80%), followed by the WDC/ADC (40%) and the full 
Council meeting (23%) (Figure 25). Chipata and Samfya follow similar patterns 
of the attendance for the zone meeting, but Chipata shows a higher 
participation at WDC/ADC meetings than Samfya. 
A first explanation of these set of 
data can be found in the 
uncertainty nature of the 
WDC/ADCs’ structures, as 
explained in the previous 
paragraph. Although rooted in the 
early period of independence, 
today, while the population’s 
awareness about their presence is 
rather low, they are still perceived 
as ‘new’. In that regards, each 
district has its own way to 
understand their role and its 
linkage with the councillors. 
As a second explanation, it is not 
surprising that the zone meetings 
are the most attended with very 
few participating at the full 
councils meetings in Samfya or 
Chipata. In this last case, distance and cost of transport can still be a barrier. 
The geographical dimension of the ward is rather big and the resources needed 
in terms of time/costs to attend these meetings are too high if compared with 
the actual ‘benefit’ in term of influence or information.  
Thirdly, there is also a general lack of knowledge among the population on the 
law’s prescription on the functioning of the local authorities. Many are 
therefore not aware of the possibility of attending the local councils’ meetings. 
For instance, a survey promoted by the University of Zambia showed that 58% 
Figure 24: Attendance at meetings per wealth group 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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of respondents were not aware of the legal provision allowing the public to 
attend the full Council meetings and only 10.7% attended (UNZA-PAS, 2005: 
iii). 
 
3 REPRESENTATION 
3.1 Who are the Local Representatives? 
Theoretically, decentralisation allows a better representation of all the social 
groups, making it easier to mobilise, get involved in the local government’s 
affairs, bring the instances of marginalised groups (poor, women, etc.) that are 
usually at the periphery of the public arena and influence the local agenda. 
Therefore, because it may give “voice” to the poor, decentralisation may 
potentially reduce poverty in its political dimension (Steiner, 2007).209 In a 
decentralised system:  
“The hope is that as government comes closer to the people, more 
people will participate in politics. All sort of constituencies – women, 
minorities, small businessmen, artisans, parents of schoolchildren, 
marginal farmers, urban poor – will then get elected to office […]” (Blair, 
2000: 23) 
Which are the main features of the local representatives?  According to the 
survey’s respondents, the councillors 
and the ADC/WDCs members are 
usually farmers or businessmen 
(figures 26 and 27). Very few are just 
politicians at council level although 
they usually belong to a political party. 
The reason is that councillors do not 
receive a salary for their job but only 
an allowance when sitting in full 
                                                             
 
209 See chapter 2 and 3. 
Figure 26: Councilors’ main occupation 
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council or commissions meetings210. The local government seems to actually 
create a space also for the most disadvantaged categories, as farmers (or 
fishers in Samfya), where they can be directly represented. In Chipata, for 
instance, nine councillors out sixteen declared that they were small scale 
farmers with a monthly income of less than 300 Kwacha (less than 40 
Euros)211. 
Another interesting data is the absence 
of religious leaders as local 
government representatives. However, 
they appear as members in WDC/ADCs 
(in Chipata only). As clearly 
highlighted by Marja Hinfelaar (2008) 
and Austin Cheyeka (2008), the 
Catholic and the Charismatic churches 
have played an important role in the 
political arena. Despite the socialist 
rhetoric that has characterised Zambia during the First and Second Republic, 
Christian churches were strongly embedded in Zambian society and the 
Church and the State have always tried to influence and co-opt each other. 
Zambian political leaders have always acknowledged the role of the religious 
chiefs within the society and they have always tried to have their support:  
“[…] in the Africa public’s perception, a ‘religious leader not only 
commands a degree of secular influence but it also perceived of being 
endowed with power stemming directly from the spirit world’. These 
                                                             
 
210 The label ‘politician’ is understood as somebody who has as main occupation, and economically 
depends on, politics. The status of councilor gives the right to have sitting allowances but not a 
monthly salary; therefore, although they usually belong to a political party, they cannot technically be 
defined as ‘politicians’ as they usually keep their previous occupation as main source of income. The 
respondents were then asked their opinion on the councilors’ allowance. 73% of the respondents were 
not aware or they did not know the amount the councilors are eligible to gain for their work. The 15% 
believe it is adequate. 
211 Meetings with the councilors were particularly difficult as they usually reach the district capital only 
for committees or councils’ meetings. However, in Chipata, a full council meeting was organized during 
the author’s fieldwork (19/11/2012) and it was possible to interview some councilors. It was agreed 
on that they would remain anonymous and that the interviews would be informal. It explains why they 
are not included in the list of key informants provided in Chapter 4. 
Figure 27: WDC/ADC members’ main occupation 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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Figure 28: Presence of traditional leaders 
among councilors 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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alleged spiritual power raised high expectations within society”. 
(Hinfelaar, 2008: 133). 
At local level, the importance of the Churches is also high. Usually, religious 
leaders do not openly campaign or participate to the political competition. 
However, political leaders always seek the support of the religious chiefs, 
especially when the election for the National Assembly is concerned (Hinfelaar, 
2008; Cheyeka, 2008). Religious leaders are also involved when wider 
consultations are needed. In Samfya, for instance, the leader of the Catholic 
Church was elected as ‘president’ during the Public Consultation organised to 
collect the input of the populace on the new draft constitution in October 
2012212. The participants to the three-day public consultation agreed to choose 
him, thus recognising his role as chief within the society; moreover, as ‘neutral’ 
power not directly involved with politics, he could be better placed to 
overview and guarantee the proper implementation of the consultation, the 
discussion and the vote. 
A similar role is played by the traditional 
leader, or Kings (Figure 28). More than 
half of the respondents (56%) know that 
traditional leaders are usually not 
directly involved in ‘active politics’ 
although the number of those who ‘do 
not know’ (N/A) is still high (29%). It is 
also interesting to observe that 32% of 
‘very poor’ or ‘poor’ people do not know 
if their traditional leaders are directly 
involved in the local council affairs. The “medium-income’ group and namely 
the ‘rich’ show to have a better understanding of this issue. In the WDC/ADCs, 
                                                             
 
212 A round of public consultations started throughout the country to collect the views of local authorities 
and civil society members on the draft on the new constitution (Republic of Zambia, 2012). The 
researcher could participate at the round held in Samfya on 01-03/12/2012. 
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traditional leaders seem to be more represented (44%). However, the data 
show a certain ‘uncertainty’ of the respondent to this question (Figure 29).  
Here, two remarks need to be made. 
On the one side, the uncertainty and 
the high percentage of ‘N/A’ show a 
widespread of a lack of understanding 
on the local government’s work and of 
civic education, especially among the 
poorer. On the other side, it also 
highlights the special role that the 
traditional leaders have within the 
Zambian political system. As already 
stated, their role is similar to the one played by religious leaders. However, 
their involvement in politics is stronger and official. In fact, 
Zambia is an exemplar of the modern African phenomenon of dual 
authority, marked by the coexistence of “the real of state sovereignty 
and the realm of traditional government; both systems effectively 
govern the same communities of citizens-subjects” (Sklar, 1993 cited by 
Bratton, 1999: 572-573) 
Rural Zambia is divided into 286 Kingdoms, which makes three Chiefs or Kings 
within each constituency as average (Baldwin, 2013). According to the 
Constitution, the King cannot run for office at any level (presidential, national 
or local)213. However, chiefs are represented at National level through an ad 
hoc chamber, the ‘House of Chiefs’, with a consultative and supportive role. 
Moreover, in his study based on empirical data on the relation between the MP 
and the Kings, Baldwin (2013) highlights the role played by the chiefs at local 
level: 
 “They still have power in allocating land, administering justice, and 
organising community projects, they have up-to-date information on 
                                                             
 
213 The Constitution of Zambia (1991) establishes that “A person shall not, while remaining a Chief, join 
or participate in partisan politics” (art 129). 
Figure 29: Presence of traditional leaders among 
WDC/ADC members 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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local issues and people often seek their advice on private matters. 
Before undertaking any initiative in their ‘kingdom’, especially if 
customary land is involved, one needs to consult them and have their 
approval. They have the trust of the population and they can therefore 
influence positively the campaign of a candidate running for office. It is 
common practice for MPs candidates to spend great efforts to seek and 
demonstrate the support of the Chiefs in their constituency. Even the 
President has usually his network of paramount chiefs and regional 
leaders which constitutes his backbone political support” (2013: 798). 
The same role is played by the chiefs at council level. They are always 
represented by their nominees at the council, where they seat as full council 
members. They same applies at the Constituency Development Fund 
Committee, the body that reviews and selects the projects to be founded under 
the CDF framework. Moreover, each ward councillor needs to work closely 
with the chiefs and to seek their support for any development or 
administrative initiative (ex. tax collection, etc) Baldwin (2013). 
In Samfya, the different role played by chiefs and religious leaders has been 
visually demonstrated by the spatial position occupied by them during the 
Consultations for the draft Constitution: before being called a ‘president’ of the 
Consultative Assembly, the Catholic priest was sitting behind the first row of 
chairs occupied by the councillors, the chiefs and the representative of the 
District Commissioner. Moreover, the chiefs have not even been proposed by 
the audience as possible candidates for the ‘presidency’ as their role is not seen 
as ‘neutral’ as the religious leader214. 
The position and role occupied by religious and traditional leaders within the 
society and the relatively high number of poor farmers within the local 
                                                             
 
214 These information was collected by the researcher during the public consultation (see footnote n° 
112).  
The perception of the Churches as a ‘neutral’ player is also visible in other important political events in 
the history of the Third Republic: Bjornlund et al., (2000) highlight the role played by the three leading 
denominations (Zambian Episcopal Conference, the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, and the 
Christian Council of Zambia) in the organization of the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating 
Committee (ZEMCC) in 1991. This latter was an umbrella organization constituted by civil society 
organizations and the three denominations with the purpose to guarantee an independent monitoring 
during the first multi-party elections in 1991. The ZEMCC’s members elected some churchmen as their 
representatives. Moreover, always during the first campaign, the churches played the role of mediators 
between Chiluba and Kaunda (Bjornlund et al., 2000). 
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councils proves that in these two Zambian districts, there are no informal 
barrier hindering all the different groups of society to be represented at local 
level, created by local elites (ex.: social, traditional or economic)215. 
In Mali, for instance, the introduction of the local council resulted quite often in 
an open ‘battle’ between traditional and modern elites: in some communes, the 
traditional elites managed to gain the control of the council; in others, it 
provided the opportunity for younger and modern groups to acquire the 
political control, although after a tremendous competition against the 
traditional elites (Lévy, 2003). The same resistance was highlighted in Malawi 
where the power struggles involved the councillors against the MPs and the 
chiefs, but also against the bureaucrats (ex. council’s Secretary) and the 
Assembly (Chiweza, 2005; Chinsinga, 2005 and 2008). 
Thus, the elite capture in term of power seems less important in Zambia than 
in other countries216. This is also supported by the focus groups discussions 
and the data survey where most of the respondents testify that ‘poor’ or ‘very 
poor’ families benefited most from the development projects initiated or 
supported by the local council, as compared to the ‘rich’ families217. 
However, the fact that the traditional or economic elites have not monopolised 
the local assemblies does not impede the creation of new marginalised groups. 
In fact, although a certain education level is required in order to seat as 
councillor, the number of those actually able to participate is limited. In 
Chipata, in the last full council meeting of 2012, the 2013 budget was discussed 
                                                             
 
215 In this study, we accept a generic concept of elite (social, economic, traditional etc.) as expressed by 
Steiner in her work in on decentralization in Uganda (Steiner, 2008: 64). As she points out, the type of 
elite depends on the country’s context and it is therefore more accurate to use a wider understanding. 
216 In this aspect, Zambia is more similar to the Ghana experience, characterized by a limited elite-capture 
(Crawford, 2008). This may be easily explained by the historical contex: for instance, in countries like 
Zambia, with a long tradition of local government and interaction between the traditional and political 
power, the ‘struggles’ for power are not as important as in countries that come from a history of 
centralisation. 
217 See chapter 7. 
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and approved218. However, how many of the 22 ward councillors were actually 
able to read that budget and to understand what was going on during the 
discussion? ‘Very few’ was the answer of a key informant to this question and 
it was also directly noticed by the researcher: very few were actually able to 
ask questions on the new budget, or actively participate to the discussions and 
many looked actually quite bored by the agenda of the day219.  
Therefore, a first issue is the actual capacity of the councillor. Those who are 
more educated or more familiar with the local government structures and 
work will have an advantage in capturing resources and initiatives for their 
own ward (or/and interest) and they can therefore guarantee a better 
representation of their ward or group.  
A second factor, which is able to explain the relative or apparent absence of an 
‘elite-capture’ in terms of power and development initiatives, is the role played 
by the political parties at local level220. Political parties are indeed well rooted 
in the wards and zones and they are able to create a network including all folks 
of the society221. Only those linked to a certain political party are able to access 
the ‘privileges’ linked to these status. As highlighted earlier in the analysis, the 
number of the independent councillors is very limited; the political parties 
often use the local councils to maintain and strengthen their network of 
popular support, to be mobilised when the National Assembly needs to be 
renovated or a President elected (Bratton, 1999 and 2007; Burnell, 2001).  
                                                             
 
218 The author could participate to the full Council Meeting held in Chipata on the 19/11/2012. 
219 The researcher could observe that only 2 councilors engaged in a discussion on the budget and one of 
those was actually a local MP. The name of the informant, an official working in Chipata district, is kept 
anonymous, as agreed with the informant. 
220 The studies on the political parties and their role at local level are very limited as noticed by Bland 
(2013). In Zambia, it represents an interesting topic for further academic investigation and it may help 
to better understand the functioning of the local government, especially in the rural areas. 
221 The entrenchment of the parties at local level can be explained through the recent history of the local 
administration in Zambia, in particular, with the one-party participatory democracy started in 1971 
and the merger, in 1981, of the political and party structures under the Local Administration Act 
(1981). For instance, Tordoff and Young argued, “This new structure was in practice used to underpin 
the power of the ruling party at local level (…)” (1994: 287). See also chapter 5. 
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3.2 Women’s Representation  
The representation of women within the local government structures can be 
used as another important variable to analyse the potential benefits of 
decentralisation policies in terms of ‘empowerment’. The data from the 
household survey show an important gender imbalance in the political 
representation. 78 out of 80 respondents answered that usually the councillors 
are men222. The additional explanations given to the answers were compared 
and aggregated in the following categories: 
1) ‘Social stereotypes’: the answer contains a comparison between men a 
women, which implies a “lack” of a particular feature in women that makes 
them ‘unfitted’ for this duty (ex.: “Men are more active and clever” (R42 [M]) or 
“Women are not honest when they receive funds” (R1 [F]); or finally “Men have 
more wisdom the women (R9 [F]). This category includes the cases where the 
answer openly expresses the social distrust against women in politics (ex.: 
“Leadership is perceived only for men” (R8 [F]); or “Men are more than women 
because people think women cannot perform better than them” (R79 [M]). 
2) ‘Barriers created by men’: the answer directly indicated that the main 
problem is the creation of “entry barriers” to women in politics by men (ex.: 
“Men are selfish, they don’t allow women to participate” (R4 [F]) or “Men are 
selfish. Women try to get involved but when the reach the moment of choosing 
the candidates, one finds out that the men have already decided among 
themselves” (R37 [F]). 
3) ‘Interest’: the answer stresses a generic lack of interest in politics by women 
without any linkage to social pressures or male behaviour (ex.: “we prefer to 
put a distance from leadership positions” (R5 [F]) or “Women don't get 
involved in politics and leadership” (R20 [F]). 
                                                             
 
222 One respondent said, “both” (R. 45) while another one “I do not know” (R. 49). 
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4) ‘Education’:  the answers stress 
the lack of education as the main 
reason of the gender unbalance in 
local politics. 
5) ‘Resources’: the answers stress 
the lack of resources (money or 
transport) as main reason of the 
gender unbalance in local politics. 
Figure 30 shows that the majority 
of respondents stress the “lack of 
interest” (29%) by women as the main reason for their small representation in 
the local council followed by  “social stereotypes” (23%) and “education” 
(13%)223. The two districts follow a common pattern, except for the “social 
stereotypes”, that are indicated as the main reason for the exclusion of women 
by local politics. That reason is more cited in Chipata (14%) than in Samfya 
(9%)224. 
The analysis shows that the majority of respondent choosing not to reply is 
female (14%), against the 10% of male respondents (Figure 31) This can be 
partly explained by certain bias: some women felt embarrassed or amused 
while answering to this question in front of a “white and female researcher” 
and a male (in most cases) interpreter.  
Other differences can be noticed comparing answers by gender: 
                                                             
 
223 It is also interesting to note the high percentage of “No answer” (24%). The analysis shows that the 
majority of respondents choosing not to reply are female (14%), as compared to, the 10% of male 
respondents. 
224 A possible reason can be a greater consciousness about ‘women rights’ in Chipata, also due to the 
proximity to a major urban center and the more remote location of Samfya. For instance, the author 
was invited to participate to a meeting in Chipata for the preparation of the ’16 days of activism against 
Gender Based Violence’ on the 21/11/2012.  
Figure 30: Presence of traditional leaders among 
WDC/ADC members 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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1. According to men the “lack of interest” (34%) is the main reason explaining the 
poor number of women as local councillors while this is important for women but 
much less (24%). 
2. Women stress the importance 
of “barriers created by men” (10% of 
women against 3% of men) while 
both genders recognize the 
importance of “social stereotypes” (24% 
of women against 21% of men). 
3. Lack of education is quoted 
more by men (16%) than women 
(10%)  
The social stereotypes around 
female involvement in politics are 
summarised in a nutshell in the 
following events told to the 
researcher during a focus group 
discussion in Chipata: 
“A woman was elected as ward councillor. At the time she was single, 
but after a while she got married and she had to follow her husband in 
Petauke. Therefore, during her absence, there was no development in 
the ward”225. 
According to some informants, “women could run for office and do a good job 
as well as a man, but only if they are single or widowed: the marriage hinders 
the woman to fully participate because she has responsibilities”. As explained 
directly by the former councillor, her husband decided to get a divorce and 
after a few months, she had to come back to Chipata, where in the meanwhile 
she had lost her position226. 
                                                             
 
225 Petauke is another district in the Eastern province. Focus Group in Kanjiala (Chipata) on the 
01/12/2012. 
226 Focus Group in Kanjiala (Chipata) on the 01/12/2012. 
Figure 31: Representation of women in the local 
Councils (% per gender of the respondent) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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At WDC/ADCs level, the gender 
balance seems more respected 
(figure 32). Very often the 50-
50% rule is followed in the 
election of the sub-district 
bodies227 . However, the role 
and the strength played by the 
female members may change 
from ward to ward. Often, 
women are not given positions 
of responsibility: most of the times they are assigned the role of WDC/ADC 
secretaries and, more rarely, of deputy president. It was also observed that 
sometimes during the meeting women were very vocal even if their male 
counterparts were present. In other cases, the women asked or waited the 
advice of a male member before replying to a question. 
In sum, data from the household survey and from direct observation has 
highlighted serious issues in female representation in the local political arena. 
This is confirmed by the official data: at local government level, only 85 women 
were elected out of the 1382 councillor that reported in the elections in 2011. 
This represents a female representation rate of 6.1%. This rate is even in 
decline if compared with the previous elections in 2006, when female 
representation in the local authorities reached the 7% (Diakonia, 2013: 35). 
The same applies for the National Assembly, where only 17 women were 
elected (11%). The last elections represented a step back in the quite positive 
trend that had characterised the female representation in Zambia: in 1991 
women representation in politics was 4.8% while in 2006 was 15.19%.  
Despite this failure, the government has tried to balance the poor female 
                                                             
 
227 This balance has also been observed by the researcher during some meetings held with various 
WDC/ADCs members during a first visit to the two districts in May-June 2012. 
Figure 32: Female representation in WDC/ADCs 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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representation in Parliament through the appointment of more women in 
decision making positions (ex. Inspector General of Police, Auditor General, 
Drug Enforcement Commission, Acting Chief of Justice, etc.) (Diakonia, 2013: 
36).  
 
4 ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1 Elections 
A first and direct tool to make political representatives accountable for their 
work is the vote. Elections may serve to reconfirm the thrust of the citizenry 
towards the politician, if its office is considered successful by the voters; on the 
other side, failure to respond to popular demands or to pursue the campaign’s 
promises may translate in their electoral defeat when running for a second 
term. However, this mechanism can work only if elections are free, fair and 
recurrent (Blair, 2000; Ribot, 2002; Crook and Manor, 1998; Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004; Connerley, et al., 2010).  
Since its independence, Zambia passed through three main important political 
phases: the “First Republic” (1964-1972) was marked by the preeminent role 
of Kenneth Kaunda and its United National Independence Party (UNIP) at 
national as well as local level. The deterioration of the economic outlook 
following the early 1970s crisis and the increasing internal political pressures 
drove Kaunda to establish a one-party system. Although Zambia stopped to be 
a multi-party democracy, the country still remained a ‘one party-participatory 
democracy’: elections were still held at all levels (presidential, national and 
local level) but some competitiveness was left only at local level (Tordoff, 1974 
and 1980; Tordoff & Young, 1994). Since 1991, Zambia is again a multi-party 
democracy and five rounds of elections were regularly held until the last 
tripartite ones in 2011. According with the last round of Afrobarometer (2012), 
Zambians perceive the last tripartite elections as “completely free and fair” 
(62%) or “free and fair, but with minor problems” (23% - Afrobarometer, 5th 
round, 2012). Also, different reports prepared by independent observers 
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confirm this perception (see: European Union, 2011; EISA, 2012). However, 
the pre-requisite of freedom and fairness has not always been fully respected: 
for instance, elections in 1996 and 2001 were perceived as fraudulent by 
international observers as well as by the population. Not surprisingly, these 
years registered a considerable decrease of the voter turnout (Diakonia, 
2013)228.  
 
4.2 The Media 
In order to reach a good level of 
accountability, the residents should 
also have access to the information 
related to the work of their local 
council and councillors (Blair, 2000; 
Ribot, 2002; Crook and Manor, 
1998; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; 
Connerley, et al., 2010). The figures 
25 and 26 show the main channels 
the interviewees and their family 
use to acquire information on the 
work and decisions taken by their 
District/Municipal Council. 
The information channels are very 
different in the two districts, the 
main reason being the lack of 
community radios in Samfya, which 
                                                             
 
228 Unfortunately, data is not available on the councilor turnout. This is due to a complete lack of 
documents at local level on the results of the previous elections. In Chipata, a councilor official 
explained that after every election all the documents are sent to Lusaka at the Electoral Commission 
(ECZ) and any public record has been kept in place, with a considerable lost in terms of historical 
knowledge. However, interviews with local representatives suggest that in 2011 a high number of 
ward councilors were not reconfirmed into their office. 
Figure 33: Source of information on Council’s work 
(Samfya) 
 
Figure 34: Source of information on Council’s work 
(Chipata) 
 
Source: Household survey 
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are largely present in Chipata. Thus, 
in Samfya, people rely much more on 
traditional leaders to have 
information on decisions taken by the 
local council. Although the one of the 
ward councillor’s duty should be to 
inform his voters about the council’s 
affairs, the data from the two districts 
clearly show that he actually plays 
only a marginal role.  
The data on the information related to 
the country’s affairs (ex.: the 
government’s decisions and initiatives, 
economic trends, etc.) reveal a 
different pattern in the 
communication flow, where the 
radios (national and local) are by far 
the most communication medium 
used by Zambians in the two districts. 
The importance of traditional leaders in Samfya a vector of information, seems 
to be confirmed also for the national news229. 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
 
229 The analysis of data per wealth group shows not surprisingly that 16% of ‘poor’ households rely on TV 
against 48% of ‘average’ families as main source of national news. Most of families rely however on 
national radio channels and, on a very limited extend, on newspapers.  
Figure 35: Source of information on country 
affairs (Samfya) 
 
Figure 36: Source of information on country 
affairs (Chipata) 
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4.3 Meetings Organised by the Ward Councillors 
The respondents have shown to 
know who the current ward 
councillor is (Figure 37)230.  
According to the 33% of the 
respondents, their councillor has not 
called for any meeting in the ward 
during 2012 (elections were held in 
September 2011), while the 14% 
were not aware of any. 54% said that 
at least one meeting occurred (Figure 38). The councillor should regularly call 
for meetings with the community in his/her district in order to report on the 
activities/decisions already implemented or approved by the local council, to 
plan future interventions, and to hear the needs of the communities. The data 
collected show that this task is usually forgotten by the councillor. According to 
these latter, the main reason is the lack of funds: as already mentioned, the 
councillors have only a ‘token’ for their presence at official meetings but not to 
cover at least the costs linked to the communication activities within the 
ward231. During the campaign, for instance, the candidate is usually assigned a 
                                                             
 
230 Usually, the name of the councilor was asked to confirm this information. 
231 This information was collected by the author through informal interviews in Samfya (see list in 
Chapter, 4) and in Chipata after the full council meetings held on the 19/11/2012. 
Figure 37: Awareness on the current ward 
councilor 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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Figure 38: N° of meetings held by the ward councilor in 2012 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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budget by his/her party to cover the costs of travelling around the ward to 
hold meetings with the electorate. It is not the case once they are elected232. 
 
4.4 Popular Perceptions on local institutions  
4.4.1 THE LOCAL COUNCILLOR  
What is the popular perception 
towards the local representative? 
The most recurrent words to 
describe the councillor are 
‘Committed’ (21%), ‘Honest’ (18%), 
and ‘Trustworthy’ (12) (Figures 39 
and 40).233. The majority of the 
respondents (72%) have described 
the local councillors using a positive 
attribute instead of a negative one 
(28%). However, in Samfya the 
interviewees showed to have a 
higher consideration of the figure of 
the local councillor (77%) than in 
Chipata (67%).  
                                                             
 
232 74% of the respondents reported that the meeting was mainly organized and open to the community 
at zone level, where also the traditional leaders were invited (53% of meetings organized with the 
community). Only 8 respondents reported a meeting organized with the ADC/WDC while 7 opened 
only to political party members. 
233 The survey’s respondents were asked to choose one or two features - among a given list of 
positive/negative features – better describing their councilors. This implies a general evaluation of the 
councilors that held the office in the last years: the question had the main purpose to highlight a 
general perception of the interviewees toward their local councilors. 
Figure 39: Household perceptions on the councilors’ 
main features 
 
Figure 40: Household perceptions on the councilors’ 
main features (comparison Chipata/Samfya) 
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The distribution of values for each of 
these positive/negative features 
highlight the different perception that 
people in the two districts have on the 
local councillors (Figure 41): the 
majority of “Committed”, “Honest” and 
“Trustworthy” options were gathered 
in Samfya, while all “Not Committed” 
answers were gathered in Chipata. 
Moreover, a higher number of 
respondents in Samfya perceive that 
their councillors are “Not Honest” if 
compared with Chipata, where people 
stressed also “Education” as their main 
requirement. Some interesting 
observations may also be drawn if one 
compares the data collected with the 
respondents’ wealth group (Figure 42). 
The ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’ have a more 
negative perception of the local 
councillors, while the ‘average’ group 
has expressed a more positive one234.  
                                                             
 
234 The ‘poor’ think that the local councilors are usually ‘Honest’ (20%), ‘Committed’ (14%) and 
‘Educated’ (13%); according with those belonging to ‘Average’ group, the main features of the local 
councilors are ‘Commitment’ (35%), ‘Trustworthiness’ (17%) and ‘Honesty’ (15%). 
Figure 41: Household perceptions on the 
councilors’ main features. Aggregated data per 
positive / negative feature (district) 
  
Figure 42: Household perceptions on the 
councilors’ main features. Aggregated data per 
positive / negative feature (wealth group) 
 
Two options per respondent were possible. % 
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and wealth group (34). 
Source: Household questionnaire 
CHIPATA SAMFYA Total 
67% 
77% 72% 
33% 
23% 28% 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
POOR AVERAGE RICH 
64% 
77% 
63% 
36% 
23% 
38% 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
202 
56% of the respondent said that 
the councillors are actually able 
to work effectively and to ‘bring 
development in the district’. 
However, some differences can 
be found between the two 
districts: in Samfya, people 
have more trust in the 
councillors’ work while in 
Chipata the majority think they 
are not able to manage the 
council235. The analysis of the 
data per wealth group shows 
that those belonging to the 
‘average’ group are almost all 
convinced that the councillors 
are able to manage the district 
and bring development, while 
the ‘Very poor/poor’ is split 
between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. These 
results may be interpreted as a higher level of trust in the potential of the 
councillors’ work in the ‘average’ group than in the others. 
Almost half of interviewee (48%) expressed a positive appreciation on the 
work of their ward councillor (Figure 43) while 42% judged their performance 
as “poor” or “very poor”. No major differences are noticeable between the two 
districts, except for a slightly worst perception of the ward councillors’ work in 
Chipata (24% against 20% in Samfya). 
                                                             
 
235 The respondents were asked if, according with their opinion, the councillors were capable of 
managing the district and of bringing development projects. The interviewees were asked to give a 
generic appreciation on councillors’ performance (taken as a group and in the last years) and not an 
evaluation on the actual ward or district councillors. The idea here is to highlight a general perception 
towards the duty bearer. 
Figure 43: Perception of councilor’s performance (per 
district) 
 
 
Figure 44: Perception of councilor’s performance (per 
wealth group) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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The analysis of the data per 
wealth group (Figure 44) 
suggests that 10% of those who 
could not express a judgment on 
their ward councillor belong to 
the ‘poor’ wealth group, only 1% 
to the average’ (usually because 
they did not know him). The ‘poor’ 
are also those that more often 
have judged as ‘very negative’ the 
performance of the councillor (3% 
against of 14%). 
Figure 45 takes into 
consideration the number of 
interviewees belonging to the 
‘poor’ and ‘average’ group and 
analyses how each group 
considers the performance of 
their councillor.   
- The ‘average’ seem to 
have a more positive perception of their councillor: 59% of the 
respondents belonging to this group judged the work of their councillors 
as “good” (48%) or “very good” (11%).  
- On the other hand, 42% of 'poor' people expressed a negative judgement 
or they were not able to express one (16%). 
Finally, figure 46 shows the opinion, based on their gender, of their councillors’ 
performance: 
- 55% of male respondents have a considerably higher appreciation of their 
councillors (16% “very good” and 39% ‘good’) compared with their female 
counterparts (31%).  
- On the other hand, 48% of women think their councillor is performing in a 
“poor” or “very poor way” against the 35% of men. 
Figure 45: Perception of councilor’s performance (out 
of group respondent) 
 
Figure 46: Perception of councilor’s performance (per 
gender) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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- The data related to “no answers” suggests that the knowledge about who is 
your councillor and what is he doing is more related with the wealth group 
one belongs to rather than the gender.  
The positive judgements are usually supported by concrete realisations that 
the respondent has seen during the office of the ward councillor or they 
acknowledge his effort to meet people and bring their demands to the council. 
On the other side, the negative usually stress the lack of “improvements” in the 
ward or commitment (“he is doing nothing!”) as main reason. 
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7  C h a p t e r  
DECENTRALIZATION – POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN ZAMBIA: 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Poverty is a condition characterised not only by material deprivation, 
(understood as a general lack of an adequate income or consumption level). It 
also includes a limited access to important public services as education and 
health. Decentralised local governments are perceived as more efficient in 
providing a wide range of public goods and services and in targeting the most 
in vulnerable and marginalised. Moreover, local governments are considered 
as key actors in pursuing local development as they can take initiatives to 
increase local business opportunities and growth (World Bank, 2001). 
In this chapter, these suggested socio-economic benefits of decentralisation 
will be analysed using empirical data collected in the two target district in 
Luapula and Eastern province. Firstly, we will look at the household situation 
and trends as it emerges from the household questionnaire and we will try to 
understand if and how the local institution have had an meaningful  influence 
in this trend. Secondly, we will highlight the type of projects that have been 
implemented within the wards as recalled during the focus group discussion 
and we will analyse if and why the residents assess them positively or 
negatively. Third, we will try to understand if the new services provided in the 
wards by the local authorities have had an impact on poverty alleviation. 
Finally, household survey and the focus group discussions will be interesting 
information on the communities’ perceptions towards the local Council. 
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1.1 Socio-Economic Indicators on Poverty 
 
1.1.1 HOUSEHOLD INCOME LEVELS  
The household questionnaires 
confirmed a high incidence of 
income poverty:  60% of the 
respondents declared to have a 
monthly income of less than 
300.000 ZMW236, which is less than 
1.5 $ per day237.  
The income trends in the last five 
years are negative, with 46% 
respondents reporting a decrease, 
29% reporting an increase and 25% 
with no change in their income 
(Figure 47). Samfya and the wealth 
category ‘very poor’ and ‘poor’ have 
been more affected by this negative 
trend if compared with Chipata and 
the ‘average’ or ‘rich’ groups 238 
(Figure 48). 
The reasons for the decrease are 
                                                             
 
236 This study refers to the values of the Zambian Kwacha until 2012. The 1st January 2013, the Bank of 
Zambia has introduced the ‘rebased’ currency, which is currently in use. 
237 This data is coherent with the World Bank and the Zambian Central Statistical Office data, which 
reports 60,5% of Zambians living below the national poverty line in 2010 (CSO, 2012a). 
238 Official data show the same pattern in the period 2006-2010 at national and provincial level. Luapula 
province, where Samfya is located, reported a sharp increase of the poverty from 73.9% in 2006 to 
80.5% in 2010. The extreme poverty has particularly increased from 53.6% to 64.9% in the same 
period. The Eastern province is also deeply affected by poverty but it registered a slight fall in the 
overall poverty level, from 78.5% to 77.9% between 2006 and 2010. However, it shares with Luapula 
the increase in extreme poverty levels from 56.4% to 58.7 (CSO, 2012a). 
Figure 47: Changes in income levels in the last 5 
years by wealth group 
 
Figure 48: Changes in income levels in the last 5 
years by district 
 
Source: Household questionnaires 
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mainly attributed to a 
fall in their produce 
(24%) and other 
external unpredictable 
factors as the weather, 
the soil fertility or the 
crop prices (29%). The 
lack of fertilizers is 
usually mentioned as 
reason for the fall in the 
agriculture production. 
The rise of family expenses is also indicated as a factor that has impacted 
negatively on the family economic resources (figure 49).  
The increase in income was mainly due availability of more fertilizes, the use of 
more land or different techniques for farming. Some also reported a salary 
increase, the start of a new job or a new business (ex.: small shop or bird 
hunting). 
The majority of the respondents had the perception that the District Council 
had no role in the decrease or increase of the family income (figure 50). 
Interestingly, the respondents often looked surprised for this question, and it 
was necessary to explain further its meaning239. The construction of feeder 
roads by the Council was indicated as having a positive impact on the 
household income, because it facilitates the transport of the farming inputs / 
outputs and increases the business opportunities with better access to the 
markets. Another reason for a female respondent from Samfya was the 
                                                             
 
239 During the survey, the researched noticed that many respondents seemed to perceive the role of the 
Council as neutral towards the household income trend, as they would not expect it to take any real 
initiative to improve their income situation. 
Figure 49: Reasons for income decrease (last 5 years) by wealth 
group 
 
Source: Household questionnaires 
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construction of a borehole close to the village that made easier to access safe 
water and increased the time women could use for other activities240. 
Interestingly, a respondent from a ‘rich’ household indicated the rise of 
personal levies as having a negative impact on its income. 
The hesitancy in answering to this question shows that most people do not 
expect the Council to 
actually take initiatives, no 
matter if with positive or 
negative impact on their 
income. However, they also 
seem to acknowledge the 
potential role the district 
could play to improve their 
household income. In fact, 
when asked what the 
Council could do to support 
the household income, the 
                                                             
 
240 In a few other cases, the provision of agriculture inputs was also indicated as a reason of positive 
impact on the family income. However, this is usually a responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
through its deconcentrated offices at district and ward level. 
Figure 50: Perceptions on council’s initiative with positive / negative effects on household income 
 
Source: Source: Household questionnaires 
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Figure 51: Perceptions of potential Council’s support to 
household incomes 
 
Source: Household questionnaires 
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respondents have usually quite clear ideas. As shown by figure 51, the majority 
ask for the provision of agriculture inputs or capital to start a new business, 
while 15% stressed the need for basic infrastructure as roads or markets. 
 
1.1.2 PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES  
In the two districts, the main sectors 
of intervention of the local 
government authorities were 
education, water and sanitation and 
infrastructures241. 
Other projects indicated by focus 
group participants included the 
construction or rehabilitation of 
health centre (ex. clinic, maternity 
wing, etc.), community halls (ex.: 
WDC/ADC offices), the provision of 
trainings or agricultures services, the 
construction of markets, or social 
projects (Figure 53)242. 
The focus group participants were 
asked to recall only the projects 
implemented by the Council or 
                                                             
 
241 As noticed by the researcher, especially in Samfya, infrastructure issues are particularly intense given 
the presence of the lakes, rivers and swamps. Often, during the rainy season the water submerges the 
road and the residents are obliged either to follow other longer roads or to cross through the water. 
Roads issues are also severe in Chipata, especially during the rainy season. 
242 The sectors more represented in the focus group discussion are those also indicated by the household 
participants, namely ‘education’ (14%), ‘infrastructures’ (24%), and ‘water’ (22%). However, in this 
case the respondents were asked, for the sake of simplicity, to focus only on the last 12 months, no 
matter the implementing institution (the focus group participants were asked to focus only on local 
authorities and not NGOs). This data can only be indicative of a trend, as it is possible for a project to be 
recalled by different respondents. 
Figure 52: Projects’ initiator by type of authority 
 
Source: Focus groups 
 
Figure 53: Main sectors of intervention 
 
D= District; G=Government; N=NGO. Source: Focus 
group. 
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Figure 54: Overall projects assessment 
 
Percentages calculated on the number of projects initiated 
by the local authorities (council or ministry departments: 73 
projects. Source: Focus group discussions 
 
Figure 55: Overall project assessment (DC only) 
 
Percentages calculated on the number of projects initiated 
by the District Councils: 42 projects. Source: Focus group 
discussions 
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ministry line departments for 
education, health, etc. Thus, 51% 
of recalled projects were 
founded by the Council, 38% by a 
ministerial department (Figure 
52)243. Similar data resulted also 
from the household 
questionnaires244. 
During the second exercise, the 
focus group participants were 
not only asked to recall the 
projects but also to assess them. 
For each of them, they were 
asked the quantity and type of 
impact today 245 , choosing 
between ‘big positive’ (++), 
‘small positive’ (+), ‘negative’ (-), 
or ‘no impact’ (/). 
Figure 54 shows that 79% of 
projects were assessed positively 
(49% ‘big positive’ and 27% 
                                                             
 
243 During the focus group discussions, the participants recalled 82 projects. Although, it was explicitly 
asked to recall projects implemented by the Council or ministry-line department, in a few cases, NGO-
funded projects were also mentioned as considered important by the participants and included under 
the label ‘N’ (11%). 
244 The values from the household survey are the following: 45% District Council, 36% Government 
departments, and 19% Other (NGO + NA). A limitation of the household survey data is that errors from 
the respondents cannot be assessed and taken into consideration. For instance, sometimes the label 
‘government’ is used just to refer to public institutions or the difference between the ministerial 
departments at local level and the Council is not so clear for the respondent. However, one way to 
correct some imprecision from the interviewee was to ask if the money came from CDF or to ask 
additional details about the project.   
245 The original PADev methodology assesses the impacts of the projects ‘then’, when it was first realized 
and ‘now’. This research has taken into consideration only the impact today, given the time constraints 
for the fieldwork. 
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‘small positive’ impact). Only a small proportion were judged as having 
negative impacts, mainly because they were not perceived as useful for the 
community and the resources could have been used for other more important 
interventions246. The percentages does not change much if  one considers only 
the projects funded and implemented by the Council, as showed by figure 55.  
Interesting data emerge from the third focus group exercise, when the 
participants were asked to choose the best three project and the three worst 
among those previously recalled (Figures 56, 57, 58)247. 
First, the results suggest that projects funded and managed by the Councils are 
proportionally less appreciated by the residents. In fact, although the projects 
funded by the Council (mainly through CDF) account for the 51% of the 
recalled interventions, they represent only the 31% of those indicated as ‘best 
projects’. On the other side, the projects funded and managed by local 
ministerial departments (39% of the recalled projects) seem to be more 
appreciated, representing the 50% of the ‘best projects’ sample248.  
However, the data seem to suggest that the interventions initiated by the 
Councils are not only the less appreciated but they are also indicated more 
often as ‘worst’ projects, representing the 59% of the ‘worst sample’ (Figure 
58). 
A common feature of these projects is that some were not timely completed or 
they were characterised by poor management, as in the case of this health post 
build though CDF: 
                                                             
 
246 For instance, in the case of the rehabilitation of a dam in Mkowe Ward (Chipata), the participants 
argued: “The dam is there but it cannot hold enough water and there is no fish. In the ‘70s, we were 
eating a lot of fish but it has been destroyed by the fishermen”. 
247 In some cases, the participants could not indicate two projects as ‘best’ or ‘worst’. Only two ‘best 
projects’ were indicated in Kanjala. Less than three ‘worst’ projects were indicated in the following 
wards: Mano (2), Chiparamba (1) and Kanjala (1). In total, 26 were indicates as ‘best projects’ and 22 
as the ‘worst’. 
248 The same applies to the few recalled projects implemented by NGOs: they represent only 10% of the 
total recall projects but the 19% of the ‘best’. 
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 “We have seen mothers delivering on their way to the hospital. This 
health post is not yet completed so it is not operational so we cannot 
assess” (Focus Group, Dilika Ward, 
Samfya, 29.11.2012). 
In other cases, although the project is 
positive, the constructions were poorly 
done and they need constant maintenance: 
“The idea of the road is good but it was 
realised with a poor wormankship. The 
road already needs maintenance and as 
soon as the rain arrive, it is be difficult 
to use the road”. (Focus Group, 
Chifunabuli Ward, Samfya, 20.10.2012). 
Also in this case, the road was funded 
through the Constituency Development 
Funds. Finally, in other cases, the focus 
group participants lamented the 
exclusion from the use of the new service 
provided by the Council. In Kanjala ward 
(Chipata) some participants lamented 
that: 
“Only those under 5 years old are use it 
[health post]. Mothers and children are 
using it. Men do not benefit”. (Focus 
Group, Kanjala Ward, Samfya, 
01.12.2012). 
Another health centre in Chimana ward 
(Samfya) created long discussions among 
the participants as the centre targeted 
people with HIV/AIDS, excluding the 
others. Women in particular expressed a 
very negative attitude towards this 
project 
.  
Figure 56: Projects’ initiator 
 
Figure 57: Best projects 
 
Figure 58: Worst projects 
 
Source: Focus groups 
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Figure 59: Access to new services provided by local 
authorities 
 
Percentages calculated on the number of projects recalled by 
the respondents. Source: Household questionnaire. 
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1.1.3 IMPACTS OF PROJECTS ON WEALTH GROUPS  
Figure 59 offers interesting 
insights on the awareness and 
access to the new services. 
Firstly, 65% of households are 
using the services provided by 
the new projects; 35% are not 
using them. Secondly, it is 
interesting to note that the ‘rich’ 
household are using almost all 
the services they can recall; the 
same does not apply to the other 
groups, where the proportion of new services they are not using is bigger. 
Thirdly, on the one side, the ‘rich’, although fewer (they represent the 10% of 
the sample), contribute for 15% of recalled projects. On the other side, the 
‘poor’ contribute for the 44% despite them represent the 52.5% of the sample. 
A ‘rich’ household can recall at least a mean of two projects while a ‘poor’ one 
can recall only 1.3, and the ‘average’ 1.7. Not surprisingly, richer households 
appear more informed on the development initiatives undertaken in the ward. 
In sum, the richer can recall more development initiatives than the other 
groups and they have more 
chances of using the new 
services provided, if compared 
with the other groups and 
especially the poorer. 
Figure 60 shows the main 
reasons hindering the 
respondents to use the new 
services and infrastructures 
provided in the last year by the 
local authorities. More 
Figure 60: Reasons for no access to the new service 
 
Percentages calculated on the number of respondents who 
affirmed to have no access to the new service. Source: 
Household questionnaire. 
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frequently the works are not completed or, although completed, they are not 
open yet. 
This data can be partially linked to the short timeframe considered for this 
question. However, another reason is directly linked to the usual pattern of 
project implementation at local level. In fact, it is common practice, especially 
for CDF projects, to budget only ‘one piece’ of the whole infrastructure. For 
instance, in the first year one can ask the construction of the main 
infrastructure; even if, at the end of the first year, the ‘skeleton’ will be build, 
the school would not been completely yet. The second year, one can ask for the 
construction of the roof. But then the school will only need the furniture, the 
Ministry of Education to take the school under its authority and to send 
teachers. 
The household respondents were 
also asked which wealth group (ex.: 
the rich or the poor) was gaining 
more benefits from the projects 
they could recall (Figure 61). 
Usually, the whole community 
could benefit from the services 
provided in the district in the last 
year (38%). If not the whole 
community, the poorest have 
higher benefits from the new projects (21%)249. This data seem to suggest that, 
putting aside the delays in completing the works, the new roads, water points, 
or schools are actually used as they respond to the needs of the people and the 
                                                             
 
249 The same pattern applies when the respondents are asked to assess the benefits on gender (ex.: man 
or woman) or different occupation group (ex. farmers, businesspersons, etc.). The respondents have 
also taken into consideration the projects not completed yet, evaluation their potential future benefit 
for the population. 
Figure 61: Perception of benefits for each wealth group 
 
Source: Household questionnaire. 
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poorest, which also constitute the majority of the population in these areas, are 
actually reached by the new services. 
The figure 62 shows that the ‘average’ usually benefits more from the projects, 
followed by the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’. According to the participants, often the 
‘very rich’ or ‘rich’ benefit less from some kind of projects (ex.: health, 
education or water) because usually they have alternative channels to access 
these services. For instance, the ‘very rich’ and sometimes the ‘rich’ prefer to 
send their children to private school, or they have their own well so they do 
not need to access to public boreholes. However, they are indicated as 
benefiting more from infrastructure projects as roads or bridges because they 
have usually have a car or a motorbike, and not only a bicycle as the ‘average’ 
or the ‘poor’. These latter benefits more from social projects as they can access 
only the health, education, water services provided at local level: they have less 
financial resources so they can only afford the locally provided services. The 
poor have smaller benefits as usually their resources are so limited that they 
can even afford to use the services provided by the new projects. 
The same logic applies also in the case of the ‘worst’ projects. The small impact 
created by worst projects on ‘very rich’ and ‘rich’ household derives, as already 
explained, from their possibility to access the same services elsewhere, even 
with better quality. The others groups are more affected as they cannot 
diversify their access to the services, moving in other wards or districts where 
these are available. The ‘very poor’ are often indicated as the most affected in 
Figure 62: Wealth group benefits (‘best’ and ‘worst’ projects) 
 
0 = no impact; 1 = small positive / negative impact; 2 = big positive / negative impact. Source: Focus groups 
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terms of potential benefit lost: the funds could have been better used or simply 
used for a good intervention directly targeting this category. 
 
1.1.4 LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON  LOCAL GOVERNMENT ’S PERFORMANCE  
The respondents of the household 
survey expressed a moderate 
overall satisfaction for the services 
provided by the Council, with 45% 
rating the services as ‘always good’ 
or ‘good’. On the other side, 24% 
consider the services as ‘poor’ or 
‘always poor’ and 24% ‘average’ 
(figure 63). 
The wealth groups showed a 
different perception towards the 
projects and services provided by 
the Council. The poor seem to 
appreciate them more, with a 
bigger majority of ‘good’ ratings 
(25%) over the ‘average’ (9%) or 
‘poor’ and ‘always poor’ (3%). The 
‘average’ group is more critical, 
with the majority judging the 
services as ‘average’ (13%), 
followed by the ‘always good and 
good’ (13%) and ‘poor’ and 
‘always poor’ (11%). 
The main reason justifying a ‘good’ perception toward the services provided is 
the commitment of the councillors (24%), intended as concrete realisation of 
infrastructures (figure 64). For instance, some argued that: “They did this 
Figure 63: Perception of quality of services / projects 
provided by the Council 
 
Percentages calculated on the total respondents (80). 
Source: Household questionnaire 
 
Figure 64: Perceived reasons justifying to the quality 
of services provided 
 
% are calculated on the total of those assessing the 
services ‘always good’ or ‘good’ as shown in figure 63. 
Source: Household questionnaire. 
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shelter and the toilets for the market” or “Now they are maintaining the road”, or 
simply “the work they do is visible”.  The same applies when the respondents 
justify a negative appreciation towards the services: “I have not seen 
development projects by the District Council” or “they do not visit this place to 
see the problems people are facing”. In sum, the realisations of new 
infrastructures or frequent visits by the councillors seem to be the main tools 
used by the residents to assess their local institution performance in terms of 
service provision. 
A rather negative assessment 
emerges when the household 
respondents are asked whether 
the efficiency of the Council has 
changed in the last ten years 
(figure 65). The majority (35%) 
think there has been 
improvements, but  still the 25% 
judges the Council less efficient 
or just the same as ten years ago 
(20%).  
The focus group discussion allows highlighting the perceptions on the local 
councils. The participants were read 9 statements and they were asked to 
assess if those were ‘always’, ‘usually’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ true. Figure 30 
shows the result of this assessment. The overall average varies between 0 
(Chimana) and 1.6 (Chiparamba) and it clearly show a generally negative 
perception toward the local government. However, in Samfya (S) the 
perception was more negative than in Chipata (C): the first five wards scored 
0.7, the last four scored 1.1250.  
                                                             
 
250 These values are calculated as a simple average of the overall scores of the wards in the same district. 
Figure 65: Households’ perceptions on local council’s 
efficiency 
 
Source: Household survey 
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The participants to the focus group discussions acknowledge the realisation of 
some interventions, judged positively when realised. Moreover, in the wards 
scoring higher values, the residents are usually more involved: “The community 
is always involved before and in the implementation as we always need to 
provide the 25% of the materials” (Focus Group, Mkowe ward - Chipata, 
04.12.2012). However, in different wards the focus group participants 
expressed some frustration for not being involved in the decision-making of 
project or for the complete absence of the councillor: “They never came to ask 
about our problems. They do not have meetings with us, not even with the 
headman” (Focus Group, Kanjala ward - Chipata, 01.12.2012). 
Different issues were highlighted during the discussions. Firstly, delays in the 
project’s completion are quite common: “Using the CDF, the District Council can 
finance projects every year and we can see them. The new services provided are 
not timely done, and every time you request a service it takes a lot of time before 
you can have it” (Focus Group, Katansha ward - Samfya, 27.10.2012); Secondly, 
often participants lamented a lack of honesty, in terms of transparency, 
insufficient information or corruption: “Most of the time, if they cannot do a 
project they cannot explain why. They are not able to explain to people how 
much money is there and about what project. Before, under Kaunda, there was 
more collaboration so we knew those details” (Focus Group, Katansha ward - 
Samfya, 27.10.2012); or “They are not honest because they do not go around 
sensitizing the community and even if you apply for a job in the District Council, 
they prefer to hire somebody from their family” (Focus Group, Chimana ward - 
Samfya, 17.10.2012). Thirdly, others argued that resources are channelled 
towards the township or diverted in other wards: “Sometimes the District 
Council promises something, but after we discover that the money has been 
diverted to another ward to finance another project” (Focus Group, Katansha 
ward - Samfya, 27.10.2012). Other issues concern the delays in the payments 
for the salaries, the lack of coordination within the local authority and the lack 
of a proper follow up and project management: “They are only sometimes 
efficient because each project has a timeframe and a monitoring procedure. 
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However, some projects are unfinished and there is no transparency or 
monitoring” (Focus Group, Chifunabuli ward - Samfya, 10.10.2012). 
 
 
1.1.5 WDC/ADCS MEMBERS  
As already noted, the sub-district structures are not a real vehicle of 
information and inclusion of the community into the decision-making system. 
The majority of the population does not know what these structures are and 
how they work. Nevertheless, respondents aware on their existence 
understand the WDC/ADCs as a ‘development tool’ and as shown by the survey 
results, they support the need of an intermediate body as they feel it is useful 
Table 30: Assessment of the local Councils 
Group 
Long term 
commitment 
Realistic 
Expectations 
Honesty Relevance Participation Efficiency 
Trust 
in 
people 
Impact 
Overall 
(average) 
1.CHIMANA 
ward (S) 
0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.MANO ward 
(S) 
1 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 1 
3.CHIFUNABULI 
ward (S) 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0,9 
4.MASONDE 
ward (S) 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0,6 
5.KATANSHA 
ward (S) 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 2 1,0 
6. DILIKA ward 
(C) 
1 1 * 1 2 1 1 1 1,1 
7.CHIPARAMBA 
ward (C) 
1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1,6 
8.KANJALA 
ward (C) 
1 1 0 0 0 * 0 0 0,3 
9.MKOWE ward 
(C) 
1 1 1 1 3 * 1 2 1,4 
Total (average) 0,9 1,0 0,4 0,7 1,1 0,9 0,9 1,2 
 
Each assessment was assigned the values as follows: 3 = Always; 2 = usually; 1 = Sometimes; 0 = Rarely/never; * = unable to assess. The 
values on the last raw and the last column are averages. Source: Focus group 
 
222 
for development. It can explain 
why the 66% believe that the 
WDC/ADCs can actually ‘promote 
development in the community’. At 
the same time, a 27% were not 
able to express an idea: they agree 
that these institutions are “too 
young” and it is not possible yet to 
express a judgement. The same 
idea has been expressed during the 
focus groups discussions: 
“The ADC has just started to 
work. Only some of them are 
honest. Since their election, the 
ADC members have started to 
have meetings with the zones to 
discuss about problems. Some 
put too much politics in their 
work instead of doing just 
development. They involve 
themselves in politics and some 
of them are politicians. We can 
trust only some of them” (Focus 
Group, Masonde Ward (Samfya), October 2012). 
Among the poor, the number of those who cannot express an opinion is quite 
high 20%. This implies that, although they know about the WDC/ADC, they do 
not have information of its role and work. 
 
  
Figure 66: Households’ perceptions on WDCs’ 
effectiveness (per district) 
 
 
Figure 67: Households’ perceptions on WDCs’ 
effectiveness (per wealth group) 
 
Source: Household questionnaire 
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CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
Today, decentralisation is a widespread phenomenon that seems like occurring 
everywhere (Crook and Manor, 1998; Eaton and Connerley, 2010; ICHRP 2005; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Among donors and governments, 
decentralisation policies are quite popular and it is likely that, in the medium 
term, we will still be living within a decentralised system (Connerley, Eaton, & 
Smoke, 2010). 
The history of decentralisation in Africa is well rooted in the colonial pattern of 
local government. However, the current wave of popularity started in the 
1990s is quantitative and qualitative different from earlier experiences. It is 
quantitative different because, as mentioned above, decentralisation is 
occurring everywhere, and it is difficult today to find a country that has not 
recently introduced or reformed its local government system or that it is not 
discussing about it. It is qualitatively different because today the goals that 
decentralisation is meant to achieve are different from past experiences. Since 
independence, African states and aid agencies have promoted decentralisation 
initiatives as a means towards many different goals, such as fast development, 
increased efficiency of the government machine, increased popular 
participation in development initiatives, and even increased centralisation 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002; Olowu & Wunsch, 2004)251. 
The last wave of decentralisation has been promoted as a mean to support the 
democratic experiences started in the 1990s and, lately, the new development 
agenda as described in the famous World Bank Report ‘Attacking Poverty’ 
                                                             
 
251 See chapter 2, heading 4. 
226 
(World Bank, 2001). This new agenda understands poverty as a 
multidimensional concept and suggests a comprehensive approach to alleviate 
it, composed by three main strategies: ‘promoting opportunities’, ‘facilitating 
empowerment’, and ‘enhancing security’ (World Bank, 2001) 252 . 
Decentralisation is widely considered as a key policy able to promote 
democracy (empowerment), to create an enabling environment for 
development (opportunities), and to address the needs of autonomy and self-
government (security) (Steiner, 2007). 
However, the pro-poor effects of decentralisation are not supported by 
unarguable evidence: the literature on the last decentralisation experiences 
undertaken in development countries offers, at best, a mixed picture253. 
Moreover, this literature is still growing, it is not always based on empirical 
evidence and it is often donor-funded. This study has tried to contribute to the 
discussion, providing additional empirical evidence on the links between 
decentralisation and poverty alleviation in a country, Zambia, that has been 
almost completely neglected by the literature on this topic254. 
Which are the goals of the last decentralisation reform in Zambia?  
Zambia has a longstanding history of local government. After independence, 
the local administration was reformed three times, with the Local Government 
Act (1965), the Local Administration Act (1980). The current framework is 
regulated by the Local Government Act, introduced in 1991, after the end of 
the one-party experience and the re-introduction of the multi-party democracy. 
This new system is half way between the decentralisation ‘by default’ and ‘by 
design’. In fact, on the one hand, the current local government system is very 
                                                             
 
252 See: chapter 3, heading 2.2. 
253 For an insightful analysis of the last decentralization experiences, see: Agrawal and Ribot (1999); Bird 
and Rodriguez, 1999; Bossuyt and Gould, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Jonhson, 2001; Crook, 
2003; Smoke, 2003; Vedeld, 2003; Jütting and Kaufmann, 2004; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Steiner, 
2007; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Treisman, 2007; Linder, 2010; Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 
(2010), Sepulveda and Martinez-Vasquez, 2011. See: chapter 2 and  
254 See: chapter 2, heading 1.5. 
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similar to the one introduced in 1964, it is largely the result of internal 
discussion and there is a widespread support in the national elites for the 
desiderability of an efficient network of local councils. However, on the other 
hand, the last two decades have also been characterized by a lack of political 
commitment in pushing further the decentralisation agenda, as shown by the 
failure in completing the implementation of the National Decentralisation 
Policy255.  
Although, the actual local government system is legally stronger than the 
previous ones due to its entrenchment in the Constitutional provisions, the 
overall legal framework does not guarantee a real autonomy in decision-
making to the local authorities, with the central government still playing a 
major role. In fact, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH) still 
retains a considerable number of powers that, de facto, limit the autonomy of 
the local administration256. Other limits have been indirectly introduced 
through sectorial policies, with powers and resources channelled towards the 
line ministry departments. Moreover, the mayor has a mere ceremonial role, 
with the council secretaries (or town clerk) playing major tasks in the day-to-
day work of the local councils. Finally, the District Commissioner, a 
government appointee, represents the government at local level. Inevitably, 
confusion over the respective functions is still frequent, as well as overlapping 
of initiatives and functions. The District Development Coordinating Committee 
(DDCC) is ineffective in harmonizing the work of the council and the 
                                                             
 
255 Decentralisation is one of the pillars of the Public Sector Reform Programme, introduced in 1993 by 
former President Chiluba. The National Decentralisation Policy (NDP) has been approved by the 
Parliament in 2002, but adopted by the President only two years later, in August 2004. A 
Decentralisation Implementation Plan (DIP) was adopted only in 2005 and it was intended to cover the 
years 2009-2013. However, the implementation plan remained largely unfinished. A revised 
Decentralisation Policy was approved by the new PF government in 2013. 
256 For instance, the minister has special powers in terms of audit and suspension of the councilors (LGA, 
1991, art. 52 and 60); the by-laws made by the council can enter into force only after the confirmation 
by the minister and this latter can refuse to sign them, require a modification or even revoke a by-law 
already approved (Ibidem, art.: 82 and 83). Finally, the minister has also the power to suspend the 
councillors and appoint an administrator to discharge the functions of the local authority (Ibidem, art. 
88). 
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ministerial departments, resulting in a mere “talking shop” (Saasa & Carlsson, 
2002: 120).  
In sum, it is clear that the central government, at least till the 2013 elections, 
has not been committed in moving forward the decentralisation agenda. It has 
largely preferred to put more efforts in strengthening the deconcentrated 
departments instead of the democratically elected local council, aiming mainly 
at securing the central power into the district. 
The reason behind this choice is mainly political. In fact, the ruling parties (the 
UNIP, especially since the 1970s or the MDD after 1991), have historically used 
the local authorities to secure their popular support. The analysis has shown 
that in the 1980s the political and governmental structures were merged in 
order to guarantee a complete control of the center over the district257. After 
the re-establishment of the democratic regime in 1991, political parties could, 
at least theoretically, compete on equal basis for power. In reality, various 
studies have expressed concerns over the actual pluralism achieved by the 
democratic state; Chikulo, for instance, has defined the Third Republic as “de 
facto one-party state” (Burnell, 2001: 240).  The predominance of the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MDD) lead by Frederick Chiluba was 
also clearly visible at local level: 
“The MDD’s hold on local government is no less strong, retaining a clear 
majority of seats in all councils in eight of Zambia’s nine provinces in 
the 1998 local elections, with Eastern Province – UNIP’s heartland – the 
sole exception” (Burnell, 2001: 240).  
Although it is too early for an assessment, one can understand the current 
enthusiasm of the Patriotic Front’s government towards decentralization as 
having the main goal to secure the popular support, at least in the medium 
term.  
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Not surprisingly, the importance of the political parties at local level has also 
emerged in the analysis of the impact of decentralisation on the political 
dimension of poverty.  
One of the leading questions of this study was: “Does the functioning of the 
local government in Zambia allow for the empowerment and the 
inclusion of the poorest in the decision making”? 
In the analysis, ‘empowerment’ was analysed in term of increased 
participation, representation and accountability258. Decentralisation creates 
opportunities for electoral and non-electoral participation. However, it is not 
sufficient to guarantee a widespread participation of the rural communities 
into the local public affairs. Data from the two target districts have shown that 
electoral participation has been quite moderate in the last electoral rounds, 
with variations in the voters’ turnout mainly linked to the general political 
context259. Moreover, the active participation as candidates is still limited and 
involves mainly those having a political affiliation, with only a marginal 
number of independent candidates running for office. Data from non electoral 
forms of participation as the involvement in the Zone or Ward Development 
Committees as voters or during their meetings is extremely low, marking their 
marginal role in increasing participation of the grassroots in the public affairs.  
Decentralisation is also claimed to enable for a better representation of all the 
social groups, especially the most marginalised groups such as the poor, or 
women, which are usually at the periphery of the public arena and cannot 
effectively influence the local decision-making. The local government in 
Zambia seems to create a space also for the most disadvantaged categories: for 
instance, field data has shown that even poor small scale farmers (or fishers in 
Samfya) were able to access a seat as councillors in the local assembly. 
Moreover, the role played by religious or traditional leaders is influential but 
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they cannot directly run for elections260. On the other hand, representation of 
women is rather challenging, as shown by the data on their active participation 
as candidates or councillors261. 
The data seem to exclude the presence of the ‘elite capture’ of the local 
institutions by specific economic or social groups as shown by many authors 
(Blair, 2000; Olowu, 2001; Johnson & Start, 2001; Johnson, 2001. Crook, 2003; 
Chinsinga, 2005 and 2008; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008). This is also 
supported by the field data on the impacts of development projects initiated by 
the local council, where ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ families have more benefits262. 
However, one concern is the actual ‘capacity’ of the councillor. Those who are 
more educated or more familiar with the local government structures and 
work will have an advantage in capturing resources and initiatives for their 
own ward (or/and interest) and they can therefore guarantee a better 
representation of their ward or group. Secondly, the data suggest a strong role 
of the political parties in defining the local politics. Political parties are indeed 
well rooted in the wards and zones, and they are able to create a network 
including all folks of the society263. Therefore, political parties or, more 
precisely, the national ruling party, seem the access point to access resources 
and get involved in the local decision-making. 
This important role played by political parties at local level, necessarily 
influence the accountability mechanisms, which appear quite weak in the two 
districts. On the one hand, elections does not seem to play a central role in 
‘punishing’ the badly performing councillors. Firstly, this mechanism can work 
                                                             
 
260 For an insightful analysis on the role of traditional and religious leaders in Zambia, see: chapter 6, 
heading 3.1. 
261 For an insightful analysis on the involvement of women in local politics, see: chapter 6, heading 3.2. 
262 See chapter 7. 
263 The entrenchment of the parties at local level can be explained through the recent history of the local 
administration in Zambia, in particular, with the one-party participatory democracy started in 1971 
and the merger, in 1981, of the political and party structures under the Local Administration Act 
(1981). For instance, Tordoff and Young argued, “This new structure was in practice used to underpin 
the power of the ruling party at local level (…)” (1994: 287). See also chapter 5. 
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only if elections are free, fair and recurrent, which has not always been the 
case in Zambia in the last electoral rounds. For instance, elections in 1996 and 
2001 were perceived as fraudulent by international observers as well as the 
population and not surprisingly these years registered a considerable decrease 
of the voter turnout (Diakonia, 2013). Secondly, since 2001, Zambia adopted 
the formula of the ‘tripartite’ elections (presidential, national assembly): the 
voter’s attention is easily diverted to the national issues instead of the local 
ones, with the consequence that some respondents admitted to have voted for 
the local council only for the sake of voting. Moreover, the information flow on 
the local government’s activities is often quite limited: field data have 
illustrated the central role still played by traditional leaders in filtering the 
information and the limited opportunities of regular consultation between the 
councillors and the voters. 
This study has also tried to analyse the socio-economic impact of 
decentralisation. In fact, today poverty is understood as a condition 
characterised not only by material deprivation but also by a limited access to 
important public services as education and health. Decentralised local 
governments are perceived as more efficient in providing a wide range of 
public goods and services and in targeting the most vulnerable and 
marginalised. Moreover, local governments are considered as key actors in 
pursuing local development as they can take initiatives to increase local 
business opportunities and growth (World Bank, 2001). Therefore, this study 
has firstly tried to understand if: 
Has decentralisation helped local institutions in Zambia to undertake 
initiatives and create opportunities to support households’ income?  
The data on the household income and its change in the last five years have 
shown the high incidence of poverty in the two councils and a quite negative 
trend especially for those belonging to the poorest groups of the society. These 
results have also been recently supported by the Zambian Central Statistical 
Office, which argues that “(…) in rural areas, the incidence of poverty was 
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generally higher among small scale farmers” (CSO, 2012a: 185), namely the 
occupational group most represented in the areas studied in this work.  
Moreover, the data have indicated no evidence supporting the idea of a role 
played by the local government in this negative trend. The field data suggest a 
neutral role instead: the councils had no impact (either positive or negative) on 
poverty levels, at least in their economic dimension:  
“Results further reveal that the incidence of poverty barely changed 
among small scale farmers between 2006 and 2010, from 81.5 to 79.9 
per cent, while it remained almost static among medium scale farmers 
at about 70 per cent (…).These results demonstrates that there is a lot 
more that needs to be done in order to reduce poverty among the small 
and medium scale farming households found in rural areas” (CSO, 
2012a: 186). 
Secondly, this study has analysed if decentralisation has helped to 
increase the quantity and quality of public services, reaching the poorest 
and most deprived groups living in the rural areas. 
Water and sanitation, education and infrastructures are the most represented 
sectors in the development initiatives undertaken by the local authorities 
(councils or deconcentrated departments). Usually, the projects funded and 
managed by the councils are appreciated by the residents. However, the 
councils’ development initiatives have more chances to fail meeting the needs 
of the residents than those funded by the deconcentrated departments. The 
reasons are mainly linked to the delays in completion, the poor management 
and quality of the new infrastructure that need constant maintenance or the 
exclusion of some groups from their use. In sum, the Council’s initiatives are 
appreciated but they often fail to meet the expected quality because of bad 
management or the need of constant maintenance. More generally it can be 
concluded that this failure is mainly linked to the failure of following the 
simple principle of ‘finance follows function’, with the councils responsible of 
the provision of numerous services but without the financial and human 
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resources necessary to actually supply them264 . Moreover, the lack of 
commitment highlighted earlier in the discussion, does not create the most 
enabling environment for the council to deliver effectively and efficiently; in 
fact, 
“Councils are mired in largely personnel-cost related debt, yet often 
deficient in skilled manpower as well as other financial and material 
resources.(…) As a consequence, most council provide minimal local 
services and where they do, it is largely to populations who live in the 
immediate vicinity of the council. They are widely perceived by local 
people and businesses as, at best, irrelevant, or at worst, an 
unwelcome irritant, being a taxing entity where little is provided in 
retour” (Kamanga, Chitembo, & Philips, 2008: 10). 
Thus, the councils seems not able to match the demands for public services and 
goods due mainly to resources constraints and an important part of it is 
channelled through the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) and not 
through the statutory resources as local taxes or governmental grants. 
The field data has also indicated that projects initiated by the local authorities 
usually target the whole community, which is mainly composed by ‘average’ or 
‘poor/very poor’ households. However, decentralisation seem to have a quite 
limited impact on alleviating the social deprivation of the poorest, while it 
guarantees more benefits for the ‘average’ group. In fact, the data have also 
shown that, on the one hand the ‘rich’ have more chances than the ‘poor’ and 
‘very poor’ to have information on new services available in the ward and to 
use them. On the other hand, the ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ have relatively less 
benefits from good development initiatives than other groups, and especially 
the ‘average’. However, they are the most affected by the bad development 
initiatives, as they have usually no other ways to access the services not 
provided locally. 
In sum, is decentralisation having pro-poor effects in Zambia? The answer 
appears rather negative and local governments show to have played a limited 
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role in alleviating the political and socio-political vulnerability of the 
population in the target districts. However, it does not imply that 
decentralisation should be rejected. Field data show that, despite the poor 
performance, communities still understand the local councils as an important 
potential driver of development.  
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8  A n n e x e s  
1 FOCUS GROUP EXERCISES 
 
1.1 Wealth Group Categorization 
Question: Please describe the things that make a person very rich, rich, 
average, poor and very poor. Using 10 stones, can you estimate the proportion 
of very rich, rich, average, poor and very poor people in your community? 
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 They are usually commercial farmers and they hire cheap labour (community 
leader). They are hard workers (cooperatives). Farmers have tractors and 
other machines for agriculture. They have kettos, pigs, goats and they own 
200 hectares land. They can access loans and invest their money 
(businessperson). They have billions of kwacha, busses, cars, tracks. They 
own a bus mansion. Children are very educated, they go in private schools 
and sometimes they study overseas. They are not dependent, they dress well, 
they have high quality shoes, and They eat 4 meals a day. For funerals, they 
use many cars and they are buried in big casket. 
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Farmers have no machinery and they use small materials. They own a car and 
sometimes a bicycle. They can have one shop, 2 houses and 20-50 hectares 
of land. They eat sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, groundnuts, peanuts. They 
have 2 meals a day. They children go to high school. They buy clothes. 
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I They have a big land (10-20 hectares). They go for second hand clothes. 
They eat 2 meals a day. Children go to public school. They own one simple 
house with grass roof or even iron sheets. Some have a car. They own a boat 
or canoes. 
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 For funerals, people hold them on shoulders. They have a "grass house", one 
bike. They have two meals a day. They own 2-4 lima (one hectare) of land, a 
canoe. Only some children go to school because they cannot afford to pay 
the fees for each of them. 
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They beg for money and for food. To eat is a problem for them. They are 
dependent from others. They have street kids that sometimes steal. They 
have handicaps. If they have one, their house is very poor, they sleep on the 
floor without blankets and they have poor toilets. They do not have shoes. 
They do not have soap or water so they have problem to wash themselves.  
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They live in a mansion built with concrete and roofed with iron sheets. They 
own a big amount of livestock and farm products. They own a car, beautiful 
clothes and they dress well. This is people like the President or they have big 
shops and a big piece of land (until 150 hectares). They afford 3 meals a day. 
Their children go to very good schools. They employ people in their farm or 
as house-servants (while they are busy to count the money). They are 
commercial farmers with many types of machinery. People are attracted to 
go to their funerals because their relatives provide a lot of food, they use cars 
and they have a concrete-made grave with a stone. They own hammer mills 
and fishponds. At home, they have electricity, refrigerators and all the 
electronic appliances. They have engines for their boats. They drink purified 
water and they live in low-density areas. 
0 0 
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 They are farmers who can afford to have enough food to go to one season to 
the other (2-3 meals a day). They have capital for medium-size business. 
They own a decent house and their children go to high school. They have 
some machinery. Fishers have a boat. They own a house but not a "fancy " 
one. They employ few people to work for them. They treat ordinary water 
with chlorine. They may own until 50 hectares of land. 
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They afford 2 meals a day. They do not own a car but just a bicycle. The 
house is made by bricks but they may have a grass roof. They own a black 
and white TV set. They engage part time workers for small jobs. There is not 
a big crowd to their funeral and they have a simple grave. They have solar 
panels, no sofas but a lounge suite. They have poor ventilators. Their clothes 
are not so bad (bud second-hand one). They run a small business. 
1 10% 
P
O
O
R
 
A
B
A
 P
IN
A
 
They have a small house with grass roof. They can have until 10 hectares of 
land but they are not able to use it all. They are hired as workers in other 
people farms. They live in high-density areas. They own a bicycle. They 
struggle to pay school fees for their children. They afford to cultivate cassava 
but not maize as it requires fertilizers. They have 1-2 meals a day. They may 
be charcoal sellers. They cannot afford to buy groceries in bar but just small 
quantities. They drink not treated water. 
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 They shave by themselves because they cannot afford to pay a barber. They 
work for food (not for money). They may have one meal a day. They live in 
mud houses. They are charcoal sellers. Their children do not go to school or 
if they go, they do not pay the fees. In their house, they do not have a bed or 
mattress but they sleep only on a reed mat. They do not have household 
properties. They use firewood for cooking, as they cannot afford to by coal. 
No sugar. The children are often thieves. They cannot afford proper clothes.  
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They have enough for themselves and they can give out. They own a 
mansion and a car. They can access transport. They afford 3 meals a day and 
their children can go to very good private schools. With their income, they 
are able to address basic needs. They are rich beyond everything. They are 
businessperson or civil servants. They are buried in caskets. They have 
modern houses with electricity or solar panels and fridge. They own 15 
hectares of land or more.  
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 They run a business or they are civil servants. They own a vehicle (motorbike 
or bicycle) and around 5-10 hectares of land. They sell products at the 
market. They have spacious houses and the roof with iron sheets. Their 
household is smaller if compared with poor people (the household size 
increases with the poverty level) 
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They afford 1 or 2 meals a day. They have a sizeable house. Their children go 
at least to public schools. They may own a boat, a bicycle or a canoe. They 
may have 1 lima dedicated to maize production (so they are able to access 
fertilizers and seeds). They own around 2 hectares of land and livestock 
(chickens, goats, and kettos). They are business people or civil servants 
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They lack of basic needs and they do not have a proper source of income. 
They cultivate but this is not enough for the family. If they own bicycles, 
they cannot afford its maintenance. They prefer to use traditional medicine 
instead of going to the hospital. They have a house with grass roof. They 
cannot afford to cultivate maize (even if the government provides the 
fertilizers) but only cassava. They have no mean of communication. Their 
concentration is on the reproductive system (the rich concentrates on the 
belly). Children go to school but often the girls get pregnant and they drop 
out even at 14. 
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 They face extreme poverty. To afford a meal is hard and they work for food 
not for money. They wear patched clothes. Children do not afford to have a 
bath because they have no soap. At home, they have fights because of 
poverty. The children have a stunted growth and they are more prone to 
diseases. Their nutrition is based on carbohydrates. They live in a degraded 
environment. People contribute to finance their funerals. Girls get pregnant 
when they are still children. 
4 40% 
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They own money, any type of vehicles, a big farm (20 hectares and above), a 
lot of livestock (20 cattle and above, goats, chickens, goats). In their house, 
they have electricity, a fridge and all the electronic appliances and it is 
covered by iron sheets. They own different bank accounts. The can afford to 
pay for high education standards for their children. They have a very 
balanced diet. 
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They own a TV, and house covered with iron sheets, solar panels. They own 
cattle, goats, chickens. They run medium-size shops or even a private school. 
They are able to cultivate 5 hectares or above. They can afford to provide 3 
meals a day to their children and to send them to very expensive private 
schools. They are not much in need of essentials commodities like food or 
clothing. They provide a bicycle or even a car to their children to go to 
school plus all the school tools (pens, etc.), food and money. Poor people ask 
them to work for food. Sometimes, they are moneylender. They are not 
workers but they employ people to work for them. They have a balanced diet 
and a good dressing code (they can afford to buy expensive cloths). 
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They go to public schools. They have 1-2 meals a day. Their houses have a 
roof covered by grass and sometimes by iron sheets. They may have 3 cows 
and some chickens or pigs. They can own a bicycle but not a car. They can 
afford a cheap single solar panel, a radio or a blank & white TV. They are 
able to cultivate 2 lima also with maize. 
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They fail to buy blankets or proper beds to sleep on. They do not have 
kettos, maybe only a cat. They can own 1 lima where they cultivate a variety 
of crops (cassava, millet, groundnuts, beans, sweet potatoes). They do not 
have enough money for school fees. They can afford 1 meal a day. They 
have a poor dressing code. Their children work for money (ex. caterpillars). 
Sometimes, children are forced to stop going to school due to financial 
constraints or for their poor diet. Some of them can become street children. 
"Pakati" laugh at "aba pina" 
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They live in mud houses. During the rainy season, they run out of food and 
they dress in a very poor way. Sometimes, they cannot afford even a meal a 
day; they do not have proper beddings and they sleep on sacs. Their children 
do not go to school and they beg or steal food from others. Women may 
become prostitutes. The mothers encourage their children to steal or 
prostitute themselves. They do not own livestock and their children have 
malnutrition problems. They do not wear proper clothes but just rags. They 
do not have shoes, soap or salt. The girls get early marriages (even at 12). 
3 30% 
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They are businessperson. They own a very beautiful house and vehicles. 
They lack nothing. They own farms, a lot of livestock (chickens, goats, etc.) 
and until 350 hectares of land. They are commercial farmers, they can 
diversify their production and they hire workers. They can invest their wealth 
inside and outside the country. They can eat anytime they want and 
everything they want (even 4 meals a day!).  They own tractors and hammer 
mills. 
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 They own big shops (all sales shops), 5/6 vehicles or a boat with an engine. 
They may have even 7 wives and they have a decent life. They live in 
beautiful houses covered with iron sheets, with in-built toilets, electricity, and 
fridge. They have a consistent income (millions and millions of kwacha). 
They own even 100 hectares of land, livestock (but not in large numbers) and 
they hire labour to work for them. 
2 20% 
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There is no hunger in their homes, they are small-scale farmers or they own 
small shops. They can afford 2 decent meals a day. They own only bicycles 
or canoes, 5-10 hectares of land and farmers earn 4-5 million a year (but they 
have also to buy inputs with this money). They live in a house with a grass 
roof (sometimes also with iron sheets) and a sofa.  
3 30% 
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They live in huts (mud houses) only sometimes build with bricks. They 
cannot meet their daily basic needs. They have a very inconsistent income 
(100.000 K a month or less). They cannot pay the school fees or proper 
clothes for their children. Their children are enrolled in public schools but 
when they cannot pay the fees, they are sent away. They can afford to pay 
only for basic education. They have no proper beddings and they sleep on 
reed mats.  
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 For days, they cannot afford a meal and they depend on things people give 
them (they need to beg). They do not have blankets and children are covered 
only by a "chitengue". They cannot send their children to school; they are 
malnourished and prone to diseases. They are dressed in rags. They do not 
own land and they cannot cultivate because they are hungry and they do not 
have energy. They live in a dilapidated house with a roof leaking during the 
rainy season. They are chronically ill and often they are old people.  
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They own a good field (10 arc) and animals (cattle, etc.). Their house is built 
with briks and iron sheets. They have solar panels. They afford three meals a 
day including breakfast. They have "transport" as cars. Their children can go 
to high schools and to the college. They have decent clothes when they go to 
church or for special occasions. They employ people. They have an oxcart as 
transport. 
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They own bicycles and small animals like goats, pigs and chickens. At home, 
they have a TV set, radios, a second hand solar panel. They are able to send 
the children to high school. They have 3 meals a day. They own an average 
garden. They work in the garden by their own and they can employ 1-2 
workers to work for them. They can use up to 5 arcs even if they may own 
more land in the form of bush. 
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The can employ some people for piece-works. They have 2-3 meals a day. 
They may own 2 goats and max 10 chickens. Their children go only to the 
basic school. They can have a simple sofa. Their house his made with bricks 
and a grass roof. They own 2,5 arc of land and some of them even a bicycle. 
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They have a garden (2 - 2,5 arc). They can be old age people who fail to use 
the land or they are disable. They lack inputs like fertilizers or seeds. They 
cannot send the children to basic school but only primary school*. They 
have no transport. Some of them can have a chicken but only as gift from 
other people. They put always the same clothing and they cannot always 
wash them. They live in mud houses nicely done. 
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They depend on others and they do piece-works. They don't have time to 
cultivate because they are too busy with piece-works. They cannot send the 
children to school. They work for food (or clothing, or chickens, etc.), not 
for money. They live in mud houses with grass roof. They have poor 
bedding. They depend on fire. No soap. Most of them are very poor as result 
of laziness or old age. 
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I They have everything they want: a big land to cultivate, vehicles, bank 
accounts. At their funeral there are a lot of vehicles and people assisting in 
the burial. Their children attend very good schools, even outside the country. 
They can buy vehicles for their children and their spouse. They can have 300 
arc or more. They don't cultivate but they sell. They buy fertilisers. They 
employ many people to work in their land. They own tractors for farming. 
They live in beautiful houses with everything inside it (electricity, water, etc.). 
and they have a proper dressing. They own big shops (ex. Shoprite, they own 
a share of it). They own hammer mills, schools, hospital, surgeries, etc. 
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 They eat well and they have good food. They use an ox chart for farming. 
They may own 10 goats, caws, 5 cattle, sheep. They may own a vehicle and 
few bicycles. They have good dressing and houses.  They own their own 
borehole. They can sponsor their children to go to good schools but not 
abroad. 
1,5 15% 
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I They own their own grocery, simple shops, 5 cattle. They have 3 meals a day 
and enough food. Their children go to private school but in a trouble way as 
not always they can afford to pay and they are sent back to public schools. 
They have some problems to pay their funerals. Their farming goes well and 
they are able to sell 3 bags of maize. 
2 20% 
P
O
O
R
 
O
S
A
U
K
A
 
They can have one meal a day (lunch). They don't manage to send their 
children to school but they work. They do piece-works to support the family. 
Their farming is poor because of a shortfall of fertilizers. They live in mud 
houses. Funerals are a problem and they are poorly done. Dressing is not up 
to date and patched clothing. They are often ill because of malnutrition. They 
cannot afford uniforms for kids at school (if they can afford to send them at 
school). They don't have good water supplies. 
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They cannot send the children to school. They don't have power to school. 
Their kids are not well dressed. They do early marriages. They don't have 
enough food and no money. They do piece-works for other people so they 
don't have time for cultivation. They have no shoes and they children have 
to beg or steal. They have empty stomach. They have one or no meal a day 
and they cannot use the soap to wash themselves. They have poor sources of 
water and they usually drink with the animals. They don't have proper houses 
(attached with grass). They are often sick. Funerals are rampant especially for 
under 5 years old children. They are aged people with nobody to care about 
them. 
4 40% 
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They have a lot of wealth, properties and money. They have everything: 
money, transport. They have a soft life: they have a vehicle and don't stress 
walking. They can buy everything and they can travel abroad for medication. 
They have plenty of food. They have all the farming inputs  and they are able 
to feed the family. They are rich farmers and they can sell their harvest 
abroad, in other countries. Their children are educated and they can study to 
expensive universities. They can travel at any time. They have good shelter: 
high class houses built with bricks, glass windows, with fridge, everything 
inside and a guard. They take flights. They don't have respect for poor 
people. They go against the laws and bring development down. They may 
own 3000 hectares. 
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They are able to feed themselves, they have a medium house (iron roofed). 
They have transport, they own one bicycle and cattle. They have good food. 
Their children go to the secondary school. They can employ people to work 
with them. They are easy to identify at community level. They have a house 
with electricity and toilets. They use cattle for cultivation. they sell maize. 
They may own up to 100 hectares. They are businessmen or farmers. Some 
of them are involved in leadership and no one can compete against them. 
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I They can have tea. They employ casual workers to work in their field. They 
can keep dependants. They can sent their children to school up to grade 12. 
They live in a house covered with iron sheets and glass windows. They own 
bicycles and motorbikes. This people can become rich or fall down to 
poverty. 
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The poor go to the "very rich" for clothing. They have 3 meals a day but 
with unbalanced food. They can have a bicycle. The poor can become "ali 
pakati" or go down and become very poor. They cannot plan the future 
because they don't have enough money. They can afford to buy two bags of 
fertilizers. They sleep on the mat, they own middle size or small houses built 
with bricks and iron sheets, but they take years to build it. They own only 
chickens or goats. They own 5 up to 10 arc (10 only if they are lucky). Their 
food is not sure. Sometimes they fail to send their children to school. 
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I They lack everything. They do piece-works. They don't have clothing or 
shoes. They live in a grass house that can be compared with a nest. They 
struggle to find food and they don't have farming inputs. They don't send 
their children to school. They are not considered in the society for decision-
making. They don't have land or transport. 
4 40% 
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They can own 2 vehicles. They don't miss anything in life (vehicles, cattle, 
land, etc.). They have 3/4 cattle to use in the land. Their children (both boys 
and girls) are educated and they go to private schools. They have shops and 
grain mills. Their children are healthy. They own a vast and well developed 
land (ex. 20 arc, completely used).They hire people for piece-works. They 
have electricity in their house, which is covered with iron sheets. The cattle 
are used as power for cultivation. They can employ workers and invest huge 
amount of money. They can sell their produce. They have no problems to 
cover the basic needs. In their farm they can diversify the products (produce 
and animals). They are often people retired from civil servant jobs (nurses, 
teachers, etc.). They then start new business as farming or shops. They don't 
look at the others, they disregard poor people and they look at them as 
inferior people. 
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They have cattle (as an ox working in the farm, pigs, goats).There is enough 
food in their homes. They can own 10 hectares land. Maybe they don't own a 
car but they have a lot of animals. Their children go to school and they are 
well dressed. They can take their children up to college (all boys and girls). 
They have a cup of milk or tea. They live a reasonable house with electricity, 
water and all kind of facilities. They have a complete diet. They grown maize 
and they go for big markets. They have 3 meals a day. Some of them own a 
vehicle. HIV people can afford to buy enough foods and drugs. 
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They have 3 meals a day but struggling. They own a bicycles or a motorbike. 
They own 5 he of land and they run some small business (ex. grocery). They 
cultivate enough for their family. They own pigs. Their children struggle to 
go to public schools. They buy big quantities of products in other places and 
they sell it here. They may own a couple of cattle that they can use to 
cultivate (but they not own a lot of animals). They may afford to buy a 
second hand vehicle. They are able to build an iron roofed house. They 
struggle to send their children to secondary school (they can never afford the 
college). If they are HIV positive, they can sustain the health costs. They 
manage to have fertilizers through cooperatives (but not from shops). You 
can put them in two categories: those able to have a bicycle, an oxcart and 
cattle to cultivate. Their children can have good jobs. However, if they have 
(ex.) 6 children, maybe they can afford to send only three to school. They are 
often employed by the government or self-employed. 
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They are lazy, this is why they are poor. They came from poor families and 
they cannot go up (in the social ladder, ndr). They can have disabilities (ex. 
blind). They are sometimes alchoolics so they don't take care of their farm. 
Their children attend the primary level only (maybe they stop at 4°). They 
can't afford secondary school. They don't have resources to buy farming 
inputs. They are often orphans who have nobody to pay for them, or elders. 
Some can afford only a meal a day or none. They are not educated. Some of 
them are illegal immigrants. They have early marriages. They live in mud and 
grass houses. They don't have enough food for the whole year. They don't 
have resources to increase their production and they depend on piece-works 
or charcoal. 
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They have one meal a day. They don't have decent clothes or house. They 
depend on piece-works and they work for food, not for money. They don't 
have money to buy inputs for their family. Their children don't go to school. 
They fail to use the advices for their improvement that other people give 
them. They don't have plans for the future. These people don't go to the 
farm but they just drink or smoke. They steal things from others. They live in 
mud houses. They don't force their children to go to school because they 
don't know its benefits. They depend on other people for food. They run out 
of food already in December. Sometimes, they fail to have a meal for 3 days. 
They can't afford any type of transport. They don't have the will to develop. 
Even if they know how to prepare nutrition food for HIV positive members. 
They have no blankets or soap. They cannot cultivate. They are lazy. They 
have fertilizers from the government but they don't use it. They come from 
remote areas in the bush where wild animals destroy their crops. They stay in 
that particular area and they don't have information about current affairs, 
they are completely cut-out from the outside world. They have never seen a 
vehicle or they have never been reached by service provides. They don't have 
hospitals and they only use natural remedies. 
4 40% 
243 
1.2 Wealth Group: Aggregated Definitions  
The focus groups’ participants have defined during the discussion the main features of 
very poor, poor, rich, very rich and medium-income families. The definitions covered 
10 different “sectors”: 
Food 
Housing 
 Job 
 Dressing  
Education 
Land/Livestock 
Vehicles 
Health 
Household type 
Other (funerals, 
discrimination, 
etc.) 
In the following charts will show the definition of each wealth group according with 
these main “sectors”. 
THE VERY POOR (ABA PINA SANA – OSAUKA KWAMBILI) 
The main features of those living in extreme poverty according with the focus groups 
participants in the two districts can me summarised as the following: 
SECTORS DEFINITIONS 
Food 
- Eating is a problem / No meal or only one meal a day 
- No use of sugar or salt 
- Nutrition based on carbohydrates 
- They run out of food already during the raining season (December) 
Housing 
- They live in a very poor/dilapidated house and degraded environment 
- They live in houses made by mud and covered by grass (leaking roof during 
raining season) 
- Poor bedding: they sleep on a carpet or on the floor without mattress. 
Job 
- They beg for money or food 
- They work for food/clothing/chicken (not for money) 
- They to piece-works (no time/strength to cultivate) 
- They spend the day drinking or smoking 
- They often sell charcoal 
- Prostitution (women) 
Dressing 
- Poorly dressed: they cannot buy clothes and they use rags or patched 
clothes 
- No shoes 
- Babies are covered only by “chitengue” 
Education 
- Usually, their children do not go to school and they do not force them to go 
because they do not know the benefits of education. 
- If they go to school they do not pay the fees and they are sent away. 
- If they go to school, children have no energy because of malnutrition 
Land & livestock 
- No Livestock 
- No land 
- No farming inputs 
Vehicles - No transport 
Health 
- They have handicaps or a chronic disease – they are often sick 
- No hospital, they can only use traditional medicine 
- Children have malnutrition problems and a stunted growth 
- No soap or water to wash themselves 
- They have poor sources of water and they usually drink with the animals. 
Household Type 
- They are often old people with nobody to look after them 
- Early marriages and early pregnancies are common 
- They have fights within the family because of poverty 
- Child labour / street children 
Other 
- They depend from others 
- Funeral: people fundraise to pay their funeral 
- They use wood to cook as they cannot afford the charcoal 
-  They are not considered in the society for decision-making. They do not 
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have information about current affairs; they are completely cut-out from 
the outside world.  
- Most of them are very poor as result of laziness or old age. 
- They fail to use the advices for their improvement that other people give 
them. - They don't have plans for the future. 
 
THE POOR (ABA PINA– OSAUKA) 
The main features of those living in poverty according with the focus groups 
participants in the two districts can me summarised as the following: 
SECTORS DEFINITIONS 
Food 
- They have 1 meals a day (sometimes 2) 
- They do not have enough food for the whole year 
Housing 
- Small / medium size house 
- Usually, they live in houses made by mud (but nicely done) and covered by 
grass. Sometimes, they manage to build an house made by bricks and 
covered by iron sheets, but it takes them years so save the required 
capital) 
- Poor bedding: they sleep on a carpet / mat. 
Job 
- Main occupations: Piece – works, day-labourer, charcoal seller 
- No proper source of income; they cannot plan the future because they do 
not have enough money 
- Their children work for money 
- Sometimes, they are drinkers and they are poor because they do not care 
about their farm 
- The poor can go up to middle-income or go down and become very poor.  
They came from poor families and they cannot climb the social ladder. 
Dressing 
- Poorly dressed: they use second hand and patched clothing (they ask the 
“very rich” for clothing). They put always the same clothing and they 
cannot always use them  
Education 
- Usually, only some children go to school. They cannot afford education for 
every child 
- Their children attend only the primary school (maybe they stop at 4°). 
- They cannot afford to buy uniforms. 
Land & livestock 
- LIVESTOCK: No livestock or chicken/goats, often as a gift from other 
people. 
- LAND: they own / use 1 up to 4 lima (Samfya) or 2 / 2, 5 arc (Chipata). They 
may own up to 10 hectares / 5 arcs but they are not able to use it all. 
- CROPS: Cassava, millet, groundnuts, beans, sweet potatoes. 
- No farming inputs (fertilizers/seeds) or just 2 bags of fertilizers 
Vehicles 
- No transport or just a bicycle (but they cannot afford the maintenance) 
- A canoe (in Samfya) 
Health 
- They may have handicaps 
- Malnutrition issues 
- No hospital, they can only use traditional medicine 
- They drink not treated water 
Household Type 
- They are often old people or orphans with nobody to look after them 
- Sometimes, they are illegal immigrants 
- No family planning (big households) 
- Early pregnancies are common 
- Child labour / street children 
Other 
- Funerals are poorly done, they are hold upon shoulders and difficult to pay 
the service 
- They are lazy, this is why they are poor 
- No proper means of communication 
- They buy groceries in small quantities 
- They are not educated 
 
THE MEDIUM-INCOME (ABA PAKATI – ALI PAKATI) 
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The main features of those living in extreme poverty according with the focus groups 
participants in the two districts can me summarised as the following: 
SECTORS DEFINITIONS 
Food 
- They have 2-3 meals a day 
- They have enough food for the whole year 
Housing 
- Small / medium size house 
- They live in houses made by bricks and covered with grass or iron sheets. 
Sometimes, window glass. 
- Appliances/decor: Black and White TV or radio, simple sofa, poor 
ventilator 
- They have cheap solar panels 
Job 
- Main occupations: labour worker, civil servant, small scale farmer, small 
business (ex.: grocery shop), self-employed 
- Income: 4-5 million Kwacha (4/5000) a year 
- Sometimes, they hire day-workers for their field 
- They can become rich or fall down to poverty 
- After a good season, they may sell up to 3 bags of maize 
Dressing - Second hand clothing  
Education 
- Their children go only to the basic school (up to grade 12). Sometimes, 
also to secondary school (but they struggle!) and they can never afford 
the college. 
- In big families, they cannot afford education for every child 
- Usually, they go to public schools. Sometimes, their children go to private 
school but with troubles as often they can afford to pay and they are sent 
back to public schools. 
- Their children can have good jobs.  
Land & livestock 
- LIVESTOCK: 10 chickens, 2 goats, 2/5 caws, pigs. They use some cattle to 
cultivate, but in general they do not own a lot of animals. 
- LAND: they own/use up to 5-10 hectares 
- CROPS: 1-2 lima dedicated to maize production. 
- Access to farming inputs (fertilizers/seeds) through cooperatives not 
shops 
Vehicles 
- A bicycle (most common) 
- A canoe or boat (in Samfya) 
- A second hand car (very few) 
- Oxcart (some) 
Health - They can afford the treatments for HIV/AIDS 
Household Type - 
Other 
- Funerals: some problems to pay for the service but they can afford a 
simple grave. No big crowd. 
 
THE RICH (ABA KANKALA – OLEMELA) 
The main features of those living in extreme poverty according with the focus groups 
participants in the two districts can me summarised as the following: 
SECTORS DEFINITIONS 
Food 
- They have 3 meals a day 
- They have enough food for the whole year 
- They have a balanced diet with sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, peanuts, 
etc. 
- They can afford a cup of tea or milk 
Housing 
- Medium size, beautiful  house; sometimes, they own more than one 
- They live in houses made by bricks and covered iron sheets. - 
Appliances/decor: Toilet, TV and/or radio, fridge and all kind of facilities 
- They have second hand solar (good ones) panels or electricity 
Job 
- Main occupations: Civil servant, medium-size scale farmer, medium-size 
business (ex.: all sales shops), involved in politics. 
- Consistent income of different millions a year 
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- They hire 1-2 day-workers for their field 
Dressing - They can buy good and expensive clothing also for their children  
Education 
- Usually, all their children go to private schools. 
- They can afford to pay for the secondary school and for the university 
(but they do not go abroad) 
Land & livestock 
- LIVESTOCK: medium number of chickens, goats, caws, pigs, sheep.  
- LAND: they own up to 50/100 hectares (also as bush) but they can use up 
to 5 
 - CROPS: They cultivate maize and they can sell their products in big 
markets. 
- Access to farming inputs (fertilizers/seeds) and small machineries 
Vehicles 
- Bicycles  
- A boat with engine (in Samfya) 
- A car or motorbike 
- Oxcart 
- Sometimes, they do not own a car but they have a lot of animals 
Health 
- They drink treated water or they have their own borehole 
- They can afford the treatments for HIV/AIDS 
Household Type 
- Small household 
- Polygamy 
Other - 
 
THE VERY RICH (ABA KANKALA SANA – OLEMELA KWAMBILI) 
The main features of those living in extreme poverty according with the focus groups 
participants in the two districts can me summarised as the following: 
SECTORS DEFINITIONS 
Food 
- They have 3/4 meals a day and they can eat anytime they want 
- They have plenty of food for the whole year 
- They have a balanced diet. 
Housing 
- Mansion, beautiful house 
- They live in houses made by concrete, bricks and covered by iron sheets 
and glass windows 
 - Appliances/decor: Toilet, TV and/or radio, fridge and all kind of facilities 
- They have solar panels or electricity 
- They may have a guard at their door 
- They live in low density areas (residential). 
Job 
- Main occupations: important politicians or civil servants, large-size 
business, commercial farmers; they own hospitals, schools, hammer 
mills. 
- Income: billions of kwacha 
- They can access loans and invest their money, even abroad or have a 
share of a company (ex.: Shoprite) 
- They hire many workers for their field or business 
Dressing 
- They can buy good and expensive clothing also for their children 
- They use high quality shoes 
Education 
- All their children (boys and girls) are very educated and they go to 
private schools. 
- They can afford to pay for expensive universities, even abroad 
Land & livestock 
- LIVESTOCK: big number of chickens, goats, caws, pigs, sheep.  
- LAND: they own up to 200/300 hectares (also as bush) and they can use a 
good portion of it 
- They can diversify their produce 
- Access to farming inputs (fertilizers/seeds) and all kind of machineries 
(ex.: tractors) 
Vehicles 
- A boat with engine (in Samfya) 
- Cars or motorbikes (also for their spouse or children) 
- Tractors 
- They can afford flights 
Health - They drink purified water or they have in-house water facilities 
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- Their children are healthy 
Household Type - 
Other 
- They do not have respect for poor people and they look at them as 
inferior people. 
- They go against the laws and bring development down. 
- Funeral: They are buried in big casket or a concrete-made grave with a 
stone, lot of people with cars participate and a lot of food is offered by 
the relatives. 
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1.3 Project Recall and Assessment 
Question: “What projects initiated by the local council have come to your 
community? When? What was the impact of the project? Why do you say this?” 
During this exercise the participants were asked to recall the projects that 
were realized within the ward in the last years by the district council. Three 
options were possible here: either the project was funded directly by the local 
authorities (district council or line ministry departments) or it was 
implemented by the District Council through CDF funds. Sometimes, the 
participants have mentioned projects implemented by NGOs. For each project 
they were also asked to assess the impact, choosing between the following 
options: ‘big positive’ impact, ‘small positive’, ‘no impact’, negative impact’ or 
‘cannot assess’.  
++ Big positive 
+ Small positive 
/ No impact 
- Negative impact 
* Cannot assess 
 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
W
a
rd
 
S
E
C
T
O
R
 
Project 
name 
In
it
ia
to
r 
n
a
m
e
(s
) 
In
it
ia
to
r 
ty
p
e
(s
) 
Project 
Description Y
e
a
r 
Im
p
a
ct
 
Reasons for impact assessment (+ 
additional comments) 
 1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
BOREHOL
ES 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
G
O
V
. 
D/G 
Construction of new 
boreholes 2
0
1
1
 
+   
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
YOUTH 
SKILLS 
CENTRE 
M
o
E
 
(G
O
V
) 
G 
Construction of an 
education centre 1
9
8
4
 
+ 
In this centre, the youth can learn 
technical skills so that they can open 
they own business after completion. 
There are graduates from these 
schools who are now able to gain their 
own life.  
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
COMMUNI
TY 
SCHOOL - 
MILEMU 
M
o
E
 
(G
O
V
) 
G 
Construction of a 
new community 
school 2
0
0
7
 
* no answer 
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
CARE 
PROVIDER 
P
R
ID
E
 H
O
P
E
 
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
 
NGO 
This is a support 
group for orphans, 
old and vulnerable 
people HIV positive 
2
0
0
4
 
- 
This is open only to HIV positive 
people not to everybody. There was a 
big dispute around this project. 
Women expressed a very negative 
attitude towards this project. For 
others, mainly man, this can also be an 
useful health centre for HIV people 
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1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
DISTRICT 
HOSPITAL (G
O
V
) 
G 
Construction of the 
district hospital 2
0
0
8
 
+  - 
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
S
O
C
IA
L
 
LOCAL 
RADIO 
STATION 
N
A
 
NA NA 
2
0
1
0
 
* This is still under construction 
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
 EU-
DECENTR
ALISATIO
N D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
E
U
 
D 
The construction of 
an ADC office 2
0
1
1
 
* This is still under construction 
 
1
.C
H
IM
A
N
A
 W
A
R
D
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
 /
 
K
IO
S
K
S
 
NEW 
MARKET A
D
C
 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
  
D 
Construction of a 
new market in 
Chimana Ward 2
0
0
9
 
- 
 This is still under construction and 
the works were not done properly 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
C
R
O
P
S
 
HAMMER 
MILL M
o
F
 
(G
O
V
) 
G 
Construction of a 
new hammer mill 
serving the ward 2
0
0
4
 
/ 
The project management was very 
poor and with the money raised you 
cannot even pay the fees for children. 
For the ADC member (a Woman) the 
impact was ++ 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
PRE-
SCHOOL 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
D 
Construction of a 
pre-school 2
0
1
1
 
* 
The school is under construction so 
there is no impact visible yet 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
 EU-
DECENTR
ALISATIO
N D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
E
U
 
D 
The construction of 
an ADC office 2
0
1
1
 
+ This is still under construction 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
EMBANK
MENT  
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
D 
Construction of 4 
embankments s
d
 
++ 
Now, it is safer to cross, also for 
children. People can better access the 
market and sell their products. 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
FEEDER 
ROAD 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
D 
Construction of 5 
feeder roads s
d
 
+ 
Now, it is easier to reach other places 
(especially for business). Sometimes 
in the rainy season the road becomes 
bad and they are asked to pay levies. 
There is no water drainage. 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 MORE 
THAN 20 
BOREHOL
ES D
IS
T
R
IC
T
  
JI
C
A
 
D 
NGO 
Construction of new 
water points  2
0
0
7
 
++ 
Now, we can afford to drink safe and 
clean water and the distance from the 
water point is shorter. 
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL M
o
E
 
(G
O
V
) 
G 
Construction of a 
new primary school 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
Before the students were having 
classes under the tree. Now,  after 
graduation, students attending  this 
school, can access even high school  
 
2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
CLINIC 
M
o
H
 
(G
O
V
) 
G     * NOT OPEN YET 
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2
.M
A
N
O
 
W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
CLINIC IN 
CHIPAKO 
AREA 
C
O
M
M
U
N
I
T
Y
 
  
Construction of a 
new clinic 
  ++ Everybody is using this clinic 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 ELECTRIFI
CATION 
OF 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOLS 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 (
C
D
F
) 
D 
Electrification of the 
primary schools 
extended to the 
teachers' compound 
2
0
1
2
 
++ 
Now people will have more time to 
read also during the night. They can 
have access to TV. People living in the 
nearby can also apply to have 
electricity at home (but they need to 
pay). In this way, they can have TV or 
internet for example and they can be 
connected with the outside world. 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
SCHOOL 
BLOCK 
1X3 J
C
P
R
F
 
  
Construction of a 
new block in the 
school 2
0
0
9
 
++ 
Before, you could have 75 student in a 
class. Now they are much less, it is 
easier for the teachers and they can 
learn more. 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
SCHOOL 
BOYS M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
new school for boys 2
0
1
0
 
++ 
Boys and girls are not mixed any more 
so they have more space 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
IN 
KATOLA 
M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
new primary school 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
This school is closer, so now children 
don't need to walk for long distance 
to/from school 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
FARMERS' 
TRAINING 
CENTRE 
M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
training centre for 
farmers 1
9
7
4
 
+ 
This was a good project because 
people can be trained. However, now 
it is not working and the rooms are 
used to accommodate nurses and 
teachers. This project should be 
revamped.  
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
TEACHERS 
RESOURC
E CENTRE 
M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
resource centre for 
teachers 2
0
0
6
 
+ 
The building is open only for teachers, 
but very few use it as there is a poor 
reading culture among them. 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
S
O
C
IA
L
 
TRADITIO
NAL 
CEREMON
IES 
ARENA G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of an 
arena to hold the 
annual traditional 
ceremonies 
2
0
1
1
 
++ 
This is a very important cultural place 
and it increases the unity of the 
community 
 
3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 ROAD 
JUNCTION 
MUSAEILA 
- Cassava G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
new road 
connecting to the 
junction 
2
0
1
2
 
++ 
Now for farmers is easier to transport 
goods. Before you needed even 2 
hours, now you can arrive in 25/30 
minutes. It is also easier to reach the 
hospital in Mansa. 
 3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
TOWNSHI
P ROAD 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
feeder road inside 
Chifunabuli 2
0
1
2
 
+ 
The idea of the road is good but it was 
realised with a poor wormankship. 
The road already needs maintenance 
and as soon as the rain arrives, it is be 
difficult to use the road. 
 3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
OLD 
BOREHOL
ES 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
N
G
O
 
G 
Construction of 
water points 1
9
7
0
s 
++ 
They were built by the government 
and then rehabilitated by an NGO. We 
are still using them. 
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 3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
NEW 
BOREHOL
ES M
L
G
H
 
G 
Construction of 
water points 2
0
1
2
 
* 
The new boreholes are not 
operational yet 
 3
.C
H
IF
U
N
A
B
U
L
I 
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
VIP 
TOILETS 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of VIP 
toilets in the 
hospital and at the 
school 
2
0
0
9
 
++ 
Now there is a better ratio between 
toilets and people 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
FEEDER 
ROAD 
MIPONDA 
- 
KASSONK
OMONA 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of the 
feeder road 2
0
0
8
 
+ 
This is a positive project but it is still 
incomplete 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  
W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 NAMUPAK
ASWA 
ROAD 
REHABILI
TATION + 
EMBANK
MENT 
C
D
F
 
D 
Rehabilitation of 
the Namupakaswa 
road and 
construction of an 
embankment 
2
0
0
9
 
+ This project is incomplete 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
Rehabilitat
ion 
classroom 
C
D
F
 
D 
Roofing of the 
teachers' house 2
0
1
0
 
+ 
It was uncompleted for a while. The 
community have built the staff house 
and with the CDF funds we completed 
the roof with iron sheets. We asked 
twice for CDF as the first time the 
funds were not sufficient to finalise 
the roofing. 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
MIPONDA 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
C
D
F
 
D 
Roofing of the 
school 2
0
0
9
 
++ 
The school was built by the 
community and then CDF funds were 
asked to complete the roof with iron 
sheets. The project has been 
completed as it was adequately found. 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
Chitumbe 
Communit
y School 
C
D
F
 
D 
Roofing of the 
school 2
0
0
8
 
/ 
There are problems with this project 
because it was incomplete and the 
wind blew off everything. The 
community has reported it to the 
district. They have not repaired it, so 
during the raining season children do 
not go to school. 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
Girls’ 
dormitory. 
Mironda 
Primary C
A
M
F
E
D
 
NGO 
Construction of a 
dormitory attached 
to the school 2
0
0
7
 
++ 
This dormitory is accommodating a 
lot of children 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
Kandolo 
primary C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
community school 2
0
0
6
 
++ It was completely very well 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
Bomba 
Wamenshi 
Primary 
G
O
V
 -
 M
o
E
 
G 
This school was 
built as a 
community school. 
Then the 
community asked 
the MoE to take 
over.  
2
0
0
3
 
+ 
The project is incomplete because the 
funding was insufficient, but we are 
using it. 
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4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 MIPONDA 
CLINIC 
MATERNI
TY WING Z
A
M
SI
F
 
G 
Construction of the 
maternity wing to 
the clinic la
te
 '9
0
 
++ 
It is complete and it works well 
although it is small 
 
4
.M
A
S
O
N
D
E
  W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
CHIMANA 
RURAL 
CENTRE U
N
IC
E
F
 
? 
Construction of a 
rural clinic 2
0
0
4
 
++ 
The project has been finalised and 
provides services to all the community 
without need to travel long distances 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
IN
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
RURAL 
ELECTRIFI
CATION 
R
U
R
A
L
 E
L
E
C
T
R
IF
IC
A
T
IO
N
 
A
U
T
H
O
R
IT
Y
 
G 
Electrification of 
Katansha ward 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
The children are able to read at night 
and they can do night classes for 
children who drop out. This is also 
good for the clinics, especially when 
they are patients during the night (ex.: 
a mother delivery). Moreover, it is 
also good for business, because many 
cannot  work during the night (ex.: a 
barber). This is also attractive for civil 
servants because they do not want to 
work in places without electricity. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 MATERNI
TY WARD 
AT THE 
CLINIC 
M
o
H
 
G 
Construction of a 
maternity wing at 
the rural centre 2
0
1
0
 
++ 
Now there is privacy. Before we were 
using an open room even for baby 
delivery and some women would 
prefer to deliver at home. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
MITIIKUL
A 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
new school in 
Mitiikula 2
0
0
7
 
+ 
Before the construction of this school 
there was '0 enrolment' but now at 
least we have some children at school. 
Before, there was only a community 
school where you did not need to pay. 
This new school has good teachers but 
there are not a lot of children 
attending because of the fees. The 
community school cost only 500ZKW 
while this new school costs 8000 
ZKW. Therefore many cannot afford to 
pay. However, it is positive for those 
who can pay, as their children do not 
have to walk long distances. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
 /
 
K
IO
S
K
S
 
MPANTA 
MARKET 
Z
A
M
SI
F
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
new market in 
Mpanta 2
0
0
5
 
- 
People cannot use it because it is 
poorly ventilated. They should have 
done it with open walls. They prefer to 
sell outside the building and it is too 
distant form here (more than 7 km). 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
C
R
O
P
S
 FOOD 
STORAGE 
SHED Z
A
M
SI
F
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of a 
storage shed for 
agriculture 
products 
'9
0
 
/ 
In that time people were cultivating in 
the wetlands like rice, they lived in 
small houses and they had not place to 
put the produce. It was used for three 
years. After the wetlands were 
flooded, so we stopped these 
productions and there was no 
produce anymore to be put inside. The 
committee managing this shed do not 
allow us to use it for a different 
purpose. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
OLD 
BOREHOL
ES Z
A
M
SI
F
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of 20 
boreholes 2
0
0
3
 
+ 
Some of them were not that deep so 
during the dry season they dry up. 
However, when there is water, it gives 
access to safe drink water without 
walking long distances. Before the 
construction of this borehole we went 
for water stream (ex.: river) 
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5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
PUBLIC 
TOILETS C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of 
public latrines close 
to a market 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
Before there were no toilets close to 
the market. So you could only openly 
defecate even with the diarrhoea 
desease. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
NEW 
BOREHOL
ES 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
 
G 
Construction of new 
boreholes 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
Not every household has a borehole; 
however they are not close enough. 
They are not operational yet. 
 
5
.K
A
T
A
N
S
H
A
  W
A
R
D
 
A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
 
ADC 
OFFICE 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
 -
 
E
U
 
D 
Construction of the 
ADC office 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
If there are problems or development 
issues people will have a place to go to 
bring their problems. It would be 
easier to find the ADC members, even 
for the councillors.  
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 
HEALTH 
POST C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of an 
health post 2
0
1
0
 
* 
We have seen mothers delivering on 
their way to the hospital. This health 
post is not yet completed so it is not 
operational so we cannot assess 
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
1 
BOREHOL
E 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of one 
borehole 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
This borehole is helping especially 
children at school. 
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 W
A
R
D
 
H
E
A
L
T
H
 STAFF 
HOUSE 
FOR 
HEALTH 
POST 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
staff house 2
0
1
0
 
/ 
They did not come to ask and involve 
the community. They MP came and he 
noticed there was an overdraft as the 
allocation was 20 million but there 
were still 1,5 million to be spent. This 
money was meant to built the clinic 
and the staff house. However, instead 
of building the staff house the 
community built the toilets. However, 
the Ministry of Health said this toilets 
were not coherent with the standards. 
So, they cannot be used and the 
hospital cannot be operational. We 
don't know what to do, as nobody 
gives us direction. There is an 
environmental health technician who 
is responsible for this area but he 
failed to solve this issue. 
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
ROOF FOR 
DAMBE 
SCHOOL 
C
D
F
 
D 
Rehabilitation of 
the roof in the 
school 2
0
0
7
 
++ We are now using this school 
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
BOREHOL
E 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t G 
Construction of a 
borehole 1
9
9
1
 
- 
This is not working anymore because 
the maintenance was not done and 
now it is too old to be rehabilitated. 
 
6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
 
BLOCK 
1x3 
DAMBE 
SCHOOL 
W
o
rl
d
 
V
is
io
n
 
NGO 
Construction of a 
school class 1
9
9
8
 
++ 
This is still helping our children to 
learn and become teachers, nurses, 
clerks, etc. The school was even 
updated to a basic school. 
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6
.D
IL
IK
A
 
W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
BOREHOL
ES JB
G
 
NGO 
Construction of 5 
boreholes 2
0
0
6
 
++ 
They are all working and we are using 
them 
 
7
.C
H
IP
A
R
A
M
B
A
 W
A
R
D
 
W
A
T
E
R
 
BOREHOL
ES 
D
IS
T
R
IC
T
-
D
O
N
O
R
 
(W
A
SH
 
p
ro
gr
am
) 
D 
Construction of 19 
boreholes in the 
ward 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
Now everybody is drinking good and 
safe water. Before we were drinking 
the water with the animals. If the 
boreholes break down we know how 
to do the maintenance because we 
were trained. If we need to order 
spare parts we can ask the council 
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C
D
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D 
Rehabilitation of 
the Misciolo-Kaluni 
Road 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
Now the road is wide and there are no 
accidents any more. It is easy to go to 
town and transport products. 
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Distribution of plots 
in the semi-rural 
areal 2
0
1
1
 
- 
The plots have no road. Those in 
planning should correct their 
mistakes. 
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MSHAWA 
BASIC 
SCHOOL 
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Rehabilitation of 
the classrooms and 
construction of the 
toilets 
2
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1
1
 
+ n/a 
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 KAMUANN
KHUKU 
BRIDGE  
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
bridge 2
0
1
1
 
+ 
Before, during the rainy season you 
could not cross the river. 
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RURAL 
HEALTH 
CENTRE 
C
D
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Construction of 
toilets 2
0
1
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* 
This is still under construction so we 
cannot assess it 
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KAWAWA 
SCHOOL C
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Construction of 1x3 
block and 2 
teachers' houses 
2
0
0
5
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2
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++ 
The teachers and the students are 
using it. They funds included also the 
furniture. 
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TRAINING 
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G 
Training on 
conservation 
farming 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
We learn that you can grow crops 
without fertilizers 
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TRAINING 
D
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E
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D 
Training on 
permaculture 
systems 2
0
1
2
 
++ 
We learned how to use the water and 
the soil 
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PUBLIC 
TOILETS 
T
o
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C
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e 
NGO 
Construction of 
toilets in the 
villages 2
0
1
0
 
++ 
Now people do not go to the bush 
anymore, so we had a decrease in 
diseases 
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 FEEDER 
ROAD 
KAWA 
KATALE 
D
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Rehabilitation of 
the road 1
9
9
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++ 
The road was severely damaged and 
even the bicycles could not pass  
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APOLLO 
DAM 
G
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v
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n
m
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Construction of the 
dam 1
9
8
3
 
++ 
We are eating the fish from the dam 
and we sell it to the market. We can 
also drink safe water 
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MARKET 
SHELTER C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
new market shelter 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
++ 
Before we had no market where to sell 
our products 
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ELECTRIFI
CATION 
OF 
CHIPATAL
A BASIC 
SCHOOLS 
C
D
F
 
D 
Electrification of the 
primary school and 
its premises  2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
++ 
Now it is easier to study and children 
can also use the PCs 
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Funsani 
Borehole 
G
o
v
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n
m
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t G 
Construction of an 
additional borehole 2
0
1
1
 
++ 
Now we have clean water, before we 
were using the same water the cattle 
was using 
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HEALTH 
POST C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
new health post 2
0
0
3
 
+ 
Only those you are under 5 years old 
are using it. So, mothers and children 
are using it. Men do not benefit. 
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MKOWE 
BASIC C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
1x3 block 2
0
0
7
 
+ 
The block has been build but it is not 
completed yet. However, the kids are 
using it 
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D
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Construction of a 
new market 2
0
1
1
 
* This is still under construction 
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CHIKIWE 
LOCAL 
COURT 
C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
new local court 2
0
0
8
 
+ 
It is too small but before we could 
only sit on the floor 
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KAMBUAT
IKE 
SCHOOL 
M
o
E
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
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G 
Rehabilitation of 
Staff houses and 
construction of 1x2 
block 
2
0
0
7
 
++ 
The accommodation for the teachers 
has improved there is more place for 
students of grades 8 and 9. Before, 
they needed to walk long distances to 
reach the school 
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Construction of one 
borehole 2
0
0
8
 
++ 
This borehole is serving a lot of people 
in the community 
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STORAGE 
SHED 
G
o
v
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m
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t G 
Construction of a 
shed 1
9
7
8
 
+ 
They did good maintenance and 
people are still using it. It looks like 
new. But you can only use it 
'seasonally'. 
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MASAMBA 
BASIC 
SCHOOL 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
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C
D
F
 
D 
Construction of a 
1x3 block for the 
primary school 2
0
1
0
 
++ 
The school was first started by the 
government and it was finalised 
through CDF funds. This is helping 
children a lot because they do not 
have to walk long distances. 
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COMMUNI
TY 
SCHOOL 
C
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D 
Construction of 1x2 
block 2
0
0
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++ 
Before it was a very little community 
school. Now it is much better and it is 
closer to the villages 
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KAPITA 
BASIC 
SCHOOL 
C
D
F
 
D 
Rehabilitation of 
the staff houses and 
1x3 block 2
0
0
9
 
++ 
Now the students can easily access 
grades 8 and 9 
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MFUWE 
ROAD 
G
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Construction of the 
road 2
0
1
0
 
++ 
Now we are able to transport the 
produce to the marked and it is easier 
to travel 
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KANDAMI
NGA DAM C
D
F
 
D 
Rehabilitation of 
the dam 2
0
0
1
 
- 
The dam is there but it cannot hold 
enough water and there is no fish. In 
the '70, we were eating a lot of fish but 
it has been destroyed by the 
fishermen 
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1.4 Project’s Impacts on Wealth Groups 
1.4.1 BEST PROJECTS ’  BENEFITS  
Question: “How much does a ‘very rich’ / ‘rich’ / ‘average’ / ‘poor’ / ‘very poor’ 
person benefit from project X? Please use a ‘Big Stones’ for ‘big positive benefit’ 
(2 in table below); a small stone for small positive benefit (1 in the table 
below); and ‘No stones’ for ‘no benefit’” (0 in the table below). 
For this exercise, the assessment was made only the three best projects, which 
had been previously selected by the participants from the full list of projects 
implemented in their ward. 
       
IMPACT 
 
GROUP SECTOR 
PROJECT 
NAME 
INITIATOR NAME DATE 
BES
T # 
V
R 
R A P 
V
P 
  1. CHIMANA ward Health 
DISTRICT 
HOSPITAL 
GOVERNMENT 2008 1 0 1 1 2 2 
  1. CHIMANA ward Social 
LOCAL RADIO 
STATION 
NA 2010 2 1 1 2 2 1 
  1. CHIMANA ward Education 
COMMUNITY 
SCHOOL - 
MILEMU 
MoE 
GOVERNMENT 
2007 3 0 0 2 2 1 
 REASONS 
1. The 'Very Rich' do not go to this kind of hospitals. Sometimes, the R and A use 
it but they can afford to go in private hospitals. The P and 'Very Poor' benefit 
most as they cannot pay for better hospitals so this is the only place they can 
go. 
2. The 'Very Rich' and R have other channels of communication (TV, internet). 
The 'Very Poor' sometimes cannot even afford to have a radio. For the A and 
P will use it a lot 
3. The 'Very Rich' and ‘Rich’ go to private schools. This school is for ‘Average’ 
and ‘Poor’ as they can all afford to pay the fees. Only sometimes, also 'Very 
Poor' people can afford it (especially if somebody else pays for the fee) 
  2. MANO ward Education 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
MoE 
GOVERNMENT 
2011 1 - - 2 2 1 
  2. MANO ward Water 
MORE THAN 
20 BOREHOLES 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
JICA 
2007 2 - - 2 2 2 
  2. MANO ward Health 
CLINIC IN 
CHIPAKO AREA 
COMMUNITY na  3 - - 2 2 1 
 REASONS 
1. Very Rich' and R don't send their children in this school. 'Very Poor' benefit 
less because they cannot afford the price. 
2. Very Rich' and R don't use the boreholes. 
3. The 'Very Poor' don't have the transport to reach the clinic. 
  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Education 
ELECTRIFICATI
ON OF 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOLS 
DISTRICT (CDF) 2012 1 0 1 2 0 0 
  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Infrastruct
ure 
ROAD 
JUNCTION 
MUSAEILA - 
KASABA 
GOVERNMENT 2012 2 2 2 2 1 0 
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  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Education SCHOOL BOYS 
MoEGOVERNM
ENT 
2010 3 0 2 2 1 0 
 REASONS 
1. Civil servants are benefitting more about it and they all belong to the Pakati 
wealth group. Rich people have already electricity and they do not allow 
poorer people to use the electric devices at their place. Pakati share it with 
the others.  
2. Very Rich' and R are using a lot the road to transport their farming products 
with tracks. Other people are not using it a lot, and sometimes you prefer to 
take the boat to go to Samfya. P people use it with a bicycle to transport 
charcoal. 'Very Poor' don't use it 
3. Very Rich' cannot afford to send their children at school. P people sometimes 
can, if they are able to pay for the uniform. Pakati and R are usually the 
teachers, who are more motivated to work in this new school. 'Very Rich' 
don't send their children here. 
  4. MASONDE   
ward 
Health 
CHIMANA 
RURAL CENTRE 
UNICEF 2004 1 - - 1 2 2 
  4. MASONDE   
ward 
Health 
MIPONDA 
CLINIC 
MATERNITY 
WARD 
ZAMSIF 
GOVERNMENT 
1990s 2 - - 2 2 2 
  4. MASONDE   
ward 
Education 
MIPONDA 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
CDF 
2009 3 - - 2 2 1 
 REASONS 
1. The Pakati can use much better hospitals even if they need to travel for a long 
distance. P and 'Very Poor' use it a lot. 
2. There is no segregation. Everybody is using the maternity ward 
3. Very Poor' cannot afford to pay for the school fees and the uniform, so they 
have a small benefit. The ‘Poor’ and Pakati can afford it so they are having 
good benefits. 
  5 . KATANSHA  
ward 
Infrastruct
ure 
RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATI
ON 
RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATIO
N AUTHORITY 
2012 1 - 2 1 1 1 
  5 . KATANSHA  
ward 
Health 
MATERNITY 
WING AT THE 
CLINIC 
MoH 2010 2 - 2 2 2 2 
  5 . KATANSHA  
ward 
Education 
MITIIKULA 
PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
MoE 
GOVERNMENT 
2007 3 - 2 2 2 1 
 REASONS 
1. The ‘Rich’ have all electrical devices and they have money to apply to have 
electricity in their house. ‘Pakati’ and poor benefit indirectly because of things 
that rich people will bring because of electricity. Ex.: if they bring a weeding 
machine, they will ask locally for repairing (instead of bringing it in Lusaka). 
'Very Poor' have a small benefit too because when they go to the hospital 
during the night, they won't need any more to pay for a candle. 
2. There is no discrimination and everybody can access the clinic, both poor and 
rich 
3. Everybody benefit from this school. Only 'Very Poor' have a smaller benefit 
because they cannot always pay the school fee so they don't attend regularly. 
  6. DILIKA ward Education 
BLOCK 1x3 
DAMBE 
SCHOOL 
World Vision 1998 1 1 2 2 1 0 
  6. DILIKA ward Water 1 BOREHOLE CDF 2011 2 2 2 2 1 1 
  6. DILIKA ward Water BOREHOLES JBG 2006 2 2 2 2 1 1 
 REASONS 
1. This school was upgraded. The 'Very Rich' may send their children to better 
schools so they benefit less. 'Rich' and 'Average' have no other places to send 
their children as there is no other school, so they benefit a lot. The 'Poor' 
cannot always send their children to school so they benefit less. The 'Very 
Poor' cannot send their children to school. 
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2. The Very Rich and Rich use a lot of water (ex.: to wash their clothing or their 
cars). The 'Average' may use the water for their gardens. The 'Poor' and 'Very 
Poor' need less water because sometimes they cannot even afford a meal a 
day. 
  7. CHIPARAMBA 
ward 
Infrastructur
e 
ROAD 
REHABILITATI
ON  
CDF 2012 1 2 2 2 1 0 
  7. CHIPARAMBA 
ward 
Water BOREHOLES 
DISTRICT-
DONOR(WASH 
program) 
2011 2 0 0 2 2 2 
  7. CHIPARAMBA 
ward 
Education 
MSHAWA 
BASIC 
SCHOOL 
CDF 2011 3 0 1 2 2 0 
 REASONS 
1. Very Rich', 'Rich', and 'Pakati' have their own transport so they have a big 
benefit from the road. The 'Poor' may only have a bicycle or they walk 
2. Very Poor', 'Poor' and 'Pakati' benefit a lot because it is the only water point 
they can use. ‘Very Rich' and 'Rich' have often their own water points and 
they do not need to use them. 
3. The 'Very Poor' do not send their children to school and the 'Very Rich' send 
theirs to better schools, so they have no benefit from it.. The school is used 
mainly by the 'poor' and the pakati' as this is the only school they can send 
their children to. Only some 'rich' use this school, other prefers better 
schools. 
  8. KANJALA ward 
Infrastruct
ure 
FEEDER ROAD 
KAWA KATALE 
District 1999 1 2 2 1 1 0 
  8. KANJALA ward 
Infrastruct
ure 
APOLLO DAM Government 1983 2 2 2 2 1 1 
 REASONS 
1. The Very Rich and Rich use the road with vehicles so they have a big benefit. 
The Very Poor do not use the road because they do not travel. The Average 
and the Poor have a small benefit because they can use it only with a bike. 
2. The Very Rich, Rich and 'Pakati' benefit a lot because they have toilets and 
bathrooms. The Poor and the Very Poor use it for fishing and they exchange it 
with the 'meal meal'. The Poor take the water from there. 
  9. MKOWE ward Education 
ALL SCHOOLS 
REHABILITATIO
N / 
CONSTRUCTIO
N 
District Council 
2007 
2010 
2008 
2009 
1 - 1 2 2 1 
  9. MKOWE ward Water BOREHOLE Government 2008 2 - 2 2 2 2 
  9. MKOWE ward Infrastructur
e 
MFUWE ROAD Government 2010 3 - 2 2 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. The Very Rich send the children to private school so they do not benefit from 
it. 'Rich' people only sometimes can benefit, but they prefer to send their 
children to boarding schools. The 'Average' and 'Poor' have a big benefit as 
these are the only schools where they can send their children. The 'Very Poor' 
are vulnerable; they do not send their children to school because of lack of 
money or ignorance. 
2. The Very Rich can drill their own borehole, all the others benefit a lot from 
this public one 
3. We all benefit from this road. The poor can even use an ambulance if needed. 
Also the salt and the soap came with the road 
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1.4.2 WORST PROJECTS ’  IMPACTS  
Question: “How much does ‘very rich’ / ‘rich’ / ‘average’ / ‘poor’ / ‘very poor’ 
person have suffered from project X? Please use a ‘Big Stones’ for ‘big negative 
harm’ (2 in the table below); a “Small stone’ for ‘small negative harm’ (1 in the 
table below); and ‘No stones’ for ‘no harm’” (0 in the table below). 
For this exercise, the assessment was made only the three worst projects, 
which had been previously selected by the participants from the full list of 
projects implemented in their ward.  
 
            
IMPACT 
DISTI
CT 
GROUP SECTOR PROJECT NAME 
INITIATOR 
NAME 
DATES 
WORS
T 
VR R A P VP 
  1. CHIMANA ward Health CARE PROVIDER NGO 2004 1 0 0 2 2 2 
  1. CHIMANA ward Water BOREHOLES 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
GOVERNMENT 
2011 2 0 0 2 2 2 
  1. CHIMANA ward 
Markets / 
kiosks 
NEW MARKET 
ADC 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
2009 3 0 0 0 0 0 
 REASONS 
1. The 'Very Rich' and R do not go to this kind of hospitals but they can afford 
private ones. A, P and 'Very Poor' suffer most as this hospital does not assist 
them. They discriminate people (HIV positive/negative) 
2. "Very Rich', ‘Rich’ and ‘Pakati’ can afford to pay the bill for pipe water. Here 
most of the families have the pipe water so boreholes are not useful. P and 
'Very Poor' use it a lot. 
3. This market is useless, people is not using it 
  2. MANO ward Crops HAMMER MILL MoF 2004 1 - - 1 2 2 
  2. MANO ward 
Infrastructur
e 
FEEDER ROAD 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
sd 2 - - 1 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. The benefits are only for projects managers (Pakati - average) who are taking 
all the money. 
2. The roads' quality is poor so it will be covered my grass very soon. The A are 
using more the road and they put levies on it. 
  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Infrastructur
e 
TOWNSHIP 
ROAD 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
(CDF) 
2012 1 0 0 0 0 2 
  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Social 
TRADITIONAL 
CEREMONIES 
ARENA 
GOVERNMENT 2011 2 1 1 1 2 2 
  3 .CHIFUNABULI  
ward 
Education 
TEACHERS 
RESOURCE 
CENTRE 
MoE 
GOVERNMENT 
2006 3 0 0 1 2 2 
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 REASONS 
1. The quality of this project is very poor and the money should have been 
spent for the 'Very Poor'. 
2. Very Rich', R and Pakati sell their products during the traditional ceremony. P 
and 'Very Poor' sometimes attend without having any food. 
3. Only some teachers (Pakati) are benefitting from this centre. 'Very Poor' and 
P are more affected because they have other problems to face (ex. how to 
buy the uniforms). 
  4. MASONDE   ward 
Infrastructur
e 
NAMUPAKASWA 
ROAD 
REHABILITATION 
+ EMBANKMENT 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
(CDF) 
2009 1 - - 1 1 2 
  4. MASONDE   ward 
Infrastructur
e 
FEEDER ROAD 
MIPONDA - 
KASSONKOMON
A 
 DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
(CDF) 
2008  2 - - 1 2 2 
  4. MASONDE   ward Education 
CHITUMBER 
COMMUNITY 
SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 
(CDF) 
2009 3 - - 0 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. This road is incomplete as the money was not sufficient. The 'Very Poor' are 
the most affected because they cannot use it and to get to the same place 
you need to take another road which is too long. Pakati and P are affected 
too but they can take the longer road because they own a car or a bicycle. 
2. This road is not complete and you cannot use it. P and 'Very Poor' have the 
worst impact because they don't have a bicycle. Pakati can use another road 
(it depends if they have a vehicle). 
3. This school is incomplete and the wind blew off everything. People reported 
to the district but the school wasn't repaired, so during the rainy season 
children of P or 'Very Poor' families cannot go to school. Pakati don't use this 
school so they are not affected. 
  5 . KATANSHA  ward 
Markets / 
kiosks 
MPANTA 
MARKET 
ZAMSIF 
GOVERNMENT 
2005 1 - 1 2 2 2 
  5 . KATANSHA  ward Crops 
FOOD STORAGE 
SHED 
ZAMSIF 
GOVERNMENT 
90 2 - 0 2 2 2 
  5 . KATANSHA  ward Water BOREHOLES 
ZAMSIF 
GOVERNMENT 
2003 3 - 1 2 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. Pakati and P people are greatly affected: the market is located very close to 
the harbour and the swamps. This means that a lot of fish could be available 
as they could go to buy big quantities of fish directly to the fishermen to 
resell it to the market. But the market is not working so they cannot have this 
income. 'Very Poor' people are affected too, because if the market was 
working they could have some piece works and a good place for begging. 
Rich people have a small negative impact because they don't have a place 
where to buy the things they need 
2. The money used for this project should have been used to finance another 
project (as the mother shelter in the clinic). 'Very Poor' are dependent from 
Pakati so if those are negatively affected, they will be affected too. R people 
can afford to build one in their own yard. 
3. Water is life so everybody is suffering. The works were not good because 
they didn't use machines so the boreholes are not deep and they dry up 
during the dry season, or if they are broken they are not repaired. They R can 
pay to build one in their own place. 
  6. DILIKA ward Water BOREHOLE Government 1992 1 1 1 1 2 2 
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  6. DILIKA ward Health 
STAFF HOUSE 
FOR HEALTH 
POST 
CDF 2010 2 0 0 2 2 2 
  6. DILIKA ward Health HEALTH POST CDF 2010 3 0 0 2 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. This borehole is not functional. Thus, the 'Very Rich' and ‘Rich’ or the ‘Pakati’ 
ask the 'Poor' and 'Very Poor' to go and look for water. So these latter have 
to go and look for water for themselves and for the other groups. 
2. The 'Very Rich' and 'Rich' can travel to other hospitals and the worst that can 
happen is that they die during the trip. The other groups cannot move 
because they do not have transport so they have no hospital. 
  7. CHIPARAMBA 
ward 
Infrastructure 
PLOTS 
DISTRIBUTION 
DISTRICT 2011 1 0 1 1 2 0 
 REASONS 
1. The 'very rich' can chose places around the road because they have money 
and they can pay more. The 'rich' may be able to build a small road to 
connect the plot to the main road. The 'very poor' cannot afford to buy a 
plot. The 'poor' can buy it but it takes up to five years to put the money 
aside. 
  8. KANJALA ward Health HEALTH POST CDF 2003 1 1 1 1 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. The Very Rich, Rich and 'Pakati' can go to the general hospital in Chipata or 
go in to a private one because they can afford to have a transport. The Poor 
or Very Poor cannot go there even if they get sick because there are no drugs 
or personnel. 
  9. MKOWE ward Infrastructure 
KANDAMINGA 
DAM 
CDF 2001 1 - 1 2 2 2 
  9. MKOWE ward Crops 
STORAGE 
SHED 
Government 1978 2 - 1 1 2 2 
  9. MKOWE ward Social 
CHIKIWE LOCAL 
COURT 
CDF 2008 3 - 1 1 2 2 
 REASONS 
1. The money could be better spent for something else and not for fishing. The 
'rich' can drill a borehole and have their water. The others are more affected. 
2. We sell our maize directly in Chipata or we use it for consumption, so we do 
not need the shed. 
3. The rich and the 'average' have the money to use this hall. The 'Very Poor' 
and 'Poor' discuss their issues among themselves. 
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1.5 Institutions’ Assessment  
Rules: Read the statements below to participants and for each of then ask if the 
statement is “Always”, “Usually” or “sometimes” true or “Usually not true” (also 
possible: “unable to assess”). 
Statements: 
1) Commitment: “They care about our development and they work focus on it” 
2) Realistic expectations: “They fulfil their promises” 
3) Honesty: “When something goes wrong they tell us honestly”. 
4) Relevance: “They really address the problems that affect us” 
5) Participation: “We can give our opinion on the type of projects they do and 
how projects are done. The traditional leaders & community are involved” 
6) Efficient: “The projects are managed in a good and transparent way. No 
corruption or mismanagement” 
7) Trustworthiness: “We feel we can trust them” 
8) Impact: “The results really improve the lives of many people in the area” 
In the table here below: 
++ Always 
+ Usually 
/ Sometimes 
- Usually not/never 
* Unable to assess 
1.5.1 THE DISTRICT COUNCIL  
 
  
GROUP 
LONG 
TERM 
COMMI
TMENT 
REALIS
TIC 
EXPECT
ATIONS 
HONES
TY 
RELEVA
NCE 
PARTICI
PATION 
EFFICIE
NCY 
TRUST 
IN 
PEOPLE 
IMPAC
T 
S
A
M
F
Y
A
 
1.CHIMANA  - - - - - - - - 
They are not committed as if you work for them they don't pay for 3-4 months; you also 
need to pay a lot of money for a plot but then there are no roads, street lights or services. 
People apply for CDF but then even if the project is approved, the service required would 
not be available. They are not honest because they don't go around sensitizing the 
community and even if you apply for a job in the DC, they prefer to hire somebody from 
their family. The relevance and participation are not good as they don't involve people and 
don't ask for feedback. They are not efficient because they don't work as a group they don't 
share ideas. 
2.MANO  / / / - + - / + 
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They don't make things real (commitment) and only sometimes they do what they have 
promised (realistic exp., trust in people). They don't visit us often enough (relevance) and 
there is no transparency (efficiency). 
3.CHIFUNAB
ULI  
/ / / - / / / / 
Commitment: they are not always monitoring the CDF funds. Realistic exp: some projects 
were not fulfilled. They are only sometimes honest because they don't tell us everything. If a 
disaster happens, the DC doesn't intervene immediately to give relief (relevance). They 
don't ask us what we need. For instance: they don't ask how many bags of fertilizers we 
need. This decision is taken above, but it should be discussed at community level 
(participation). They are only sometimes efficient  because each project has a timeframe and 
M&E procedure. However, some projects are unfinished and there is not transparency in 
M&E. There is a little bit of accountability otherwise the task force (against corruption, nrd) 
would have fired them (trust in people). The impact is sometimes good, because not 
everybody can benefit from the projects. 
4.MASONDE / / - / - - / / 
We have applied for different projects (ex. the embankments) and they were done; however 
people who have worked to realise it haven't been paid yet (committed). Sometimes the 
projects are realised and we can see them (realistic exp.). The councillors don’t tell us when 
things are wrong (honest). Only sometimes they come and address the problems 
(relevance). They DC don’t say about the projects they are going to bring (participation). 
The DC is not transparent because of corruption (efficient). We can trust them because at 
least the projects they bring are visible (trust in people). When they do a project, the 
community have more employment opportunities (impact). 
5.KATANSH
A 
/ / - / - + / + 
Using the CDF, the DC can finance projects every year and we can see them. The new 
services provided are not timely and every time you request a service it takes a lot of time 
before you can have it. The CDF is released only once a year and it not always arrives to the 
last beneficiaries (committed). The DC can only partially fulfil the promises because they 
don't have regular funding and the CDF in only once a year and most of time is not 
sufficient for everything (realistic exp.). Most of the time, if they cannot do a project they 
cannot explain why. They are not able to explain to people how much money is there and 
about what project. Before, under Kaunda, there was more collaboration so we knew those 
details. They are hiding something so they are not honest. The councillor comes to ask 
people about their problems and they are responding to our needs (relevance). We are 
involved in the selection of the projects but not in their implementation (participation). 
When there is a project they create a project management committee and they explain them 
how to manage it (efficiency). Sometimes the DC promises to do something but after we 
discover that the money has been diverted to another ward to finance another project (trust 
in people). The whole community benefits from the projects (ex.: the clinic) (impact). 
C
H IP A
T A
 
1.DILIKA / / * / + / / / 
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They are sometimes committed: sometimes they don't manage because they don't have 
enough money. They prefer to do projects closer to the town centre. They give excuses (ex. 
'there is no fuel', 'we need the lunch allowance for the driver', etc). Also the way they treat 
people, their attitude is not good: instead of listen the grievances, they make people feel 
inferior. Then, people get frustrated and they do not go again. (Realistic Exp): Sometimes 
they do not manage to complete the projects (ex.: they stop before complete the roofing) or 
they are not done (ex.: health post). (Honesty): The bureaucratic chain is too long, there are 
too many middle men so it is difficult to assess. It was different if there was a direct channel 
from the government (or councillor, MP) to the zone. (Relevance): Here, there is not a 
proper road network. When you go with a complain, they say 'yes' but then they do not do 
it. (Participation): Usually, yes. For instance, the councillor came to ask us which project 
was the most important to be implemented. We asked the health post. (Efficiency): Only 
sometimes: Transparency is not always there, evidences not given and we don't know how 
much the procurement office paid for the inputs. Moreover, there was an overdraft of 1.5 
million, despite the council said they got even 900.000 K more. (Trust in people): Only 
sometimes, when they are able to 'do things'. (Impact): Only sometimes: for example, we all 
benefit from the school. 
2.CHIPARAMB
A 
/ + - + + + + + 
(Commitment): Sometimes they do things right. They are committed but they don't always 
manage to finish what they start. (Realistic Exp.): They know where to get the resources. 
(Honesty): Most of the time they do not fulfil what they promise. (Relevance): They have 
addressed the problem of water, also through the zone/WDC committee. (Participation): 
They ask people and involve us 
(Efficiency): But sometimes there are issues. (Trust in people): When they promise 
something they do it. (Impact): They involve people in the area (ex.: boreholes and road are 
for everybody). However, there are challenges to finalise the projects. They start but to 
finish it takes time. 
3. 
KANJALA 
/ / - - - * - - 
(Commitment): They promise but they don't fulfil. (Realistic Exp.): During elections, they 
come and promise but they don't fulfil. (Honesty): They never came to ask about problems 
(Relevance & participation): They do not have meetings with us, not even with the 
headman 
(Efficiency): not able to assess. (Trust in people): They don't come to visit us. (Impact): 
They failed to fulfil their promise. 
4.MKOWE / / / / ++ * / + 
(Commitment): They meet the needs of the people only occasionally. 
(Realistic Exp.): Ex.: the classroom block is not funded properly as it is still incomplete. 
Every time we don't know if they'll finish or not. (Honesty): They come to check the works. 
Ex.: The community built a school, they came to visit it and they said it was ok and they 
took it up. (Relevance): The council don't address the problem because the bureaucracy will 
delay a lot the solution. They do not concentrate much on rural areas, but only on urban. 
Sometimes they don't have resources to make them address the problems. It is the system 
that does not work. They don't fail completely, but sometimes they do. (Participation): They 
community is always involved before and in the implementation as we always need to 
provide the 25% in materials of labour. (Efficiency): We cannot assess. (Trust in people): If 
they promise we trust them but sometimes they fail. Sometimes, they don't have the 
capacity to run those activities. (Impact): The projects they do are useful (ex.: they sprayed 
the houses). 
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1.5.2 THE ADC/WDC 
 
  GROUP 
LONG 
TERM 
COMMIT
MENT 
REALIST
IC 
EXPECT
ATIONS 
HONEST
Y 
RELEVA
NCE 
PARTICI
PATION 
EFFICIE
NCY 
TRUST 
IN 
PEOPLE 
IMPACT 
S
A
M
F
Y
A
 
1.CHIMANA  * * * * * * * * 
They cannot assess – too early 
2.MANO - - - * + + + * 
The ADC has just started so we haven't seen the realizations yet. We wait to see the fruits. 
3.CHIFUNABU
LI 
+ + + + + + + + 
Before people were chosen for its political affiliation now this doesn't happen anymore 
(commitment). They are fulfilling the expectations because we have seen the projects done 
but they should provide projects reports (honesty). They see the problems and they report 
them to the district (relevance). When there is a project, stakeholders are involved 
(participation). There is efficiency and trust in people because "we have seen the projects 
and the improvements". They should continue in this way because they have a great 
potential (impact). 
4.MASONDE / / / / * / / * 
The ADC has just started to work. Only some of them are honest. Since their election, the 
ADC members have started to have meetings with the zones to discuss about problems 
(relevance). Some put too much politics in their work instead of doing just development. 
They involve themselves in politics and some of them are politicians (efficiency). We can 
trust only some of them (trust in people). 
5.KATANSHA + + / * * * * * 
The ADC has just started so we cannot assess. The previous ADC was quite ineffective and 
it was not working. The new one has just started and, up to now, the members have shown 
commitment. In the implementation of the project, we haven't seen any mismanagement 
(honesty).  
C
H
IP
A
T
A
 
1.DILIKA * / * + + + / * 
(Commitment): We cannot assess as the WDC is like a dead house: "we don't see thing 
coming out" of this committee. (Realistic Exp.): Sometimes, when the WDC is working in 
conjunction with the council. (Honesty): They don't explain things. (Relevance): They are 
trying, but they are not always able to do things. (Participation): They usually share 
information with the people. (Efficiency): Usually, they are able to give us a feedback. 
(Trust in people): Only sometimes, when they are able to 'do things'. (Impact): Not able to 
assess 
2.CHIPARAMB
A 
+ + + / + + + + 
(Commitment): They community rely on the WDC to take the problems to the council  
(Realistic Exp.): They bring the council's work close to the people but they are not 
supported by the council. (Honesty): - . (Relevance): They involve the community. 
(Participation): Sometimes, they make false promises. (Efficiency): They come to the 
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community and they ask for problems  
(Trust in people): They talk with people. (Impact): The WDC helps the community 
3.KANJALA * * * * * * * * 
In this case it is impossible to assess: out of the 9 participants only 3 knew what the WDC 
is. 2 are WDC member, one is external. 
4.MKOWE * * * * * * * * 
In this case it is impossible to assess: out of the 8 participants only 2 knew what the WDC 
is. 1 is the former councillor, the other is a WDC member. 
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2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. FAMILY INFORMATION 
 
1. Gender a. M 
b. F 
2. Your marital status is…? a. Married 
b. Widowed 
c. Separated 
d. Unmarred 
3. Age (or birth year)  
4. Where were you born? a. Same place 
b. Elsewhere in the province, specify:__________ 
c. Outside the province, specify:____________ 
5. Ethnicity / Mother tongue  
6. Religion a. Christian, specify:______________________ 
b. Muslim 
c. Other, specify:_________________________ 
7. Do you or a member of your family have 
a handicap? 
a. Yes, specify whom and what____________ 
b. No 
8. How many members in your family?  
9. How many wives do you (does your 
husband) have ? 
 
 
M 
/
F 
Y
e
ar
s 
Where does s/he 
live? 
(1) same place 
(2) same region 
(3) outside, specify  
Education
al level  
 
Job(s) 
 
Religion 
Mar
ried
? 
Y|N 
WIFE OR 
HUSBAN
D 
 
 
     
CHILD 1        
// 2        
// 3        
// 4        
// 5        
// 6        
// 7        
// 8        
10. Did you go to school? a. Yes, specify level:___________ 
b. No 
11. Are you (or your wife/husband) a 
traditional leader? 
a. Yes, specify ____________ 
b. No 
12. Are you (or your 
wife/husband/children) member of an 
association / development committee? 
 
13. (If YES) Which one? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
a. WDC / ADC 
b. Women Association 
c. Youth association 
d. Agriculture association (farmers, 
herders) 
e. Trade Union 
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f. Political party 
g. Other, specify: _______________ 
 
2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION - FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION : 
 
14. What is your main job?  
15. Do you (or your wife/husband) have other 
income generating activities? 
a. YES, specify 
b. NO 
16. Which is your total family income 
(monthly)? 
a. Less than 200.000 
b. Between 200.000 and 300.000 
c. Between 300.000 and 500.000 
d. Between K 500.000 and 1.000.000 K 
e. More than K 1.000.000 
17. Which vehicle does your family own if any? 
a. Car How many? 
b. Motorbike  
c. Bicycle  
d. Tractor  
e. Boat  
18. How much livestock does your family own? a. Cattle  
b. Goats  
c. Chickens  
d.   
e.  
19. Do your family own a piece of land?  
20. If not, Why? 
a. yes                b. no 
__________________________________ 
21. How much land …. 
…does your family own? … does your 
family 
cultivate? 
a. 2 lima or less a. 2 lima or 
less 
b. 2-4 lima b. 2-4 lima 
c. 1-5 hectares c. 1-5 
hectares 
d. 5-10 hectares d. 5-10 
hectares 
e. more than 10 h e. more than 
10 h 
22. In the last five years, has your income 
increased or decreased? 
a. Increased 
b. Decreased 
c. No change 
23. (If Increase) Which are the main factors of 
this change? 
 
24. (If Decrease) Which are the main factors of 
this change? 
 
25. In the last 5 years, did the district council 
take any initiative that has positively 
influenced your family income? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
Explain 
26. In the last 5 years, did the district council 
take any initiative that has negatively 
influenced your family income? 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
Explain 
 
27. What could the district council do to help 
improving your family income? 
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3. POLITICAL DIMENSION – DISTRICT LEVEL 
 
28. In 2011, did you (and you wife/husband) 
register to vote? 
 
 
29. (If Not) Why? 
a. YES, SPECIFY___________________ 
b. NO 
 
a. I didn’t know 
b. I was not interested 
c. It was too expensive 
d. The registration office was too far 
e. Other____________ 
30. Did you vote in the last tripartite elections? 
(Y|N) 
 2011 2006 2001 
PRESIDENT    
PARLIAMENT    
DISTRICT    
31. (If YES) 
For the District Council, did you vote for a 
man or a woman?  
a. M, explain _____ 
b. F, explain  ______ 
32. (If YES) 
Please choose a word that describes the 
candidate you voted for at district level… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33. (If NOT) 
Why not? 
 
a. Political affiliation 
b. Honesty - integrity 
c. Education 
d. Wealthy 
e. Socially committed (NGO/CBO) 
f. Clever/Skilful 
g. Religious 
h. Other_____________________ 
 
a. I didn’t know 
b. I was not interested 
c. It was too expensive 
d. The electoral post was too far 
e. Other____________ 
34. During the last year (2011-12), did you 
stand as candidate for one of the following 
elections? 
a. Parliament   Yes | No 
b. District council  Yes | No 
c. Zone (WDC)            Yes | No 
35. Did you (or your wife/husband) campaign 
for a candidate to the council during the last 
tripartite elections? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
36. Please choose two words that describe the 
councillors at District level…  
a. Honest b. NOT honest 
c. Educated d. NOT educated 
e. Committed 
f. NOT 
committed 
g. Trustworthy 
h. NOT 
trustworthy 
i. Clever/skilled j. Religious 
37. Do you think they are able to manage the 
district and promote development projects? 
 
WHY? 
a. Yes b. No 
c. Don’t 
know 
 
38. If compared with the work they do for the 
community, do you think their allowance 
is… 
a. Excessive 
b. Adequate 
c. Too low 
d. I don’t know 
39. Are there traditional leaders among the 
councillors?  
a. Yes b. No c. Don’t 
know 
40. Who are usually the other councillors 
(except for the traditional leaders? 
 
a. Religious leaders 
b. Farmers 
c. Fishermen 
d. Businessmen 
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e. Craftsmen 
f. Politicians 
g. I don’t know 
41. Usually there are more men or women as 
councillors? 
Why? 
a. M b. W 
 
42. Do you know your (ward) councillor? a. Yes b. No 
43. (If yes) In the last year (2012), how many 
meetings did your councillor organize in 
your ward/community to speak about 
- development projects, 
- problems related to your community, 
- to report about district 
decisions/meetings? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44. (if yes) with whom? 
MEETINGS ORGANIZED BY 
THE COUNCILLOR 
MEETINGS ATTENDED 
BY THE RESPONDENT 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 
d. 3 
e. 4 
f. MORE THAN 4 
g. I DON’T KNOW 
a. 0 
b. 1 
c. 2 
d. 3 
e. 4 
f. MORE THAN 4 
g.  I DON’T KNOW 
a. Traditional leaders 
b. WDC/ADC 
c. Zone/community 
d. Workers/business associations 
45. How do you judge the work of your WARD 
councillor in the last year? 
a. Very good b. Good 
c. Poor d. Very poor 
Explain:  
 
 
 
 
4. POLITICAL DIMENSION – WARD / AREA DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES 
 
46. Is there any Ward/Area Development 
Committee to discuss and propose 
development projects? 
 
47. (if YES) When was that created? 
 
 
 
48. (if YES) Was it created by… 
 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
a. Recently 
b. Long time ago 
c. I don’t know 
a. Central government 
b. District Council 
c. Traditional leaders 
d. Community 
e. NGO 
f. I don’t know 
49. Which is its nature? 
Are their members affiliated to a political 
party? 
a. Political 
b. Development 
c. Fiscal / tax collection 
d. Other 
50. Who is in charge of choosing WDC’s 
members? 
 
a. Chief/king and traditional leaders 
b. Elected by the village 
c. Appointed by the District Council 
d. Political Parties 
e. I don’t know 
51. (if elected) Did you or one of your family’s 
members vote for the election of the WDC? 
 
 
 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
a. Political affiliation 
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52. (if YES) Please, choose 3 main features that 
influenced your choice for the candidate 
you voted for.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53. (if NO) Why not? 
b. Honesty - integrity 
c. Education 
d. Wealth 
e. Affiliation to the WDC/ADC 
f. Skills / cleverness 
g. Traditional leader 
h. (Former) civil servant / teacher 
i. Religion 
j. Other……………………….. 
 
a. I didn’t know 
b. I was not interested 
c. I was not invited 
d. Other____________ 
54. Please choose two words your WDC’s 
members 
a. Honest b. NOT honest  
c. Educated d. NOT educated 
e. Committed f. NOT committed 
k. Trustworthy l. NOT trustworthy 
g. Religious h. Clever/skilled 
55. Is the WDC able promote development 
projects in this community? 
a. Yes 
b. N
o 
c. I don’t know 
EXPLAIN: 
 
 
56. How are they rewarded for the work they 
do for the community? 
 
 
a. Remuneration from the District council 
b. Remuneration from the community 
c. They benefit from the project (bicycle, 
etc.) 
d. No remunerations / volunteering 
e. I don’t Know 
57. b (if rewarded) If compared with the work 
they do for the community, do you think 
their reward is…. 
a. Excessive b. Too low 
c. Adequate d. Don’t Know 
58. Are there traditional leaders among the 
WDC/ADC’s members?  
 
h. Yes 
i. No 
j. I don’t know 
59. Who are usually the other members 
(except for the traditional leaders? (2 
options) 
a. Religious 
leaders 
b. Craftsmen 
c. Farmers d. Politicians 
e. Fisher f. Other 
g. Businessmen  
60. Usually there are more men or women as 
ADC members? 
61. Why? 
a. M b. W 
EXPLAIN: 
62. How do you judge the work of the 
WDC/ADC in the last year? 
a. Very good b. Good 
c. Poor d. Very poor 
63. How many meetings in the last year (2012) 
did your zone WDC member organize 
- to report about WDC meetings 
a. 0 b. 1 
c. 2 d. 3 
e. 4 f. More than 4 
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- to discuss development projects or  
- problems related to your community? 
 
 
64. (if yes) with whom? 
 
 
a. District Council / MP 
b. Traditional leaders 
c. WDC/ADC 
d. Zone/community 
65. What is your family’s main source of the 
Chipata’s Council’s work and decision? 
(2 options) 
a. TV 
b. National 
Radio 
c. Local Radio 
d. Newspaper 
e. Other 
f. ADC / WDC 
g. Internet 
h. Friends 
i. Chief/trad. leader 
66. What is your family’s main source of 
information about events and politics in 
Zambia? 
a. TV 
b. National 
Radio 
c. Local Radio 
d. Newspaper 
e. Other 
f. ADC / WDC 
g. Internet 
h. Friends 
i. Chief/trad. leader 
67. In the last year (2011-2012), have you 
participated to one of the following 
meetings? 
a. DDCC Y | N  
Y | N 
Y | N 
Y | N 
b. District 
Council 
c. ADC/WDC 
d. Zone 
 
 
5. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION - SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
68. How do you rate the services provided by 
your council? 
A. Always good 
B. Good 
C. Average 
D. Poor 
E. Always poor 
69.  (If always good/good) Which are the main 
reasons of good quality of services 
provided? 
(2 option is possible) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70. (If always poor/poor) Which are the main 
reasons of good quality of services 
provided? (more the one option is possible) 
a. Resources availability 
b. Councillors very committed to 
development 
c. WDC very active 
d. Good and transparent management 
e. Community /traditional leaders 
involved in Councils’ 
initiatives/planning 
f. Other____________________________ 
a. Lack of resources 
b. Lack of commitment of councillors 
c. Lack of capacity/initiative of the WDC 
d. Corruption 
e. Political interference 
f. Community / traditional leaders not 
involved in Council’s 
initiatives/planning 
g. Other_____________________________ 
71. If compared with 10 years ago, now district 
council is…  
a. More efficient, explain…. 
b. Less efficient, explain… 
c. The same 
d. I don’t know 
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During the last year, how many times did 
contact your councillor to talk about individual 
or community issues? 
  
During the last year, how many times did you 
contact your MP to talk about individual or 
community issues ? 
  
72. If the people in your community have a 
problem/request, who do you address to? 
 Chief / Headmen 
 Area/Ward committee member 
 Health/Education committee 
 Religious leader 
 Local district councillor 
 District commissioner 
 MP 
 Other, please specify________ 
 Health  
 Education  
 Water & 
Sanitation 
 
 Waste collection  
 Infrastructure  
 Environment  
 Agriculture 
extension 
services  
 
 Land  
 Security / 
policing 
 
73. Can you list the main infrastructures / services built/provided in your ward in the last 
year? 
Infrastructu
re / service 
When 
How 
many 
Who did it? 
 
(D) District 
(G) Government 
(N) NGO 
 
Are you 
or 
members 
of your 
family 
using it? 
YES | NO 
If not, Why? 
(1) Too expensive 
(2) We don’t need it 
(3) Too far 
(4) It’s broken / not working 
(5) Other 
 
School   D | G | N Y | N  
Health post   D | G | N Y | N  
Feeder Road   D | G | N Y | N  
Bridge   D | G | N Y | N  
Borehole - 
pumps 
  D | G | N Y | N  
Community 
hall 
  D | G | N Y | N  
Fertilizer   D | G | N Y | N  
Hammer 
mill 
  D | G | N Y | N  
Certified 
seeds 
  D | G | N Y | N  
Loans   D | G | N Y | N  
Skill 
training 
  D | G | N Y | N  
 
74. Who has benefitted most from this 
infrastructure/services? (2 options 
possible) 
a. Poor people b. Rich people 
a. Men b. Women 
a. Farmers 
b. Businessmen/w
omen 
c. Fishermen 
d. Traditional 
leaders 
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75. Which is the biggest problem in your 
community? Lack of…  
a. School/te
acher 
b. Lack of health post 
c. Road d. Borehole/pump 
e. Communit
y hall 
f. Fertilizer/Seeds/Mill 
g. Loans 
h. Other_____
__ 
i. Skill training 
j. Waste collection 
76. In the past year, have people in your village 
met a councillor or other public official to 
request that the district council address this 
problem?  
A. Yes, where these actions successful? 
_____________________________________________
_______________________ 
B. No, why not _________________________ 
__________________________________ 
77. If the district made available this service, 
would you be willing to pay a fee to support 
its cost? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
78. If the District Council received 100 million 
kwacha, on which activity would you want 
most of the money spent? 
__________________________________________________
__________________________________________________
__________ 
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3 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED IN SAMFYA DISTRICT COUNCIL  
3.1 Sample List of Participants to DDCC265 
 
  
                                                             
 
265 Samfya District Administration (2011). Minutes of the DDCC meeting (22 September 2011). Copy 
available at the Samfya District Planning Office, which works as secretariat for the DDCC. 
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4 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED AT THE CHIPATA MUNICIPAL 
COUNCIL 
4.1 CDF Revised Guidelines (Excerpts) 266 
  
                                                             
 
266 Source: Chipata Municipal Council – Copy available at the Planning Unit (Nov. 2012) 
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5 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED AT LGAZ LIBRARY - LUSAKA 
5.1 Legal Framework 
5.1.1 REGISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF VILLAGES ACT (1971  AND 
1994)267 
 
FIRST SCHEDULE 
(Section 8) 
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A PRODUCTIVITY 
COMMITTEE 
1. To elect one of its members other than the Chairman to represent the Productivity 
Committee on the Ward Council. 
2. To plan the growth and development of a village and to promote the well-being 
of the villagers, and in particular- 
(a) to build, improve and maintain school buildings or buildings of other 
educational establishments, and to participate in all educational programmes; 
(b) to provide and improve water supplies in the village; 
(c) to build and improve village health centres and other like institutions with a 
view to ensuring the highest standard of sanitary conditions for the villagers; 
(d) to build roads to service the village and neighbouring villages; 
(e) to establish depots for serving the village; 
(f) to build an administrative centre in the village; 
(g) to provide facilities for the welfare, recreation and social enjoyment of the 
villagers; 
(h) to plan and to effectuate the establishment and growth of new villages. 
3. To make decisions on such matters as are referred to it by the villagers. 
4. To promote the spirit of unity among the villagers. 
5. To encourage greater production in agriculture. 
6. To organise the marketing of village produce and animal products. 
7. To establish co-operatives for the purposes of marketing village produce and 
animal products. 
8. To promote and encourage family savings and investment. 
9. To promote the establishment of small-scale village industries and encourage 
inter-village commerce. 
10. To encourage advancement of education in a village. 
11. Generally, to do all such things as may be necessary or desirable for the 
establishment, promotion and development of facilities for the betterment and 
happiness of the villagers socially, culturally, economically and politically and to 
create awareness among the villagers towards those ends. 
                                                             
 
267 Source: Archive of the Local Government Association of Zambia – Volume 16 of the Laws of Zambia, 
Chapter 289) - (Nov. 2012) 
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SECOND SCHEDULE 
(Section 12) 
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A WARD COUNCIL 
1. To elect the members of the Ward Development Committee. 
2. To discuss in general problems of the ward and make decisions to guide the 
Ward Development Committee in the administration of the ward. 
3. To review plans for the development of the ward and to approve programmes for 
its development. 
4. To assist the Ward Development Committee in assessing the requirements of the 
villagers in the ward and in organising ways and means whereby the Ward 
Development Committee can assist in improving the economic and social 
conditions of the villagers. 
5. Generally to help facilitate in every possible way the work of the Ward 
Development Committee. 
 
 
THIRD SCHEDULE 
(Section 15) 
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF A WARD DEVELOPMENT 
COMMITTEE 
1. To provide an efficient and effective administrative machinery for the villagers in 
a ward. 
2. To supervise the work of Productivity Committees. 
3. To organise an efficient and effective utilisation of the ward's natural and human 
resources in order to increase the capacity of the villagers in the ward to raise their 
standards of living. The Ward Development Committee shall assess the total needs 
of the ward, working out priorities and harmonising them with overall Government 
priorities in order to achieve for the ward maximum advantage from the 
implementation of the projects under the management of the ward and those under 
Government control. 
4. To create machinery through which the villagers can undertake increasing 
responsibilities to solve their individual, family, village and ward problems. 
5. To assist the villagers in a ward to understand the role of individuals, families 
and villages in the Republic. 
6. To support and facilitate regional planning through the rural council responsible 
for the area of a ward. 
7. To provide efficient and modern techniques for raising productivity in the area of 
a ward and, in particular, the Ward Development Committee shall- 
(a) determine the best crop for the area and ensure the highest level of productivity 
of that crop; 
(b) give maximum attention to the rearing of animals best suited to the area to 
ensure maximum financial return; 
(c) discourage the villagers from growing unproductive crops and from keeping 
animals purely for traditional prestige; 
(d) ensure the highest standards of maintenance of paddocks and improvement in 
grazing; 
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(e) encourage the villagers to move from unproductive areas to areas with greater 
prospects for economic advancement and prosperity; 
(f) make use of water where it is available for irrigation purposes so that the ward 
can grow more than one crop annually; 
(g) participate in the construction and maintenance of water drainage systems. 
8. To assist in the construction of road networks within the area of a ward. 
9. To encourage the establishment of co-operative societies to engage in agricultural 
production, marketing, transportation and construction and also to establish 
consumer co-operatives. 
10. To encourage individual and family savings and investment. 
11. To encourage the growth of small-scale industries in the area of a ward. 
12. To encourage inter-ward co-operation in schemes of communal interest. 
13. To assist in the organisation and co-ordination of inter-village schemes for the 
construction and maintenance of school buildings in the area of a ward. 
14. To ensure that there is proper cleanliness and sanitation in each village in the 
area of a ward. 
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6 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED AT NIPA LIBRARY - LUSAKA 
6.1 Evolution of The Local Government Structure  
6.1.1 CHIPATA RURAL COUNCIL IN 1972268 
 
  
                                                             
 
268 Source: s.n. (1972). The organization of the Chipata Rural Council. Administrative Studies in 
Development, n° 6. Lusaka. NAPA 
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6.1.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN 1978  AND 1981269 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN 1981 
 
                                                             
 
269 Source: National Institute of Public Administration (1981). Decentralisation in Zambia. Readings in the 
New Local Administration System. Lusaka. NIPA. Document offered to the author by the library’s chief 
officer. Multiple copies are available in the NIPA Library. 
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6.2 “Humanism” by K. Kaunda (Excepts) 270 
 
  
                                                             
 
270 Source: Kaunda, K. (1968). Humanism and a guide to its implementation. Lusaka, Zambia Information 
Services. Multiple copies are available at the NIPA Library. 
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